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ABSTRACT

THE EVIDENTIAL WEIGHT OF CONSIDERED MORAL JUDGMENTS
by Christopher Michael Cloos

The input objection to reflective equilibrium (RE) claims that the method fails as a
method of moral justification. According to the objection, considered moral judgments
(CMJs) are not truth-conducive. Because the method uses inputs that are not credible, the
method does not generate justified moral beliefs. The objection is solved by
reinterpreting RE using contemporary developments in ethical intuitionism. The first half
of the thesis sets up the input objection, explores potential responses to the objection, and
uncovers the best way to solve the objection. The second half of the thesis solves the
input objection by defining key terms, detailing the revised RE procedure, reinserting the
notion of a competent moral judge into the method, using intuitionist criteria for
identifying genuine moral intuitions, creating three filters capable of sorting good from
bad CMJs, and showing how it is possible to assign evidential weight to CMJs so that
they can be used as standards against which moral principles can be measured and a
justified moral theory realized.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND AND BIG PICTURE
Reflective equilibrium (RE) remains a prominent way of thinking about moral
justification. However, many moral theorists mention RE in their work without actually
analyzing the method itself. Many theorists are not aware of the current state of the
literature. RE has been shown to be defective. To cite one example, Daniel Bonevac
(2004) has shown that as a decision procedure RE fails to reach a final equilibrium state
where beliefs are fully justified. As a consequence of Bonevac’s paper RE must be
revised if it is to remain viable. Bonevac somewhat develops a pragmatic/intuitionist
version of RE, yet he never fully develops such a version of the method.1
Historically, RE has been tweaked in response to a fundamental objection to the
method known as the no credibility objection or the input objection.2 According to this
objection the inputs of the process must be initially credible if the outputs of the process
are to consist of justified beliefs. Norman Daniels extended RE from its pure-Rawlsian
interpretation in order to answer Richard Brandt’s formulation of the input objection.
Brandt (1979) became an RE-eliminativist by opting for a rational, desire-based moral
epistemology. Brandt did this in response to his own criticism of the Rawlsian version of
RE. Brandt’s accusation amounted to pointing out that Rawls’ method had intuitionism
1

Cf. Brink 1989: 103. In fairness, it could be argued against Bonevac that he has misunderstood the
notion of coherence and justification in RE. That RE fails as a decision procedure comes as no surprise
because there is no decision procedure for determining the explanatory power of beliefs. Such a move,
however, makes RE succeed or fail in relation to the notion of coherence. There is reason to move away
from a pure coherentist interpretation of RE, as I will shown later.
2
I cast the input objection in terms of the search for credible inputs. Though there are many input
problems one could raise against RE I take the search for credibility to be the preeminent input problem.
As a result, I use the input objection and the no-credibility objection interchangeably.

1

in its starting points. Daniels addressed this concern by elaborating the notion of wideRE, which posited foundations without foundationalism. Daniels’ wide-RE reinforced
the traditional interpretation of RE as a method consisting of coherentism,
constructivism, and conservatism (CCC). Another theorist who provided a welldeveloped interpretation of RE was Michael DePaul (1993). He created radical-RE in
response to problems he perceived with Daniels’ embrace of conservatism. It is
interesting to note that none of these responses to the input objection met the objection
head-on. These responses side-stepped the problem and introduced a host of new
problems into the method. The important point is this: how one responds to the input
objection determines the type of interpretation of RE one formulates and advocates.
In this thesis, I will formulate a post-Rawlsian version of RE that embraces the input
objection and answers it head-on. Instead of clinging to a (CCC) interpretation of RE I
will revise RE in the direction of foundationalism and moral realism by using moderate
ethical intuitionism to establish the credibility of the inputs.3 Recent developments in the
literature on intuitionism make this a viable move. Many RE-proponents have rejected
positing special foundations. This is because such foundations were equated with strong
foundations. In contrast, moderate intuitionism employs fallible foundations. Rawls
himself was not against positing special foundations. In certain places in A Theory of
Justice he refers to the starting points of RE as epistemically privileged. There are
further motivations for moving away from a coherentist interpretation of RE.
3

Minimally, ethical intuitionism holds that some moral truths can be known without inference. According
to this view there are basic (non-inferential) moral beliefs. Such a view is committed to cognitivism (i.e.,
that there are moral propositions), and typically, though not exclusively, the view is combined with moral
realism and ethical non-naturalism.

2

Two reasons to move away from coherentism are that it is no longer the dominant
theory of justification and truth in epistemology, and technical results in formal
epistemology have shown that pure coherentism is not truth-conducive. Regarding the
former, Rawls was writing at a time when Goodman and Quine made holistic
epistemology fashionable. Rawls himself seemed under the sway of holistic
methodology as he moved from a more foundationalist approach to moral epistemology
(in 1951) to a more coherentist approach (in 1971).4 Even Laurence BonJour who was
once a leading proponent of coherentism has now embraced foundationalism.5 Yet, a
shifting of the proverbial winds is not a sufficient reason for moving away from a
coherentist picture. There are also technical results that show that coherentism is not
truth-conducive. Most of my discussion of RE will not focus on the structural aspects of
the method (e.g., the basing relation), though architectural questions will surface
throughout the thesis. I will largely embrace foundationalism without providing a
detailed defense of foundationalism per se.6 That being said, I recognize that there is
more work to be done after this project in defending RE from common objections to
moderate foundationalism. There is, however, an immediate objection to my approach
that arises.

4

See Pust 2000: 14-22.
For evidence of this shift compare BonJour 1976 with BonJour 1999.
6
I will also largely assume that foundationalism is committed to some form of moral realism and
coherentism is committed to some form of constructivism. Though this may be the standard case, it is not
without exception (e.g., see Brink 1989 for a defense of coherentism and moral realism). The version of
intuitionism I endorse escapes many of Brink’s objections because Brink construes intuitionism as a
traditional foundationalist version of moral realism. I, however, adopt a contemporary version of
foundationalism that is modest about the strength of the foundations.
5

3

One might wonder whether my solution to the input objection is too obvious. If the
input objection to RE questions the initial credibility of the inputs, and I simply posit
special foundations, which are by definition initially credible, then it seems my solution
to the input objection is not a substantive solution. Surely not all theorists before me
could have missed such an obvious solution. More specifically, Brandt’s objection
accused coherentism of intuitionism. An objector might balk: all you are claiming is that
intuitionism rather than coherentism is true, so saying that intuitionism is true does not
establish why coherentism cannot be accused of intuitionism. It appears that I am
positing too easy of a solution and missing answering Brandt’s objection directly.
Looking closer at Brandt’s objection, it is not an argument against Rawls’
coherentism that accuses Rawls of adopting intuitionist-style foundations. If this were
the case, this objection would be problematic because RE’s input data (i.e., considered
judgments), as understood by Rawls, are not compatible with intuitionism’s starting
points, which according to Brandt requires indefeasible foundations. The input data on
any viable interpretation of RE is revisable and not strongly foundational. Instead,
Brandt was requesting that the input data, however that data is conceived, be of the sort
that could support the weight of justification. Brandt was requesting better epistemic
foundations for an ethical theory than the kind Rawls had posited. Brandt’s objection
could be seen either as requesting something more foundational, though not indefeasible,
or requesting a refinement of the coherentist picture; otherwise, the output of the process
would not achieve the objective of the method—justifying a moral theory.

4

Most theorists have either misinterpreted the input objection and simply reinforced
the point that considered judgments are not strongly foundational (i.e., fixed data points),
or they have sought to bolster the starting points under a coherentist scheme by reinterpreting RE so that considered judgments have some prima facie (i.e., initial)
credibility and further worries about the judgments’ credibility vanish due to the vast
revision pressure brought to bear against them. It is telling that no one has opted to
directly answer the objection by establishing considered judgments as proper foundations
for justifying a moral theory. This move has not been attempted because it is only within
the last decade that the theoretical apparatus needed for such a move has been credibly
established.
My solution to the input objection may seem obvious, but it is far from easy. It may
seem obvious that if considered moral judgments (CMJs) are special foundations then
they are credible and the input objection does not hold water. The difficulty, then, is
formulating the story of their reliability. Even Daniels recognized the need for such a
project, “To be sure, it would be good if we could supply a philosophically satisfactory
set of credentials for the reliability of considered judgments.”7 Instead of directly
addressing why CMJs can be assigned justificatory weight (i.e., granted epistemic status)
Daniels opted to use the judgments in a beneficial way. His solution to the objection is
methodological. It does not establish the credibility of the CMJs themselves. It is my
contention that assuming that appeal to CMJs is unavoidable and that they can be used
constructively does not go far enough to explain why they are best suited to be starting

7

Daniels 1996: 6.

5

points and something against which we should test other aspects of our belief system.
Given this consideration, solving the input objection involves formulating an analysis of
the reliability of CMJs. What is the story we can tell about why these judgments are
reliable or worthy elements in a theory of moral justification? One has to tell how these
foundations get their unique epistemic value and how they avoid common traps to good
reasoning, such as social bias, personal prejudice and wishful thinking.
1.2 OVERVIEW OF THE METHOD
In this section, I will situate RE within theoretical rationality, outline the typical
formulation of RE, and highlight how the method gives rise to the input objection.
Reflective equilibrium is a method of moral justification. The focus of RE is
theoretical rationality. That is, RE seeks to justify moral theories—comprised of moral
beliefs and principles—to gain a more accurate picture of right and wrong. This
endeavor can be contrasted with practical rationality, whereby the focus is on actions that
one might undertake to satisfy desires. Though RE might be concerned with moral
actions it is not used to determine what it is right to do in a given case. It need not be the
case that one actually does RE. What matters is that RE can be done throughout deep
historical time, not that it can be done in a particular case. One might wonder, “Why
attempt to justify a moral theory thorough a process that no one actually does?”8 The
importance of studying RE is that it is a theory that has been used to justify certain moves
in moral and political philosophy. Whether RE is in principle possible (or theoretically
viable) sheds light on the use of the method to justify conceptions of justice and moral
8

I thank Anand Vaidya for pressing me on this point.

6

issues (e.g., perspectives on euthanasia and biotechnology).9 RE is also important
because it involves an attempt to manage and discover new moral principles. Though
one might not be able to carry out RE pragmatically, something like the RE process does
describe a great deal of moral theorizing. Gilbert Harman has regarded RE as one of the
top three trends in moral and political philosophy because trying to find moral principles
to account for moral intuitions can lead to new discoveries.10 Analyzing whether RE is a
theoretically rational method for justifying moral theories calls into question a great deal
of philosophical practice. Now I will explain the method.
The RE process begins with a set of initial judgments. These judgments seem
correct upon reflection. They include judgments made at all levels of generality—from
judgments about particular cases to judgments about abstract general principles. These
judgments are filtered to eliminate judgments made under conditions unfavorable to the
exercise of undistorted cognitive functioning. This eliminates judgments made in a state
of emotional duress, incomplete knowledge of relevant facts, or excessive concern with
one’s own self-interest. Judgments that survive this filtering process are termed
considered moral judgments (CMJs). In the next stage, moral principles are formulated
that systematize (i.e., account for) the CMJs. The goal is to achieve a coherent package
of beliefs.11 Where there is inconsistency between principles and CMJs one works from
both ends, as needed, revising judgments and principles until one achieves a state of
narrow-RE whereby judgments and principles are consistent. Progressing from narrow to
9

Rawls 1971, Daniels 1996, St. John 2007.
Harman 2003.
11
I often use the term ‘belief’ as a general term that covers the three types of beliefs in one’s belief-set
(i.e., CMJs, principles, and background theories). Nothing important hinges on this convention. When I
use ‘belief’ as technical term I will notify the reader of this more precise locution.
10

7

wide-RE one considers background theories. Background theories are comprised of
moral and nonmoral judgments about the nature of persons, the role of morality in
society, and so on. Background theories place the judgments and principles in one’s
belief-set under different moral conceptions, which serve as arguments for or against
one’s working moral theory. One continues ironing out inconsistencies and revising the
CMJs, principles and background theories until a maximally coherent belief-set is
achieved. This set consists of an ordered triple of CMJs, moral principles, and
background theories. When one arrives at this state one has reached wide-RE. Beliefs
that reach wide-RE are fully justified in light of being members of the maximally
coherent belief-set.
RE gives rise to the input objection because CMJs are used as data points against
which other beliefs are tested and revised throughout the procedure. Fit with CMJs is
considered a good thing. It seems reasonable to think that moral theories are better when
they accord with credible moral judgments.12 RE is a method of moral epistemology that
exploits this intuition. Moral theories, which are comprised of moral principles, are
brought into a state of mutual support with CMJs (or moral intuitions).13 However, many
critics of RE have argued that moral intuitions are not fit to serve as evidence for or

12

This point is made by Hooker 2002. There are a couple of ways to understand why the fittingness
relation between theories and credible judgments benefits theories. If the judgments are credible, then fit
with those judgments corroborates or confirms the theories to a certain degree. Fit with credible data points
increases the justification (i.e., grounds or support) for the theories. Another way to understand this point is
in terms of data coverage. In general, if theory A better accounts for the data when compared to theory B,
then A is to be preferred over B. Fittingness delivers justificatory goodness because fit with credible data
increases the likelihood of the correctness of the theory.
13
I will follow precedence set within the literature and use ‘considered moral judgments’ and ‘moral
intuitions’ interchangeably (Lemos 1986: 504; Lenman 2007: 63-64). However, CMJs are rightly
understood to be a species of moral intuitions, as considered judgments are intuitions that have survived a
filtering process.

8

against moral principles.14 It is argued that testing moral principles against CMJs will
never lead to justification because CMJs possess no evidential weight.15 This is a
problem for normative ethics because, “Reflective equilibrium remains the usual way that
philosophers think about the vexed status of intuition in normative ethics.”16 A potential
response to this problem is to be an eliminativist and exclude from RE any special class
of CMJs. However, RE is incompatible with this move.17 Instead, I will argue that moral
intuitions derived from certain ideal conditions and cognitive competences can justify
moral principles. In arguing for this conclusion I will consider objections against CMJs
and refine and develop the requisite conditions and competences.
1.3 WHY BOTHER WITH REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM?
Reflective equilibrium is often regarded as a natural way to think about justification
in moral theorizing.18 Despite the initial attractiveness of RE the method is riddled with
problems. These issues include, but are not limited to, those identified in the table on the
next page.

14

See, e.g., Hare 1973; Singer 1974: 494, 516; 2005: 344-346; Lyons 1989: 146-147; Brandt 1979: 16-23;
Brandt 1990; Copp 1984: 160-161; Little 1984: 384-385; Sencerz 1986; Timmons 1990: 107.
15
Commonly called the no credibility objection (see Daniels 2003) various critics have used a variety of
terms for what considered judgments lack: probative force, evidential value, and evidential force. I adopt
‘evidential weight’ to cover all such references out of conceptual simplicity and technical feasibility. That
is, ‘weight’ readily lends itself to technical (i.e., probabilistic) conceptualization.
16
Appiah 2008: 78. This topic is also of relevance to epistemology, as experimental philosophers claim it
is illegitimate to appeal to intuitions as evidence (e.g., Swain, et al. 2008).
17
Scanlon 2003: 151. Scanlon’s example is that RE is incompatible with the idea, “that ‘intuitions’ about
what is just or unjust in particular cases should not be given any weight in justifying general principles but
must be derived from them.”
18
RE is “natural” because it formalizes the common sense notion that one’s belief system is in flux,
consistency between beliefs is a good thing, and that beliefs must be revised in light of new beliefs.

9

Table 1: Problematic Components of Reflective Equilibrium

Problematic Component

Problematic Domain

Considered Moral Judgments

No Credibility (evidential value), Justificatory Role
(pragmatic vs. epistemic), Underdetermination of
Principles and Theory, Indexing Confidence, Specification
of Filtering Conditions, Calibration.

Revision Procedure

Path Dependence (order of addressing discrepancies),
Intuitive Judgment, Open Problems in Belief Revision,
Degrees of Justification (vulnerability to revision),
Nonmonotonicity.

Final (Resultant) Equilibrium

Inexhaustibility (beliefs outstrip representation in final form

State

or theory), Indeterminacy, Undecidability (halting
problem).

Versions of the Method

Narrow vs. Wide, Conservative vs. Radical, Domaindependent Appropriations (bioethics, epistemology,
morality, mathematics, etc.).

Method in General

Disagreement, Conservatism, Emptiness, Architecture
(coherentism), Classification of Elements (judgments,
principles, background theories, and constraints),
Competent Judge (characteristics required for a viable
inquirer), Begging the Question Against the Moral Skeptic.

Given the problems associated with reflective equilibrium the question becomes, as
Michael DePaul tersely wonders, “Why bother with reflective equilibrium?”19 DePaul’s
answer to this question is that other methods of philosophical inquiry are irrational

19

DePaul 1998.

10

because they involve either abandoning reflection, leaving out of reflection certain beliefs
or not allowing the results of inquiry to inform what one believes. DePaul provides a
negative argument in support of RE because he does not think RE can be positively
defended as a method that will act as a reliable guide to truth or produce justified beliefs.
Instead, he imposes a rationality criterion and holds that all other approaches are
irrational. This move requires DePaul to defend RE by arguing that rationality is the
primary value that ought to guide moral inquiry and that all other approaches to moral
epistemology are irrational.20 Until DePaul defends rationality as the primary value of
inquiry, which is a huge undertaking, it is reasonable to assume that inquiry should be
structured around the traditional goals of aiming at truth and achieving justification.21
For now I will set aside the question of truth and focus on justification. What is
justification?
In its epistemic form justification seeks to answer the question, “Under what
conditions is a subject S epistemically justified in believing a proposition that p?”
Generally speaking, epistemologists answer this question in one of two ways: the
conditions are internal or external to the subject. As an example of internalism, Earl
Conee and Richard Feldman argue that one is justified only if one’s doxastic attitude (i.e.,

20

Ibid: 307. About the primacy of rationality to inquiry DePaul confesses, “the truth is that I am not at all
sure what to say.”
21
To be sure, the rationality of RE and irrationality of alternatives is an attractive feature of RE, but it is
not likely to convince an RE-skeptic who wants to know whether a positive account of RE can be
formulated to defend its use in pursuing the epistemic goals of forming beliefs that are true and justified.
Granted, the epistemic value of truth and justification are contested. However, if moral inquiry does not in
some minimal sense involve truth and justification, then one has already assumed a particular version of
inquiry (e.g., moral skepticism) which is incompatible with RE. Thus, one has begged the question against
RE as a valid method of inquiry.

11

attitude of belief), which meets certain conditions, fits a body of evidence.22 As an
example of externalism, Alvin Goldman holds a belief is justified if and only if it is the
product of a reliable belief forming mechanism.23 What unites these epistemologists is
that they are seeking to explain justification in relation to knowledge. Traditionally,
justification is what gets added to true belief to yield knowledge.24 Epistemic
justification is connected with the goal of truth. Believing true beliefs and not believing
false beliefs can be viewed as the primary epistemic goal in the pursuit of knowledge.25
Epistemic justification is crucial to achieving this goal because it involves providing
reasons for our beliefs in relation to what is true.
Moral justification can also be understood in relation to truth.26 In fact, the input
objection is centered around a truth claim: without CMJs being credible (i.e., true to some
degree) one may only end up with a coherent package of false beliefs. A belief is reliable
if it is truth-conducive or able to evidence truth. Solving the input objection involves
showing that CMJs are reliable. If CMJs are reliable indicators of the truth of their
contents, then they will be good inputs and tend to generate justified outputs. The
difference between epistemic and moral justification is in the content of the beliefs.
Moral beliefs evidence truth in relation to moral factors (e.g., justice, care, moral
sentiments, promise keeping, and the good and the right). This makes moral justification
related to epistemic justification, but moral justification cannot be completely subsumed

22

Conee and Feldman 2004.
Goldman 2008.
24
Cf. Williamson 2000.
25
It is an open debate whether truth is the primary epistemic goal (e.g., Steup and Sosa 2005: Ch. 10). I
only claim that it is possible to view it as such.
26
Cf. Freeman 2007: 31.
23
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under epistemic justification because the propositions will evidence different content and
different truths. With these considerations in place it is natural to ask, “In what way is
RE a method of moral justification?”
T.M. Scanlon claims that justification can be understood with regard to beliefs or
with regard to persons. In the first sense, principles or judgments can be justified by
being supported by sufficient reasons. In the second sense, a person can be justified in
holding the beliefs within her belief system, but it may remain an open question whether
the beliefs within her system are justified. As Scanlon explains:
A person may be justified in accepting a principle if it accounts for his or her
considered judgments in reflective equilibrium and the person has no reason to
modify or abandon these judgments. But it does not follow that this principle is
justified. Whether it is or not will depend on the status of these considered
judgments.27
A person can be justified in accepting a principle into her belief-set without the
principle itself being justified. A principle’s justification stems from the status of the
CMJs it is connected to.28 This highlights the importance of the current project of
establishing the evidential weight of CMJs. If a principle is tested against a CMJ that
possess no prima facie credibility, then the principle is not necessarily justified even
though the person may be justified in holding the principle. To circumvent this problem
one must either (i) establish that the justification of beliefs and persons change in concert,
or (ii) establish the initial credibility of CMJs. The better option is (ii) because it is
27

Scanlon 2003: 140.
One may also wonder at what time a belief becomes justified. Are beliefs only justified once they are in
the final state of equilibrium? Or, does justification come in degrees? These are important questions but a
bit premature and would take us too far afield at this point. I will argue in a later section that my
reformulation of RE allows for degrees of justification, which circumvents criticisms that tie justification
to the achievement of a final equilibrium state (e.g., Bonevac 2004).
28
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possible for beliefs and persons to come apart when it comes to justification (e.g., a
person might be justified in holding her beliefs but her beliefs might not be justified).
Thus, without establishing (ii) RE is not a method capable of justifying moral beliefs.
A generous skeptic could grant that RE might be a method of moral justification, yet
she could rightly press, “What’s the upshot of this undertaking? Why bother finding a
method to justify moral beliefs?” To reply to such a skeptic I turn to Rawls.
There are three assumptions that underlie taking a broadly Rawlsian approach to the
justification of moral beliefs.29 The fallibility assumption holds that moral theories are
not perfect or infallible. There is no assurance that a presently accepted moral theory will
not, at some point, be supplanted by another theory that better explains the relevant data.
The best a moral theorist can do is to search for the theory that best explains the moral
data (i.e., the CMJs) at hand. In this way, moral theory is akin to science in terms of
theory change. The practicality assumption eschews any attempt to restrict moral
justification to the meta-domain. Moral theories are not solely accountable to higher
order meta-beliefs concerning the nature of justification but must also be made consistent
with first-order claims about justice, civil disobedience, discrimination, fairness, and so
on. Moral theory must deal with substantive moral issues and cannot retreat to the metadomain or ignore practical interests. The applicability assumption claims that despite the
reality that most people do not have a formal system of moral beliefs, but rather a group
of beliefs loosely held together with logical relationships, there is great value in
attempting to formalize moral beliefs. Making CMJs consistent with basic regulative

29

Harris 1974: 137-138.
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principles can lead to the solution of new moral dilemmas. As one tries to formulate
principles, the application of which would lead to the considered judgments at hand, one
is equipped with regulative principles that can be applied to further moral problems. I
endorse all three assumptions as reasons to “bother” with RE, although I do not defend
the assumptions here.30
1.4 WHAT TYPE OF JUSTIFICATION DOES RE OFFER?
As previously mentioned, option (i) for establishing the evidential weight of CMJs
holds that the justification of beliefs and persons changes in concert (i.e., when a belief is
justified a person is justified in holding the belief, and vice versa). By contrast, the input
objection is an example of how beliefs and persons can come apart in justification. The
input objection plays on the difference between a person being justified in holding a
belief and a belief being justified. This can be illustrated by way of an argument:
1. Subject S can be justified in accepting principle q as long as q accords with S’s
CMJs in reflective equilibrium. (premise)
2. The justification of q depends on the prima facie credibility (not the mere
believability) of the CMJs that support q. (premise)
3. When S is justified in accepting q it does not necessarily follow that q is
justified.31 (1, 2 Conj)
4. CMJs cannot be established to be prima facie credible. (input objection)
5. Thus, q cannot be justified. (2, 4 MT)
The outcome of the argument above is that RE cannot justify principles and theories.
My thesis can be viewed as a denial of premise 4 so that RE can justify beliefs. The
argument above claims RE cannot justify beliefs when beliefs and persons come apart in
30

I do not, however, endorse the specifics of the moral commitments that Rawls thinks we have. For
example, Rawls’ commitment to the substantive principle that, “it is fair to submit people to principles they
themselves would have chosen” (Little 1984: 374).
31
The justification of principles is something extra that must be established in relation to CMJs.
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justification. When proponents of RE respond to the input objection by focusing on how
people can justify CMJs—without the proponents establishing the prima facie credibility
of CMJs—they fail to directly respond to the input objection. This position is commonly
put forward as person-centered credibility (PCC):
(PCC) Considered judgments are initially credible because they are the judgments
that persons affirm upon reflection under ideal conditions.32
PCC implies that we establish the initial credibility of CMJs by making the
judgments under ideal conditions (i.e., that we hold the beliefs with confidence gives
them credibility). Such a move is often made to resist CMJs being foundations of some
stripe yet to affirm CMJs being initially credible. An assumption underlying (PCC) is
that credible persons will tend to select credible beliefs. However, the process through
which credibility is passed from persons to beliefs must be explained and defended. In
defending this claim one will need to argue that persons and beliefs do not come apart in
justification. This requires arguing against premise 3 by negating either premise 1 or
premise 2. Negating premise 1 requires claiming a belief can be accepted for some
reason other than whether it fits with other beliefs (i.e., CMJs). Taking this approach
moves the theorist in a foundationalist direction, which moves the theorist away from RE
as traditionally formulated. Negating premise 2 requires claiming that the justification of
beliefs does not depend on credibility being injected into the process from the start. I will
argue against this “wait and see” approach to justification later. For now I will mention
32

As typically understood on an RE model, these conditions could be physically instantiated by one being
in a situation of emotional equanimity, sobriety, full knowledge of relevant facts, and possessing sufficient
intelligence to be able to understand the concepts and issues about which one is making a judgment. The
upshot of ideal conditions is that they are conditions conducive to good judgment making and by inference
conditions conducive to capturing the moral facts.
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that the justification of a principle does depend on whether or not the standard against
which it is assessed is to some degree credible. Claiming that a CMJ is prima facie
credible is claiming that it is credible to some degree and that the CMJ is capable of
serving as a standard against which principles can be justified. In the end, negating
premise 2 is merely affirming premise 4—claiming that CMJs are not prima facie
credible. So, this response is not a response to the input objection but an affirmation of it.
Finally, directly negating premise 3 begs the question against the argument by holding
that beliefs and persons cannot come apart during justification when it is often the case
that they do come apart and the argument is merely playing on this fact. It is possible
that we can be justified in accepting a principle even though the principle is not
justified.33 Similarly, we can be justified in accepting a CMJ even though the CMJ is not
credible because, for instance, other factors undercut the justificatory force of the
judgment. Such factors we might not be, nor could we be expected to be, aware of no
matter how reasonable and impartial we are.34
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This distinction could be upheld by borrowing a distinction from epistemic justification: deontological
justification versus perspectival internalism (Pappas 2005). If justification is a deontological concept, then
it is a matter of fulfilling one’s intellectual duties. A scientist, for example, has a duty to follow the
evidence where it leads and not cling to propositions incompatible with a hypothesis due to emotional,
political or religious attachments. The scientist would be justified in holding the belief if she lived up to
her intellectual duties. However, whether or not the belief in question is a justifier or is itself justified is a
separate, though perhaps interrelated, issue. One could fulfill one’s intellectual duties but fail to possess a
justified belief as a result. The deontological concept of justification is a thesis about the term “justified”
and this may not have an impact on what the justifiers turn out to be. In contrast, perspectival internalism
is a thesis about what type of beliefs count as justifiers for other beliefs; namely, only justified beliefs can
justify beliefs. This is a thesis concerning beliefs, not a thesis concerning whether the person has
conducted herself in such a way that she is “justified” in the beliefs she possesses. Similarly, a person
could be justified in accepting a principle without the principle thereby being justified.
34
One could stipulate omniscience or perfect impartiality to the notion of ideal inquirers, but it is not clear
these provisions would apply to persons as such.
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Two considerations emerge from this discussion: (1) if one wants to rest the
credibility of CMJs on persons one must argue that persons and beliefs do not come apart
during justification (i.e., where you have a person justified in holding a belief you also
have a justified belief), or (2) one must argue directly for the credibility of beliefs (i.e.,
even if persons and beliefs come apart during justification you can still have justified
principles because the judgments on which they are ground are credible). Consideration
(2) is the only viable way to directly respond to the input objection. It can be
accomplished by negating premise 4 by showing that CMJs can be established as prima
facie credible.35 An upshot of arguing for consideration (2) is that I will be able to make
sense of RE being a deliberative method of moral justification.
There is a difference between a descriptive versus a deliberative interpretation of
RE.36 This distinction concerns what the method is aimed at regarding justification. On
a descriptive interpretation RE aims at capturing the moral beliefs of a person or group of
people. On a deliberative interpretation RE aims at deciding what is correct to believe
about moral matters. The former interpretation is descriptive and the latter interpretation
is prescriptive or normative.
Each interpretation lends itself to a different interpretation of how ideal conditions
are functioning during the filtration of initial judgments to make up the set of CMJs. For
the descriptive interpretation judgments one is confident in under ideal conditions best
35

Though the history of the debate over the credibility of CMJs has centered around prima facie credibility
(i.e., credibility on a first pass), my solution to the input objection will be stronger—something in the
neighborhood of secunda facie credibility (i.e., credibility after a thoroughgoing process of reflection and
filtration). As an upshot, establishing secunda facie credibility allows me to capture prima facie credibility
as a consequence. For most of this thesis, however, I will keep with standard convention and only discuss
prima facie credibility.
36
Scanlon 2003: 142-148.
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express one’s ability to make moral judgments. The conditions accept judgments that
represent this capacity well and reject judgments that tend not to represent this faculty
well. For the deliberative interpretation the ideal conditions function to get at what is
correct and avoid what is unreliable. Judgments made while ill-informed of the facts or
under emotional duress will tend not to correctly reflect moral matters because they will
tend to reflect performance errors, personal biases and cultural conditioning; whereas,
judgments made under ideal conditions will tend to, “state those things that seem to us
most clearly to be true about moral matters if anything is, and that unless there is some
ground for doubting them it is reasonable to grant them initial credibility (leaving open
the possibility that they may be revised or rejected later in the process).”37 I agree with
Scanlon that the deliberative interpretation of RE is the primary interpretation of the
method. Under the deliberative interpretation CMJs evidence what seems true about
moral matters and because of this they are initially credible. In seeking to establish CMJs
as prima facie credible one is seeking to establish the primary goal of RE as a method of
justification. Seeking the truth and evidential weight of CMJs allows one to answer the
input objection, which requires that the CMJs are, “initially credible—and not merely
initially believed—for some reason other than their coherence, say, because they state
facts of observation.”38 Thus, answering the input objection directly aligns with the
correct interpretation of RE’s ability to produce justified beliefs.

37
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2. THE INPUT OBJECTION
2.1 CMJS POSSESS NO EVIDENTIAL WEIGHT
In this section I will briefly explain the input objection, present different ways of
responding to the objection, and showcase some of the dialectic on the objection in an
attempt to gain clarity about what is at stake in the debate.
Broadly speaking, the input objection can be captured by the following claim: CMJs
possess no evidential weight because of reason R. The main placeholder for R is the
charge that CMJs are purely subjective. That is, CMJs do not possess sufficient distance
from an inquirer’s other beliefs or the beliefs of the inquirer’s culture. This subjectivity
charge is a request for greater objectivity, and it can be understood in terms of theoryladenness. CMJs are subjective because they are determined by one’s educational
training, childhood development and cultural norms. Instead of being responsive to the
moral facts in a given case, it is alleged that CMJs are inappropriately responsive to
contingent factors. Because CMJs do not possess sufficient objectivity they are not fit to
serve as evidence for or against moral principles or theories. Now I will make sense of
the claim that CMJs possess no evidential weight.
Evidence is a standard against which claims can be measured or justified. Evidence
that supports a theory confirms that theory, and evidence that tells against a theory
disconfirms that theory. Any piece of evidence can confirm or disconfirm a theory to a
greater or lesser degree. Weight, roughly speaking, is the degree to which a piece of
evidence can confirm or disconfirm a theory. In RE, the evidence in question is a CMJ.
If, for example, CMJ x is weightier than CMJ y, then x has a greater ability than y to serve
20

as evidence for or against a moral principle, or a set of moral principles, comprising a
moral theory. When a claim is made against CMJs that they do not possess evidential
weight this means they are not suited to be a standards against which moral theories can
be assessed. This claim is typically taken to be totalizing in that CMJs possess no
evidential weight. Proponents of RE often respond to this claim by showing that CMJs
possess some evidential weight, even if the precise weight possessed cannot be
formulated.39 David Brink illustrates this tendency:
All I claim is that considered moral beliefs have initial credibility. I do not claim
they enjoy maximum initial credibility; such a claim is not necessary in order to
claim that coherence with considered moral beliefs is evidential. If we can show
that moral beliefs with some initial credibility cohere with other beliefs, including
beliefs of still greater initial credibility, we have reason to accept those moral
beliefs and others that they support.40
To adequately respond to the input objection it is important to show how CMJs
possess enough evidential weight to be used as justifiers in the RE process. Showing that
CMJs possess some evidential weight is not an adequate response to the subjectivity
charge because merely consistent CMJs could possess prima facie evidential value yet
fail to be objective or responsive to the moral facts. If the source of those CMJs is
distorted, then the CMJs will not possess enough evidential weight to produce adequate
justification.41 This means that answering the subjectivity charge must screen CMJs for
not only consistency but also for judgments that stem from corrupt sources. Such a move
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Because ‘weight’ is used metaphorically a further problem is determining how much weight a CMJ must
possess to serve as evidence for or against a theory. Is there a minimum threshold or are all RE-proponents
committed to an “anything above zero” understanding of weight? There is a further problem with ‘weight’
used as metaphor: does weight reside in the belief or in the inquirer? Does a belief possess weight or is
weight an attraction to a belief that resides in the propositional attitude of the inquirer?
40
Brink 1989: 139.
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I owe this point to feedback I received from Anand Vaidya.
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not only captures prima facie evidential weight but also moves CMJs into the arena of
secunda facie evidential weight (i.e., evidential value resulting from surviving a
thoroughgoing process of reflection and filtration).
2.2 WAYS TO ESTABLISH THE CREDIBILITY OF CMJS
There are three general ways one could try to establish the credibility of CMJs. The
first move is to show that CMJs are non-inferential foundations. The second move is to
establish an analogy with observation reports. The third move is to use CMJs in a useful
way without telling the story of the credibility of moral intuitions per se, instead just
showing how CMJs play a vital role in RE methodology. I will focus on the last move in
a forthcoming section entitled “the methodological response." In the rest of this section I
will look at the non-inferential foundation move and the observation report move.
Looking at the dialectic on these moves it becomes clearer what is at stake and what
option remains viable for establishing the evidential weight of CMJs.
Establishing CMJs as non-inferential foundations is one way to solve the input
objection. The requirement that CMJs be credible might be the requirement that at least
some CMJs be non-inferentially justified. This response to the input objection stems
from viewing the objection as positing that intuitionism, as a version of foundationalism,
is true rather than coherentism. Brink considers this response and claims that it makes
RE take-on all objections to foundationalism as a general theory of the structure of
justification.42 Brink argues foundationalism is untenable in all its versions, so
establishing CMJs as non-inferential foundations is not a viable option. Brink saddles
42

Brink 1989.
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intuitionism with strong foundationalism and concludes non-inferential foundations are
incompatible with RE, which is a method that allows for the revisability of beliefs in an
effort to generate coherence. In contrast, contemporary intuitionists need not be strong
foundationalists. Weak or modest foundations can be used within a framework that also
employs coherentism to increase the justification of the belief-set. Brink’s response to
the charge of intuitionism involves reinforcing RE’s coherentism. For Brink, if CMJs
were intuitionistic moral judgments they would be self-justifying, but CMJs are
ultimately justified through coherence with other beliefs, so they are not self-justifying or
a product of intuitionism. Brink’s move does not work because a contemporary
intuitionist like Robert Audi allows intuitionistic moral judgments to have evidential
grounds of justification. Audi clarifies this by saying:
I have already explained how intuitive moral judgments may have evidential
grounds and, even though non-inferential, may be defended by inferences in many
cases where a need for justification arises.43
So, it is not the case that intuitionism means moral judgments are purely selfjustifying. Although at some time non-inferential moral judgments must have been
justified without being inferred from premises, at a later time, and as part of a body of
beliefs, they can receive support from other propositions. Thus, establishing CMJs as
non-inferential foundations is still a viable move for solving the input objection because
such foundations can be incorporated into a belief system in a way that allows them to
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serve as foundational justifiers and receive support from inferential connections with
other beliefs.44
Another way to solve the input objection is to consider an analogy between moral
intuitions and observation reports. Daniels notices that Brandt’s version of the input
objection gains greatest plausibility when CMJs are compared with observation reports in
empirical science.45 This is because putting these entities side-by-side it becomes
apparent that there is a causal story to tell about the reliability of observations, but there
is not an analogous story to tell about the reliability of moral judgments. Due to this
contrast in reliability, initial credibility can be assigned to observation reports but not to
moral judgments. To combat this reading of the input objection Daniels claims that the
analogy between moral intuitions and observation reports generates only a pseudoobjection. Moral concepts, like rightness and wrongness, are not basic properties of
moral states of affairs, whereas observational properties are basic properties of causal
states of affairs. So, observation statements play a different role in the story we tell about
causal reliability than moral judgments do in the story we tell about moral reliability.
Daniels concludes that moral judgments do function differently than observation reports,
so an objection that points out that they do function differently is not a genuine objection
against moral judgments. In effect, Daniels explains away the input objection without
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I understand ‘non-inferential’ to mean judgments that are not ultimately justified by inference from other
beliefs. Though non-inferential judgments can be strengthened by receiving support from other beliefs
their justification is independent from the support they receive from other beliefs (Cf. Streumer 2007). If
non-inferential judgments are regarded as strongly foundational, then such judgments cannot have their
degree of justification increased by their connection with other beliefs. The justification of strongly
foundational judgments is solely determined by non-doxastic sources. Such beliefs would be incompatible
with RE because mutual support is a key feature of RE.
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directly arguing against the disanalogy between observation reports and moral intuitions.
Claiming that the analogy generates a pseudo-objection leaves open a move in the
dialectic whereby a theorist can argue directly for the disanalogy as a way to sustain the
input objection. Such an approach is taken by Daniel Little.
Little argues for the disanalogy between observation reports and CMJs, and he
concludes that this disanalogy is a bad thing.46 Little does this by providing three reasons
why the disanalogy generates an asymmetry in the credibility of observation reports and
CMJs. First, according to Little, the causal basis of perception allows us to think that
observations are largely correct.47 The origins of moral judgments are, by contrast, not as
likely to be correct because, “accidents of familial, religious, and educational experience
seem to have a major influence on the particular constellation of beliefs which eventually
express our moral competence.”48 Second, considered moral judgments involve greater
reflection and are more likely than observation reports to be theory-laden. Considered
judgments are arrived at by weighing relevant facts and principles, so the judgments are
more likely to reflect the background theories of the inquirer. Third, “Whereas
observation reports serve to validate or refute empirical theories, concrete moral
judgments are themselves often validated or refuted by appeal to more general moral
theories.”49 Moral judgments require justification from moral theories more frequently
than they justify moral theories, whereas observation reports frequently serve to justify

46

Little 1984: 377-379.
A counter-example to this point was raised by Anand Vaidya. Speaking literally, all observation reports
are false because they report on space as if it is Euclidean, yet we live in a non-Euclidean space. This is
one way to press Little’s unexamined faith in the veridicality of observation reports.
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empirical theories. Little’s reasons in support of the disanalogy drives home the input
objection more forcefully.50
Even though Little has provided reasons to think that the disanalogy between
observation reports and CMJs is problematic for RE, it is informative to return to why
Daniels thought the disanalogy was unproblematic for RE. Looking at a response to
Daniels sets-up the move I am going to endorse for establishing the credibility of CMJs.
Daniels attempts to turn a liability into an asset. That is, Daniels tries to turn a
reason RE lacks objectivity (i.e., theory-ladenness) into a source of credibility for the
method. Background theories might prove an independent check on the acceptance of
moral principles and judgments. The theory-ladenness of CMJs results from being
unaware how background theories, largely shaped by cultural indoctrination, control the
judgments that are formed. Daniels requires the inquirer to not only reflect on her
favored background theories but also to reflect on competing background theories. By
doing this Daniels introduces some degree of independent support for principles and
judgments and requires the inquirer to be more aware of how theories are controlling her
reasoning. Considering a wide range of competing theories is thought to provide a
justificatory gain over a more narrow approach that only systematizes the beliefs the
inquirer already subscribes to. Such inter-theoretical support is thought to provide
traction in cases of moral disagreement. Inquirers can point to an independent theory and
50

These points reinforce the importance of my thesis to normative theory. If CMJs are epistemically inferior to
observation reports because they lack the reliability of perceptual reports, then there is not much reason to place
credibility in CMJs because it cannot be shown by analogy that they are largely correct. Observation reports can serve
as a credible empirical check against physical theories, but moral judgments cannot serve as a credible check against
moral theories. Moral judgments, at most, can describe our moral competency, but they cannot prescribe what is
morally correct. As a result, moral inquiry that relies on CMJs falls into the realm of anthropological moral
psychology, but it does not fall under the realm of normative moral theory.
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debate the theory instead of going in circles about moral disputes, which to cite one
example—the abortion debate—often endlessly cycle without achieving consensus.
Little raises a problem with Daniels’ approach: it merely shifts the problem of credibility
to the background theories. What constitutes the independent grounds on which the
background theories can be established as credible? Little makes this problem clear using
the case of Smith and Jones:
Smith and Jones. Consider discussants Smith and Jones who disagree over
moral theories T and T’. Suppose T and T’ are equally consistent with all
considered judgments shared by Smith and Jones, so both discussants may
continue to hold their distinct views without inconsistency. But when we
introduce philosophical theory P which Smith and Jones both accept, it may
emerge that P supports T and is inconsistent with T’. In this case Smith and Jones
must come to agree on the correctness of T on pain of inconsistency. Thus appeal
to background philosophical theories may permit us to achieve consensus over a
moral theory; but (unless we have independent reasons for believing these
theories to be correct) such an appeal does not increase the rational warrant we
may attach to the moral theory.51
The Smith and Jones case implies that consensus is purchased without a gain in the
warrant of moral theories. It simply shifts the credibility question to the philosophical
background theories. However, the history of philosophy shows that establishing the
credibility of a philosophical theory is far from a conclusive matter or a matter that lends
itself to conclusive independent credibility.52 Philosophical theories frequently reflect
theoretical commitments instead of objective facts. It seems that wide-RE only justifies
moral theories to the degree that inquirers share the philosophical theories appealed to in
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Some philosophical theories can be checked against the results of scientific experiments. Psychological
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the argument. This is at best a lateral move in terms of justificatory strength. Little
completes his analysis by deepening the distinction between ethics and science when it
comes to coherentist epistemology.
For Little the objectivity of theory is determined, in part, by the independence of the
evidence supporting the theory. Observation reports are more objective than moral
judgments because perception is independent from background theory. CMJs and
philosophical theories are not independent controls on moral theory. CMJs emanate from
one’s background theory and philosophical theories only increase rational warrant to the
degree that there are independent reasons to think the theories are correct. This means
that moral theory and science are not equally objective; thus, they have different
epistemic standing. Little summarizes his findings by restating the input objection and
drawing out the relativistic implications of his conclusion:
There is thus a crucial disanalogy between the two areas: empirical theory is
constrained by evidence which is in a rough and ready sense independent of the
theoretical conclusions we eventually arrive at, whereas moral deliberation is not.
But if there is no class of beliefs which have an antecedent credibility independent
of their relations to other statements, then how does any epistemic warrant enter
the system of moral deliberation? We must conclude that the method of reflective
deliberation provides only a very weak scheme of justification; it depends heavily
and unavoidably on the particular considered judgments and background beliefs
with which we begin, and these are themselves unjustified. The most this process
can do is to bring to the surface the principles which underlie the moral practices
of the existing community, and subject those practices to a limited form of
rational criticism.53
The dialectic between Daniels and Little reinforces the move I am going to make in
arguing for the credibility of CMJs: establishing them as non-inferential foundations. No
matter how sophisticated the RE procedure becomes by incorporating in background
53
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theories one cannot escape the input objection if the starting points are not credible. In
the preceding quote Little requests a set of beliefs that possess “an antecedent credibility
independent of their relations to other statements” so that justification enters the belief
system. Though it is possible to argue against the input objection by establishing
symmetry between observation reports and CMJs the best option for solving the objection
is to establish CMJs as non-inferential foundations. This is the option I endorse. Before
providing a positive account of this solution I will look at the third option for solving the
input objection: holding that CMJs are credible because they play a vital methodological
role.

3. THE METHODOLOGICAL RESPONSE
3.1 KEY DISTINCTIONS
In this section I will draw a distinction between the methodological role versus the
epistemic status of moral intuitions or CMJs. I also will frame the input objection more
succinctly. First, let me reframe the input objection using a different distinction.
Mark Nelson draws a distinction between a strong and weak version of the input
objection.54 The strong version holds that one has a positive reason to think moral
intuitions are false. This version of the objection falls under the category of a tainted
well argument. If you place a well on a nuclear waste dumping site it will tend to yield
water contaminated with radionuclindes or other elements of radioactive waste. A defect
in the origin of the water will tend to yield bad water. The same might be said of moral
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intuitions: if there is a defect in the origin of moral intuitions, then they will tend to be
false.55 Peter Singer puts forward a strong version of the input objection when he
considers that many moral convictions derive from, “discarded religious systems, from
warped views of sex and bodily functions, or from customs necessary for survival of the
group in social and economic circumstances that now lie in the distant past.”56 Holding
that intuitions are tainted sources of justification—likely to be false—yields a strong
conclusion. According to Singer, “it would be best to forget all about our particular
moral judgments.”57 There is reason to avoid such a strong statement.
Nelson mentions four points a tainted well argument must establish.58 First, such an
argument must explain why CMJs are likely to be false because of their nature and origin.
Second, the explanation of the falsity of CMJs must be the best explanation of this
phenomenon, not simply a possible explanation of why CMJs are false. Third, the
explanation needs to apply to all CMJs, not just certain types of CMJs. Fourth, tainted
well arguments must show that the defects in the nature and origin of CMJs
systematically resists correction; otherwise, recognizing that some concepts, theories and
cognitive faculties can taint CMJs is compatible with designing a filter to only allow
good CMJs to pass through to the next stage. This does not make arguing for a strong
interpretation of the input objection impossible, but it does make it a less attractive
55
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non-credible or tainted.
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mountain to scale. It is possible, however, to use the strong version to motivate the weak
version of the objection.
The weak version of the input objection holds that there is no reason to think CMJs
are true, regardless of whether there is reason to think of them as false. This form of the
objection holds that CMJs possess no evidential weight. To respond to this version
Nelson proposes an argument from practice. He reminds us that there are not noncircular reasons to regard perceptual observations as true, but we still regard them as
credible and use them in scientific reasoning. So, even if CMJs are not true, it is
permissible to regard them as credible and use them in moral reasoning. This is a lessarticulated version of the analogy between observation reports and moral intuitions. As
previously explained, such a move does not address whether CMJs are credible. It
simply reminds us that we can use them as if they are credible. A better response
involves showing CMJs are credible or capable of serving as evidence for the truth of
moral theories. In addition, solving the weak version of the objection takes care of the
strong version of the objection. If there are reasons to think that CMJs are true, then
those reasons can be used to rebut reasons to think that CMJs are false.
A successful defense of RE against the input objection must rebut the weak version
of the objection by establishing CMJs in relation to moral truth. It must do this in a way
that makes CMJs suitable as evidence for or against theories. This can be done by
showing that CMJs possess epistemic weight. By being evidence of the truth of moral
theories, and true themselves, CMJs can provide rational grounds for preferring one
theory over another theory. CMJs gain positive epistemic status by being true in virtue of
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possessing positive epistemic status, and, as a result, being fit to provide rational grounds
for moral theories.
The next distinction I want to explore is between methodological role and epistemic
status.59 Some theorists hold that only if a CMJ possesses positive epistemic status
should it be used in a justificatory capacity. Proponents of RE like Norman Daniels and
Michael DePaul take a different approach. They argue that even if CMJs do not possess
positive epistemic status they can still serve an important methodological role that, in the
end, leads to justification. This is done by allowing CMJs to serve a role in RE
methodology (e.g., acting as fire-starters or sustainers of reflection) regardless of their
epistemic status. After CMJs play this role it is possible to see what survives the
reflection process and claim that what survives is what is justified (i.e., what remains
when a point of reflective equilibrium is reached is justified). On such a reading it is
possible to hold the view that CMJs possess no positive epistemic status (i.e., they merely
reflect one’s prejudices) yet to affirm that the best way to justify a moral theory is by
using CMJs. Further motivating the methodological response to the input objection is the
idea that possessing positive epistemic status does not provide a guide to moral inquiry.60
The result is that one can have CMJs with a positive epistemic status that do not play a
methodological role, and vice versa. It is possible to argue for one without arguing for
the other.
I agree that the epistemic status and the methodological role of CMJs are two
different avenues of justification CMJs can be used to pursue. However, I hold that any
59
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successful response to the input objection is going to have to establish CMJs within both
avenues of justification. One must have reliable or truth-apt CMJs and properly use the
CMJs in a methodological role that exploits their truth-aptness to increase the
justification of the belief system. This provides a full response to the input objection.
The need for both avenues of justification can be elaborated by returning to the
distinction between epistemic status and methodological role.
A truth-apt CMJ corresponds to taking justification as aiming at truth or reliability.
A CMJ that is well-utilized by having a clearly identified methodological role
corresponds to taking justification as providing rational grounds for or against moral
theories. The problem with the history of RE is that theorists have focused on either an
epistemic or a methodological response to the input objection and never fully answered
the objection. In the next section I want to provide two examples of how theorists have
avoided the epistemic status of CMJs and focused solely on methodological solutions.
These theorists tried to remain agnostic about meta-ethical questions and strictly assigned
a methodological role to CMJs to show that CMJs can serve as rational grounds for
theory choice. As is now apparent from the distinction between strong and weak versions
of the input objection such positions do not claim CMJs are true, they simply try to use
CMJs in a useful (i.e., pragmatic) way. Omitting the positive epistemic status of CMJs
results in a failure to address the weak version of the input objection and provide a
rebuttal against the strong version of the objection.
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3.2 POSITIONS EMPHASIZING A METHODOLOGICAL RESPONSE
The two theorists I will use as examples of taking a methodological approach are
William Shaw and Norman Daniels. These theorists remain agnostic about the truthaptness of CMJs. Failure to establish the positive epistemic status of CMJs results in an
inability to solve the input objection. In this section I will establish that the theorists
avoid meta-ethical issues and argue against such an approach.
For Shaw reliance on intuition in moral philosophy is unavoidable.61 Shaw
understands moral intuitions not in the Moorean sense as being self-evident but in the
Rawlsian sense as being firmly-held moral judgments. The epistemic status of moral
intuitions is left an open question, as firmly-held moral judgments do not necessarily
signify the apprehension of objective moral properties. Shaw agrees with Rawls that
there are only two alternatives to reliance on moral intuitions: positing self-evident first
principles or taking a naturalistic approach by defining moral concepts in terms of nonmoral concepts. The other alternative is to start from our firmly-held moral convictions
and try to bring all of our beliefs into one coherent view. Using intuitions as unavoidable
starting points is acceptable for Shaw because these intuitions are not gut-reactions. Such
moral intuitions are, “delivered after calm consideration and reflection, undisturbed by
personal interest or emotion.”62 Considered moral judgments are not making contact
with objectively true moral facts, instead they are emanating from experience and our
reflective capacities.
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The slogan of Shaw’s perspective is: if the conditions are right, the intuitions are
credible. Ideal conditions of reflection guard against judgments simply reflecting gutreactions based on cultural indoctrination. It is possible, however, to generate a problem
for Shaw’s slogan.
Though an inquirer is reflecting under ideal conditions one problem is that the
mechanism doing the reflecting (i.e., the mind) has not been shown to be reliable or to
yield judgments with positive epistemic status. Telling a story about the reliability of
CMJs involves telling a plausible story about the reliability of the psychology behind
moral judgments. Placing reflection in an ideal context does not tell the story of the
reliability of the psychological mechanism producing the judgments. Even in ideal
conditions one may be systematically wrong in determining which judgments are
credible, not because the conditions are not ideal, but because our minds are hard-wired
for certain biases.63 If this could be the case even in ideal situations, the only way to
form a reliable judgment is to not use the mechanism that is systematically unreliable.
However, because one must use the mind to form judgments the only other option is to
tell the story of the reliability of the judgments themselves. That is, despite intuitions
stemming from an unreliable source the intuitions are still credible in virtue of exhibiting
certain characteristics that are truth-conducive. Shaw avoids the hard problem of
establishing that CMJs are truth-conducive by avoiding taking a meta-ethical stand on the
63
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epistemic status of CMJs. This is demonstrated by Shaw’s response to Brandt’s claim
that firmly holding a judgment gives the judgment a status no better than a fiction. As
Shaw wonders:
[B]ut do not any normative judgments—like our shared conviction that the torture
of innocent children for fun is immoral—rightly enjoy prima facie credence? The
view that such considered judgments, even when they are widespread, lack any
initial credibility is hard to swallow. If, rather, as I think, judgments generated
under such [ideal] circumstances do emerge for that reason with some plausibility,
then the problem which Brandt poses for the intuitionist’s coherence theory of
justification disappears.64
A quick response to Shaw’s statement is that credence is not equal to credibility:
possessing prima facie credence is not equal to possessing prima facie credibility (i.e.,
truth-aptness). This is exactly Brandt’s point: credence does not correspond to
credibility.65 Instead of viewing Shaw as having misunderstood Brandt’s objection I will
posit a more charitable reading and hold that Shaw misspoke when he said that
“normative judgments...rightly enjoy prima facie credence.” Let me now look at a more
charitable response.
According to Shaw the input objection disappears under the influence of ideal
conditions. Against this I argue that the problem does not disappear, it simply reappears
in a different place as the status of CMJs is outsourced to the project of defending the
ideal conditions under which CMJs are made. However, such conditions have been
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systematically analyzed and have been found incapable of generating credibility.66 The
methodological response makes the input objection take on greater force. As the rug is
pulled out from under ideal conditions all that is left is a direct response to the epistemic
status of CMJs, but a methodological response is unable to directly address the epistemic
status of CMJs. Without showing that CMJs possess independent prima facie credibility
the problem is not solved. This means that the methodological solution is not sufficient
to establish CMJs as credible. Shaw does, however, acknowledge that there is an
alternative to the methodological response when he mentions, “Earlier intuitionists met
this problem head-on by arguing that our faculty of intuition yields knowledge of
objective, non-natural moral properties.”67 Despite seeing this option there is good
reason why Shaw and Rawls did not think an epistemic response was a viable option.
Equating an intuitionist model with positing strong foundations prevented theorists
from embracing an epistemic response to the input objection. Because Shaw equated the
intuitionist model with boldly asserting strongly axiomatic foundations (i.e., self-evident
Moorean intuitions) neither he nor Rawls saw this as a viable alternative. The literature
on intuitionism has recently progressed to open-up a third alternative to axiomatic selfevidence or reductive naturalism. This option is moderate intuitionism. I embrace
moderate intuitionism as a way to directly address the input objection by positing modest,
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non-inferential foundations. Such an alternative will be explored in relation to Robert
Audi’s work during the positive account I formulate of the credibility of CMJs. Now, to
show that the narrow rendering of only two alternatives to the use of intuitions, as
understood by Shaw and Rawls, does not establish the positive epistemic status of CMJs I
will turn to Noah Lemos. As Lemos says of the argument that there are only two
alternatives to relying on moral intuitions:
Neither of these alternatives, it is argued, hold out much hope for fundamental
ethical principles, and since there are no other alternatives we must rely on our
considered moral judgments. This argument, however, does not show that any of
our considered moral judgments have any positive epistemic status. At best it
shows that if fundamental moral principles are to be justified, then considered
moral judgments must play some sort of justificatory role. But the argument does
not show that some fundamental moral principles can be justified or that
considered moral judgments can play an epistemically justificatory role.68
Lemos’ statement is a good summary of how Shaw and Rawls fail to establish the
positive epistemic status of CMJs and, hence, their fitness to serve as evidence for or
against moral principles.69 Now I will consider Daniels attempt to establish the initial
credibility of CMJs by providing a methodological solution.
To analyze Daniels’ approach I will take a meta-ethical vantage point. I will largely
follow Mark Timmons’ treatment of Daniels.70 Timmons’ approach is useful because he
raises two objections to RE that illuminate the importance of providing an epistemic
solution to the general input objection (i.e., credences do not correspond to credibilities).
The first objection Timmons raises is the moral input objection. It is a version of the
general input objection that focuses on meta-ethical issues, as it is an attempt to force the
68
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RE-realist to become a constructivist concerning moral facts. The objection states that
CMJs are not likely to correspond to inquiry-independent moral truths. Under an RErealist interpretation, CMJs provide evidence of inquiry-independent moral truths; CMJs
point at truth or correspond to an inquiry-independent realm of moral facts. The RErealist must hold that CMJs are reliable, as evidence, in corresponding to such moral
facts. For the RE-constructivist, CMJs do not correspond to moral facts beyond inquiry;
instead, moral facts are a construction of inquiry. On the RE-constructivist model there is
no need to tell the story of how CMJs reliably point at an inquiry-independent realm of
moral facts. If the moral input objection can box-in a theorist to RE-constructivism then
the methodological response gains traction because it aligns with constructivism. By
contrast, the epistemic response aligns with realism because it holds that CMJs are truthconducive whereas the methodological response does not assume nor does it take a stand
on the truth-aptness of CMJs. One way to circumvent the moral input objection is to
establish that CMJs reliably correspond to an inquiry-independent realm of moral
properties and facts. This can only be accomplished by abandoning a pure coherentist
interpretation of RE.
The moral input objection works because it assumes RE is a coherentist model of
justification. The objection works as follows. It requires an adequate theory of
justification to be truth-conducive to some degree. This will work for RE as a coherentist
model only if one embraces a constructivist, not a realist, conception of moral truth. RE
cannot guarantee truth in the realist sense; it can only set up conditions under which
CMJs are likely to be true. CMJs will not necessarily correspond to an external (non-
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conceptual) reality. So, coherentist moral epistemology must adopt a constructivist
account of moral truth. This is because coherence is a matter of beliefs mutually
supporting one another. Maximizing coherence does not necessitate input from a realm
external to the belief-set because it is a standard internal to the belief-set—it is a matter of
how the beliefs fit together and mutual support one another. Without external input the
beliefs will not necessarily correspond to what is true in terms of non-conceptual reality.
Thus, according to the objection, for a theorist to get an adequate theory of justification
using RE the theorist must be a constructivist about truth.
This is a problem for responding to the general input objection because
constructivism is aligned with the methodological response, and the methodological
response is inadequate for solving the input objection. One way of circumventing this
problem is not to assume that RE is a pure coherentist methodology. I will argue for this
position and cast RE as a foundationalist method with coherentist elements, which opensup a realist interpretation of CMJs whereby they correspond to inquiry-independent
moral facts and truths.
The many alternative systems objection, like the moral input objection, forces the
coherentist to be a constructivist about moral truth. To meet the criterion of truthconduciveness the coherentist needs to be a constructivist about truth in the face of many
alternative coherent moral systems.71 To understand this objection it is important to note
that a normative theory consists of a consistent set of moral principles. Using different
sets of moral judgments it is possible to generate different sets of consistent moral
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principles. Seeking coherence will not necessarily facilitate a clear choice between
different moral theories. This makes it difficult to achieve intersubjective agreement on a
pure coherentist rendering of RE. The method takes-on relativism and suffers from an
inability to establish on an independent basis the warrant of the whole belief system. If
interpersonal disagreement persists and RE-truth is construed in a realist sense, then
coherentist epistemology will not necessarily be truth-conducive. That is, unless truth is
construed relative to a given system, unless one becomes an RE-constructivist.
Two observations come out of the forgoing discussion. First, solving the many
alternative systems objection it is not enough to provide a methodological solution. Even
if interpersonal agreement could be generated, a methodological solution would not show
which of the alternative coherent moral systems is to be preferred. This is because truth
is relative to each system and choice between equally coherent systems is bound to be
arbitrary to some degree. To overcome this one could argue that the coherent system to
be preferred is the system that contains CMJs that possess positive epistemic status
because they are credible or truth-apt in the realist sense. A second observation is that
remaining a constructivist is not a plausible option for solving the general input objection.
A constructivist provides a methodological solution by not taking a stand on the existence
of inquiry-independent moral truths. The input objection is solved only if CMJs are in
fact true. A methodological solution is not able to establish that CMJs are guaranteed to
be true or sufficient to provide evidence of truth; they are only likely to be true if
conditions are ideal. However, even ideal conditions are not enough to secure the
probative value of CMJs. On the other hand, an RE-realist can resist the moral input
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objection and the many alternative systems objection by adopting a foundationalist
architecture and providing an epistemic solution that establishes the prima facie
credibility of CMJs. This also results in a solution to the general input objection. I now
turn to the work of Daniels to show that being a constructivist and providing a
methodological solution does not establish the credibility of CMJs.
Daniels adopts a don’t worry strategy upon confronting the input objection. This
strategy says: don’t worry about the epistemic status of CMJs or trying to solve the moral
input objection; instead, focus on the many alternative systems objection by providing a
methodological solution, then see if this solution provides a story about the credibility of
CMJs. Daniels seeks to show that coherentist methodology can lead to interpersonal
convergence, and then he will deal with the input objection after convergence is
established. As Daniels says:
It is plausible to think that only the development of acceptable moral theory in
wide reflective equilibrium will enable us to determine what kind of "fact," if any,
is involved in a considered moral judgment. In the context of such a theory, and
with an answer to our puzzlement about the kind of fact (if any) a moral fact is,
we might be able to provide a story about the reliability of initial considered
judgments. Indeed, it seems reasonable to impose this burden on the theory that
emerges in wide reflective equilibrium.72
Only after reaching wide-RE can a theorist, looking backwards, establish whether
CMJs constitute moral facts. Daniels’ solution is initially attractive because in getting to
wide-RE one must bring CMJs and principles in-line with background theories. These
theories are largely nonmoral. So, disputes over nonmoral theories may prove more
tractable than disputes over CMJs and moral principles. It looks plausible that greater
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consensus could result from moral inquiry on such an account. There are three problems
Timmons identifies with this strategy.
First, there is the problem of ever achieving convergence. Without an account of the
initial credibility of CMJs there is reason to doubt whether reaching convergence is
possible. Turning to background theories to try to reach convergence and solve the many
alternative systems objection does not eliminate the fact that background theories rely on
CMJs for their justification. The filter that is imposed on initial moral judgments screens
for general sources of error in judgment making. These general conditions involve
freedom from bias, emotional duress, ignorance of facts and so on. Judgments that
surviving this general filtering process and become CMJs are reliable in some sense, but
there are many incompatible sets of CMJs that meet the general filtering conditions. So
searching for convergence using background theories without selecting in advance the set
of moral facts represented by CMJs is not likely to result in moral convergence. The
second worry Timmons has about Daniels’ don’t worry strategy is that it reverses the
order of addressing the two objections necessary to secure a solution to the input
problem. Ultimately, a solution to the input objection must establish CMJs as true from a
realist perspective. Daniels’ methodological strategy is unable to do this because:
Unless we have some reason to suppose in advance, and independently of the
results of wide RE that this sort of methodology has all along been guided by
inquiry-independent moral properties and facts that serve to constrain the inquiry,
I see no reason to construe CMJs realistically—as by and large representing
reliable input from an objective reality.73
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Even if the methodological approach is cashed out in coherentist/realist terms there
is a problem with epistemic potency.74 Coherentists generally hold that RE possesses
some epistemic credentials. If an integral part of RE’s ability to have epistemic potency
is in question until the end-point of the method, then there is no reason to accept the
epistemic potency thesis until the end-point of the method. Without establishing the
positive epistemic status of CMJs prior to the end-point of the method the epistemic
potency of RE must be taken on blind faith. It is like saying: there is not currently reason
to believe RE is epistemically credulous, but wait until the end of the process and your
faith in RE will be vindicated. This means a coherentist/realist must make a weaker
claim about the power of coherence methodology in ethics, namely if CMJs are currently
reliable, then the end-point of RE will vindicate the reliability of CMJs.
The final concern of Timmons about the don’t worry strategy involves the idea of
theory-ladenness. If an observation is theory-laden, then being able to make the
observation depends on having made some theoretical assumptions. Instead of
observations purely reflecting sense experience they are mediated by theories. This does
not destroy the ability to make scientific observations as long as the observations are
independent of the theories they are being used to test. If the observations are not neutral
evaluations of the theory, then they cannot be reliable guides to the truth of the theory. A
similar thing can be said about moral theories. CMJs should not be weighted in favor of
one of the competing theories they are used to evaluate. Otherwise, CMJs are biased and
not reliable evidence of moral truths. The don’t worry strategy involves waiting until one
74
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has a moral theory in reflective equilibrium and then using that theory to explain the
reliability of the CMJs that were used to select the theory. A casualty of this approach is
the type of objectivity the realist wants to capture. The CMJs do not stand at a proper
distance from the theories, as the theories are used to explain the reliability of the CMJs
that are used to justify the theories.75 In contrast, a reliability story can be told about
scientific observations in advance of scientific inquiry, and this story is properly
independent of the results of such inquiry. This means that Daniels must abandon the
don’t worry strategy and start the process with a group of CMJs and a story about their
reliability. Both the story and the CMJs will be subject to revision, but because the
epistemic status of the CMJs is established independently from the results of the inquiry
the theory will be tested against inquiry-independent facts.76
In conclusion, looking at Shaw and Daniels produced the following results. A viable
approach to addressing the input objection is to posit modest, non-inferential foundations
by adopting some form of moderate intuitionism. Such an approach exploits a realist
interpretation of CMJs whereby they correspond to an inquiry-independent moral realm.
Taking a “wait and see” methodological approach to solving the input objection will not
result in converge between inquirers on moral theory selection. To solve the input
objection one must attack the moral input objection first. The don’t worry strategy must
be abandoned because it first attacks the many alternative systems objection. Ignoring
the epistemic status of CMJs in an effort to focus on their methodological role will
undermine one’s efforts in the end. It is not enough to take CMJs as an unavoidable
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alternative in starting moral inquiry, as Shaw does, and it is not enough to ignore the
epistemic status of CMJs, as Daniels does, until the method itself has been revised and an
instance of employing the method has reached its conclusion. The status of CMJs must
be established first, then the justificatory role CMJs play within the method of RE can be
solidified.77

4. ARCHITECTURE AND TRUTH
4.1 VARIOUS COMBINATIONS
The previous section touched on architecture (i.e., the structure of justification) and
truth. This section will elaborate on those themes by answering the following question,
“What combination of architecture and truth is best suited to solving the input
objection?” The two options I will consider are: coherentism or foundationalism, and
realism or constructivism. After exploring various combinations of truth and architecture
I will defend the combination of realism and foundationalism as the best combination to
solve the input objection.
Toward the end of the last section it was concluded that a coherentist/realist must
address the moral input objection before tackling the many alternative systems objection.
What are the prospects for such an approach?
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A representative of a coherentist/realist approach is David Brink.78 Brink tries to
establish the credibility of CMJs contextually prior to reaching the end-point of RE.
There are three problems with his approach. The first problem is that the entire RE
process is ridden with intuitive judgments. Unless the capacity to make intuitive
judgments is defended as reliable it is not clear that an inquirer can establish the
credibility of CMJs within a context in an objective fashion. Second, Brink’s analogy of
CMJs with observation reports is inadequate. It is not obvious that using CMJs as
auxiliary hypotheses to test a moral theory establishes that moral beliefs are credible
along realist lines. This may only show that CMJs can be used methodologically in such
a capacity, but whether using them in such a capacity provides a credible check against
the truth of moral theories is another story. This relates to the notion of objectivity as
independence from the theory being tested. Observation reports can be established as
credible independent of inquiry to a degree that CMJs cannot. Third, if CMJs are
ultimately credible in virtue of being ground in empirical properties and facts (or being
evidence of such facts), then it may turn out that the system ultimately embodies a
foundationalist architecture. If there is no external input into the system of beliefs, then
the system may not make contact with non-conceptual reality. These considerations
point the coherentist/realist in the direction of either foundationalist architecture or
constructivist truth. What are the merits of being a coherentist/constructivist and can
such a position solve the input objection?
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Under a coherentist interpretation a CMJ is justified if it is part of a coherent system
of beliefs. These beliefs include CMJs at all levels of generality. For a constructivist
moral facts are constituted by the beliefs held in reflective equilibrium. A constructivist
holds that the truth of CMJs is explained by reference to the process by which they are
constructed, which includes human stances (e.g., attitudes and conventions) specific to
RE methodology.79 A constructivist wants a well-justified system and may remain
agnostic about the ultimate truth-value of the components of the system. In solving the
input objection, however, a constructivist cannot remain silent on meta-ethical issues.
Because constructivism equates the moral facts with coherent beliefs held in reflective
equilibrium the best fit for a theory of truth is a coherence theory.80 The truth of beliefs
is determined by coherence with other beliefs, not correspondence to a realm outside the
beliefs. This makes the coherentist/constructivist establish the truth of CMJs in relation
to a coherence theory of truth. The problem with this move is that recent technical results
tell against the notion of coherence being truth-conducive.
Recent developments in formal epistemology show that coherence alone is not truthconducive.81 I will mention a couple results from this area of research. Erik Olsson has
argued that any theories that depend on the truth-conduciveness of coherence must put
forward a doxastic, or testimonial, truth connection instead of a propositional one. Even
then, there is only a very weak connection between an increase in coherence and an
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increase in the likelihood of truth.82 Tomoji Shogenji has argued against justification by
coherence from scratch. Shogenji considers individual pieces of evidence that possess no
individual credibility and wonders if making them coherent makes the evidence credible.
Most theorists agree that independent evidence that possesses individual credibility when
brought together in coherence can make the evidence more credible. But Shogenji argues
that independent evidence that does not possess individual credibility when brought
together in coherence does not generate credible evidence. Justification by coherence
from scratch is impossible.83 This is a problem for pure coherence theory because it
assumes no credibility of the initial data. The coherentist/constructivist must explain how
beliefs that have no independent credibility can become truth-conducive by being brought
into coherence with one another.
The probability calculus results just mentioned tell against the
coherentist/constructivist picture. The coherentist/constructivist takes on a theory of truth
that is not truth-conducive and takes on a theory of justification that cannot generate
justification. This reinforces the importance of establishing the initial credibility of
CMJs. Typical RE theorists do not posit the independent credibility of CMJs but only a
weaker version of credibility that is uniquely tuned to ideal conditions. Assigning weak
credibility to CMJs is problematic: general filter conditions are not selective enough to
screen amongst many incompatible sets of CMJs that satisfy the conditions, and
82
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confidence alone in judgments that survive filtration is not enough to make CMJs initially
credible. This seems to push the RE theorist in the foundationalist/realist direction.84
A moral realist believes moral claims can be taken literally. This means that there
are moral facts and true moral propositions. CMJs try to instantiate moral facts and assert
moral propositions. There are two senses of objectivity involved in moral realism. The
first kind involves realism about moral facts and the truth (or falsity) of moral
propositions. The second kind of objectivity holds that moral facts exist irrespective of
persons believing things about right and wrong. This last sense of objectivity
distinguishes moral realism from moral constructivism. Constructivism makes truth both
belief and evidence-dependent. Realism holds that the truth of moral propositions exists
independently from anyone’s beliefs and evidence. An inquirer can, on the realist model,
discover the truth of moral propositions, but the truth of those propositions is not
constructed relative to the inquirer’s beliefs and evidence.
There is a natural link between realism and foundationalism. Foundational noninferential beliefs are justified irrespective of their evidential relations to other beliefs.
Non-inferential beliefs can provide evidence of moral facts. These moral facts are
inquiry-independent, yet CMJs used within inquiry can provide evidence for the truth of
those moral facts. On the foundationalist/realist model, the truth of moral facts can be
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directly apprehended through intuition.85 These truths are discovered through a process
of understanding and reflection, not inference. On this account, RE is a method for
achieving a better understanding of moral facts and the truth of moral propositions, yet
the truths that are discovered are inquiry-independent moral facts.86 Endorsing this
perspective moves my approach away from the coherentist/constructivist picture whereby
moral facts are constituted by an inquirer’s propositional attitude at the end-point of
reflective equilibrium—when a set of beliefs are held to mutually support one another in
maximal coherence. Now I must explain how RE is possible within the foundationalist
framework and how such a post-Rawlsian interpretation of RE still captures some of
Rawls’ intuitions.
4.2 RE IS COMPATIBLE WITH FOUNDATIONALISM
Foundationalism is the thesis that justification is asymmetrical. A distinction is
made between basic and non-basic beliefs. Basic beliefs are epistemically privileged.
This means that their positive epistemic status does not come from their inferential or
evidential relations with other beliefs. A non-basic belief is justified by bearing an
appropriate relation (evidential or inferential) to a basic belief. What is important for the
foundationalist is that there are non-inferentially justified beliefs that provide the
85
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justification of other beliefs. Inference to basic beliefs can provide justification for nonbasic beliefs, but inference from non-basic beliefs to basic beliefs is not required for the
justification of basic beliefs.
Different types of foundationalism emerge depending on the strength of the
foundations. Strong foundationalists of the Cartesian variety hold that basic beliefs must
be certainties that cannot be doubted and that deductive validity is required to transmit
justification upward from the basic beliefs. By contrast, Audi has created a doubly
moderate version of foundationalism: the foundations possess some credibility but not
absolute certainty, and justification can be transmitted upward by inference, not
deduction alone.87 If RE is to accommodate some form of foundationalism it cannot be
the strong variety. RE is not compatible with positing CMJs as indefeasible foundations.
CMJs must be revisable. They must possess some epistemic privilege in the form of
credibility but be capable of being revised in the face of new beliefs and experiences.
Regarding moderate foundationalism, basic beliefs are nonderivatively yet defeasibly
justified. As Audi says about moderate foundations, “the relevant beliefs may apparently
have a far wider range of types of content, and certainly they need not be infallible,
indubitable, or immune from revision in the light of new beliefs.”88 One advantage
modest foundationalism has over its strong counterpart is that it has a wider range of
grounds at its disposal. This facilitates a larger tool-set for providing justification.
Despite linking RE with foundationalism being both possible and desirable it is important
to consider an objection to the idea of uniting RE with foundationalism.
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It is possible to argue that RE and foundationalism are not “positions on the same
topic.”89 This idea can be defended based on the distinction between the methodological
status and the epistemic status of CMJs. RE is properly conceived as a method for
organizing our beliefs, and foundationalism concerns the epistemic status of our beliefs.
Though the topics of status and method are related, the connection between the two is not
simple. Distinguishing between different types of foundationalism DePaul concludes that
narrow-RE is not committed to foundationalism, as it is often assumed, and wide-RE is
compatible with foundationalism. This flips the standard conception on its head because
it is typically assumed that narrow-RE is committed to foundationalism and wide-RE
coherentism. First, I will outline DePaul’s argument, and then I will use my own
considerations and some considerations from Roger Ebertz to undercut DePaul’s
argument. Next I will claim Ebertz’ argument must be sharpened if a necessary
connection between RE and foundationalism is to be drawn.
The argument that narrow-RE is not necessarily connected to foundationalism rests
on showing there is equivocation in the use of the term “considered moral judgment.” To
assume that a person’s beliefs in narrow-RE exhibit a foundational architecture two
claims are made (i) CMJs are not formed based on the relation they have to other beliefs
a person holds (ii) other moral beliefs are formed in relation to foundational CMJs, and
such beliefs (i.e., principles) are held because they best account for foundational CMJs.
The first claim is accurate in relation to the initial set of CMJs (CMJ1) the person holds
because set CMJ1 is formed through a filtering process and not in relation to other beliefs
89
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the person holds. The second claim is accurate in relation to the final set of CMJs (CMJn)
the person holds because set CMJn is formed through a process of revision in relation to
other beliefs (i.e., principles). To achieve a coherent set of moral beliefs it is possible
that CMJ1 and CMJn are not going to be the same. Through radical revisions it may turn
out that none of the beliefs in CMJ1 are in CMJn. So, it is argued, CMJ1 cannot serve as
the foundation for other beliefs because once one has arrived at the final set of moral
principles (MPn) that would best systematize CMJ1 it is unlikely that one will still hold all
or any of the beliefs in CMJ1. Also, CMJn cannot serve as the foundation because this set
of beliefs is likely to have been constructed in relation to other beliefs, and the beliefs in
MPn might have been formed for reasons aside from their relation to CMJn. This puts a
person wanting to maintain narrow-RE is connected to foundationalism in a bind. The
only way out that allows one to hold onto claims (i) and (ii) is to equivocate between
CMJ1 and CMJn. The two claims will only be satisfied if one does not draw a distinction
between initial judgments and final judgments. If one equivocates one can hold that
CMJs in general are capable of being foundations and MPs can be justified in relation to
those foundations. If one draws a distinction between varieties of CMJs one cannot
satisfy the two claims of foundationalism.90
The best way to undercut DePaul’s argument is to make more accurate claims on
behalf of foundationalism. A more accurate specification of the two claims is that (i’)
CMJs are not formed by using other beliefs as premises (ii’) other beliefs are formed as
inferences from foundational CMJs. DePaul’s two claims on behalf of foundationalism
90
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are too general. It is not simply that a belief is related to another belief that makes it nonbasic; rather, how the belief is related to the other belief must be part of the distinction
between basic and non-basic. As long as the beliefs in the set of CMJn are noninferential, then they can be used as foundations for the principles that systematize them
throughout the process. So, the key is not whether CMJs are ever revised in relation to
other beliefs, but that when they are revised they are not revised through explicit
inference.
For Ebertz, RE is best interpreted as a form of modest foundationalism.91 The prima
facie credibility of CMJs derives not from their relation to other beliefs but by indicating
the way beliefs seem to the person morally. The beliefs that survive the filtering process
can serve as standards against which principles can be tested. These beliefs have prima
facie direct justification, but they can be undercut during the reflection process. If beliefs
survive to the end of the process they are ultima facie justified, and there is no reason to
think that they lose their direct justification.92 Relating this point back to DePaul’s
argument, just because the final set of principles in narrow-RE (MPn) are pointing at a
different set of beliefs (i.e., CMJn instead of CMJ1) this does not mean that MPn is
pointing at beliefs that are not directly justified. The radical interpretation of RE
challenges this point.
The radical interpretation of RE challenges the idea that the final set of principles is
pointing at a justified set of CMJs. Given that CMJ1 and CMJn might be completely
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different, yet CMJn might be nevertheless justified, this means it is wrong to say that the
justification is coming from the prima facie justification of the initial CMJs. Instead, it
seems correct to hold that the notion of coherence is driving the justification, not the
beliefs that are posited to be foundations. Initial CMJs survive the process based on
coherence considerations, not based on possessing positive epistemic status. Thus, it
seems that coherence and not foundationalism is generating justification.
Ebertz argues against the previous challenge by focusing on the inescapable role
CMJs play. CMJs are necessary components in RE, and principles must cohere with
CMJs if they are to be justified. Rawls himself even claimed, “There is a definite if
limited class of facts against with conjecture principles can be checked, namely, our
considered judgments in reflective equilibrium.”93 Having considered judgments about
moral situations is more direct than applying a general principle to a situation. These
judgments continue to have direct justificatory force because a person can continue to
make direct judgments even when the procedure leads to radical shifts in the beliefs.
Ebertz lets go of the search for truth and epistemic privilege and holds that it is our ability
for moral perception and judgment that gives the CMJs a directness that begets
justificatory force. Ebertz takes a turn in the constructivist direction. He finds this
approach corroborated in Rawls’ Kantian Constructivism. As Ebertz says, “The goal is
not to find principles that are true, but to find principles which are reasonable for us to
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live by, given our own common situation and assumptions about persons and society.”94
This leads Ebertz into two problems.
Taking a constructivist turn in defending modest foundationalism exposes one to the
problem of social indoctrination and establishing the normativity of modest foundations.
The first problem occurs if one embraces RE as seeking practical, not epistemic,
justification. The principles accepted are those which match something like an
overlapping consensus of core values in a society.95 The values that a society shares
eventually become the principles by which it is reasonable for those in the society to
accept and live by. These principles do not derive their force from being in coherence
with other beliefs (CMJs). They derive their force from reflecting the reasonable
overlapping consensus that makes a well-ordered society possible. One problem with
this approach is found in societies where slavery and prostitution are norms. If a shared
value in society is that people should be held to do labor against their will based on their
race or that it should be legal for persons to sell sex for money, then one has to ask
whether such CMJs should play the role of being criteria principles are based on. If this
society is not representative of societies around the globe, and it does not seem that
prostitution and slavery ought to drive the justification of principles everyone should
accept and live by, then a generality problem rears its head. How does one cut the notion
of a society to get at the normative values? Are the values all relative to a society? If so,
then how does one fight the problem of pernicious prejudice and cultural indoctrination?
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How does one identify the core values that ought to govern a society if one simply takes
the deeply engrained values as the ones that drive the formation of moral principles?
The second problem that results in taking a constructivist turn in defending modest
foundationalism is that one is led into a don’t worry strategy. Ebertz’ strategy involves
restating the inescapable methodological role CMJs play in justification. This, however,
avoids addressing the problem of the epistemic status of CMJs. That CMJs can possess
direct justification because they are made on the basis of moral perception does not
establish the beliefs so formed as credible. It just shows that whatever the beliefs are the
beliefs can be reproduced throughout the RE process. That is, as humans we do not lose
the ability to replace a revised CMJ with another CMJ, so throughout the process we can
always keep in place a thing that plays an important role in justification, namely, a CMJ.
Again the question returns, what is it about the nature of a CMJ that gives it the ability to
play this role? That CMJs can play a special role does not mean that they should play that
role. Applying a don’t worry strategy only takes-on further difficulties with cultural
indoctrination and cutting the societal pie to know where to find the correct moral values,
not to mention the specific difficulty of being unable to solve the input objection.
The reason Ebertz shied away from a foundationalist/realist combination of
architecture and truth is because he held that intuitionism is committed to infallible
foundations. This is the same mistake made by Shaw and Rawls. As Ebertz says about
Rawls’ quote equating CMJs with moral facts, “Clearly, they should not be understood as
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committing Rawls to the existence of self-evident or unchangeable moral truths.”96 In
discussing Rawls’ move away from truth and toward a practical conception of
justification Ebertz says, “Although this conception of the justificatory task does take
Rawls further from classical ‘intuitionist’ foundationalism, it is not at all clear that is
takes him away from foundationalism per se.”97 Realizing RE is compatible with
foundationalism the best way to argue for this is to hold that the foundations are prima
facie true pending further reflection. Without embracing foundationalism/realism in the
form of moderate intuitionism the epistemic status of CMJs remains in question. RE is
never placed on solid footing.
I conclude this section by affirming some of Rawls’ intuitions. I affirm Rawls’
intuition that CMJs are facts against which principles are to be evaluated.98 The problem
for affirming this intuition is, at the same time, affirming Rawls’ coherentist intuition that
justification is a matter of everything fitting together—it is a matter of mutual support.
This intuition can be accommodated.99 Moderate (fallibilist) foundationalism is able to,
“account for the main connections between coherence and justification, and it can
provide principles of justification to explain how justification that can be plausibly
attributed to coherence can also be traced—by sufficiently complex and sometimes
inductive paths—to basic sources in experience and reason.”100 Despite the compatibility
of coherentist elements (i.e., mutual support) along with foundationalism I argued in this
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section that, “reflective equilibrium is a model not of coherentism but of modest
foundationalism combined with the claim that coherence between beliefs is an additional
necessary condition for justification.”101 This sets-up a question that needs to be
answered. What version of RE best fits with moderate foundationalism?
4.3 AGAINST WIDE ETHICAL FOUNDATIONALISM
There are two main versions of RE: narrow and wide. Given that the most plausible
way of solving the input objection involves taking a realist/foundationalist stance it is
possible to wonder whether narrow or wide-RE better accommodates this stance.
Narrow-RE better accommodates this stance because narrow-RE is typically cast in
intuitionist terms whereas wide-RE is typically cast in non-intuitionist terms. Narrow-RE
looks at CMJs as non-inferential sources of justification whereas wide-RE looks at
nonmoral background theories as sources of justification. For a wide-RE foundationalist
model the background theories constitute foundations proper. Though narrow-RE is a
better fit for a combination of architecture and truth capable of solving the input objection
wide-RE poses a problem for my approach.
A challenge to my view that an intuitionist version of foundationalism is best suited
for RE is that a non-intuitionist version of wide-RE is able to be foundational without
positing non-inferentially justified beliefs. This does not give CMJs full-fledged
epistemic standing independent of other beliefs, but it does challenge whether there is a
way around the input objection—a way of introducing credibility into the system without
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telling a “realist” story. What Timmons calls wide ethical foundationalism is such an
attempt.102
Non-intuitionist wide ethical foundationalism posits nonmoral background theories
as foundations in the architecture of justification. It holds that certain moral principles or
judgments are privileged relative to other moral beliefs because they depend on nonmoral
background theories to receive their justification. This makes it possible to justify moral
beliefs independent from reliance on other moral beliefs. It positions nonmoral
background theories as the standard for choice between moral theories. I will argue
against wide ethical foundationalism.
For Timmons a foundationalist about ethical justification adopts what is called the
independence thesis (IT), which can be elaborated as follows:
(IT)

Relevant background theories, sufficient for constraining a choice among
competing moral systems, can be developed independently of moral
considerations.103

According to Timmons, accepting or rejecting (IT) determines whether one is
foundationalist or non-foundationalist concerning the architecture of justification. For a
coherentist like Daniels (IT) is not possible because a nonmoral theory, say of persons,
cannot be developed apart from moral considerations. The goal for the foundationalist,
according to Timmons, is to develop a theory of persons that satisfies (IT). This would
show that wide ethical foundationalism is possible because a nonmoral background
theory can be formulated without reliance on moral beliefs, and such a theory can serve
102
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as an independent check on moral beliefs. If this can be accomplished then there is no
need to posit CMJs as foundational because CMJs can receive their justification from
such background theories. CMJs need not possess initial credibility. The problem with
Timmons’ formulation is that he bases his version of foundationalism on a coarse
distinction between immediately and mediately justified beliefs. His version of ethical
foundationalism runs as follows:
For any person S at time t, if S is justified in believing any moral proposition at t,
then the set A of S’s moral beliefs that make up that justified set has the following
justificatory structure:
i. There is a nonempty subset A* of A such that S’s believing each member
of A* is immediately justified;
ii. All other members of A (all non-A*s) are such that in believing each
member of that set, S is mediately justified where such justification
involves at least one member from A*.104
It is possible to draw a distinction between propositions that are immediately versus
mediately justified.105 A foundational belief need not be immediately justified. For
example, a self-evident proposition can be mediately justified. Such a proposition need
not be inferred through the mediation of other beliefs. It can be non-inferentially justified
through the mediation of reflection. An immediately justified proposition does not
require such reflection. Mediately justified beliefs are knowable without relying on
inferences as their grounds, but they may require reflection in order to see their truth or to
see that the proposition is self-evident. Thus, the propositions that serve as foundations
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in set A* need not only be immediately justified.106 It is possible that S’s believing each
member of A* is immediately and mediately justified.
Using moderate intuitionism as an example of a commitment to foundationalism it
shows that Timmons’ construal of foundationalism is not general enough to cover what
all moral theories are committed to when they adopt a foundationalist structure. Bringing
this discussion back to (IT), one could be an intuitionist/foundationalist and reject (IT).
Foundationalists need not accept (IT) or wide ethical foundationalism. It is possible for
an intuitionist/foundationalist to reject that nonmoral background theories in RE can be
developed independent from moral considerations. It may be that nonmoral theories can
constrain theory choice based on moral considerations, namely, fit with moral
propositions that are foundational. Timmons use of (IT) to divide foundationalists from
non-foundationalists belies an adoption of a particular structure of ethical justification—
wide ethical foundationalism. However, the problem with wide ethical foundationalism
connects to the problem with Timmons’ version of foundationalism, even when
formulated in wide foundationalist terms. The subset A* of A need not be formulated so
that each member of A* can be justified independently of any other member of A. It may
be the case that during justification members of A* can be clarified by appealing to
members of A, as in law when one uses a prior case as precedence to see the truth in the
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case at hand without inferring from precedence to the justification of the case at hand.107
So, wide ethical foundationalism is not the only type of foundationalism that can be
accommodated by RE. It seems possible to accommodate an intuitionist version as well.
If it is reasonable to opt for positing CMJs as foundations and avoid positing
nonmoral background theories as foundations, it seems one is left with only narrow-RE
as the best version of RE. This might be viewed as a non-progressive step for RE. Much
of the justificatory power of RE is thought to consist in the wide range of considerations
and the detailed revisions it urges. The justificatory gain from this searching and fearless
moral inventory is thought to make RE a defeasible theory of moral justification. Have I
not robbed RE of its justificatory force by claiming that wide-RE is not tenable as a
theory of foundationalism?
4.4 WIDE-RE IS NOT SUPERIOR TO NARROW-RE
The first reason it seems wide-RE (WRE) is preferable to narrow-RE (NRE) is that,
“WRE allows us to make a weaker and more defensible claim about the initial credibility
of our considered moral judgments.”108 As noted throughout this paper many
philosophers have objected that initial CMJs (CMJ1) have no credibility. Brandt makes
this claim and Daniels takes this objection as a reason to move in the WRE direction.
Instead of granting judgments in CMJ1 a privileged status (i.e., calling them non-
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inferential intuitions), it is better not to grant these judgments credibility. However, both
WRE and NRE require making claims about the credibility of initial CMJs. Some of our
judgments (e.g., beliefs about astrology) will have no credibility. NRE does not require
our principles and theories to systematize these judgments. It only requires that we
systematize judgments with prima facie credibility. WRE must also ascribe prima facie
credibility to initial CMJs if it is capable of justifying moral theories. If the principles in
WRE only derive their credibility from nonmoral background theories, then the best way
for moral principles to derive credibility would be to deduce the principles from the most
plausible current background theories. However, in effect, this would be to abandon
WRE.109
Proponents of WRE might respond to the argument above in the following way.
They might grant that as a whole initial CMJs possess initial credibility but argue that
many of these judgments are likely to be incorrect. Daniels, for instance, points out that
many of these judgments are likely to reflect, “cultural background, self-interest, or
historical accident.”110 Because NRE only asks that principles are brought in-line with
initial CMJs it requires that most of the initial CMJs are correct. WRE, on the other
hand, makes a weaker claim about the correctness of CMJs because it uses background
theories as a further mechanism in weeding out incorrect CMJs. So, WRE makes a more
plausible claim about how credible initial CMJs are. Responding to this argument one
must remember that NRE is not without a filtering mechanism capable of eliminating
judgments conducive to error. Both methodologies possess this feature. If the filter can
109
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be improved it is possible to filter out incorrect CMJs with a high degree of accuracy. It
is also possible to use empirical studies to help decide when CMJs are correlated with the
factors Daniels mentions (i.e., reflect cultural background, self-interest or historical
accident).111
There is another reason why NRE and WRE are on equal footing when it comes to
being committed to the credibility of CMJs. In either NRE or WRE theories can act as a
corrective on CMJs. Sometimes it is difficult to know when to revise a moral principle to
accommodate a moral judgment and when to revise a moral judgment in light of a moral
principle. One way that it would be preferable to revise a judgment is if a compelling
theory is created that accounts for the judgment but the theory requires the inquirer to
revise the judgment. Reinterpreting the data in this way is typical in science. Similarly
in moral theory, “a compelling moral theory may explain why a given intuition seemed
correct initially, although from our new theoretical perspective we can see that it should
be revised.”112 Given that moral theory is more theory-laden, as Daniels has suggested,
then this type of revision may happen more often in moral theory than in science.
If a WRE-proponent continues to press that WRE allows for a more qualified claim
about the degree of credibility that CMJs possess, then this requires the proponent to
defend the superiority of WRE to NRE using two claims. These claims are the other two
reasons why one might hold WRE is superior to NRE. WRE might be shown to
eliminate more of the mistaken initial CMJs if it can be proven that (1) moral principles

111
112

Holmgren 1989: 47.
Ibid.

66

in WRE gain their credibility from nonmoral background theories and these theories are
more reliable than moral judgments, and (2) WRE avoids accidental generalization of
CMJs as moral theories are formulated.113 I return to the don’t worry strategy of Daniels,
which holds that a stance on the credibility of CMJs is forthcoming from going through
the process of WRE. Once we know “what kind of fact, if any, is involved in a
considered moral judgment” we will be able to describe why such a judgment is typically
warranted. For Daniels, people might also converge on a specific equilibrium point, and
CMJs could be referenced as credible to explain why there is convergence on objective
moral truth. I have already discussed the problem with this approach in relation to
Timmons’ work.114 Holmgren, however, takes a different approach to rebutting Daniels.
Holmgren brings the discussion of the superiority of WRE over NRE back to the
question of why a proponent of NRE could not adopt the same provisional stance toward
the credibility of CMJs as the proponent of WRE. The proponent of NRE could discover
what kind of fact is involved in a CMJ by reference to a moral theory. Inquirers from
diverse background might also converge on a narrow equilibrium point. So, a reason for
the credibility of CMJs could emerge from NRE in much the same way as WRE. The
WRE proponent might respond that looking at background theories increases the
possibility of converge because people can debate background theories instead of moral
judgments and principles. This argument hinges on the reliability of background theories
and their supposed superiority to moral theories. It, again, requires the WRE proponent
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to establish the truth of claims (1) and (2) mentioned above. However, even if a
convergence point is reached, the moral theory at the point of convergence cannot be
used to account for the credibility of the CMJs in the way Daniels proposes. If a moral
theory establishes the credibility of CMJs it must be sufficiently independent from the
CMJs it is used to establish the credibility of. But, if one waits until a theory is selected
in WRE to explain the credibility of CMJs, then the credibility of CMJs can only be
defended in reference to assumptions that favor the moral theory selected. This means
that CMJs cannot play a role in moral theory selection in the way that observation reports
in science help select correct scientific theories. If one waits to explain the credibility of
CMJs, selects a theory in WRE, then explains the credibility of CMJs using that theory,
then the CMJs cannot be used to select a moral theory without undermining the ability to
objectively explain their credibility.115
Holmgren goes on to argue against claims (1) and (2). Against the idea that
background theories are more reliable than moral theories Holmgren argues that both
WRE and NRE use nonmoral background theories. Epistemological theories can be used
to show that moral principles can derive support from nonmoral background theories.
Such an argument might run as follows:
1. There is a truth of the matter about morality.
2. If a moral principle economically systematizes a greater range of our
considered moral judgments than competing principles, it constitutes our
best available approximation of a true moral principle.
3. That principle P economically systematizes a greater range of these
judgments than competing principles, we can conclude that P is our best
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approximation of a true moral principle and ought to guide our actions in
cases in which it clearly seems to apply.116
This argument derives a moral conclusion from a nonmoral background theory. The
epistemological principle supports the use of RE methodology, but it does not do so
within the context of WRE. Nor does the principle differentiate between NRE and WRE.
Holmgren identifies that, “Moral intuitionists have always drawn on logical and
epistemological background theories to justify the methodology they use to justify moral
theories.”117 Thus, it seems that moral intuitionists who employ the NRE methodology
can still use nonmoral background theories to justify moral theories.
It is possible to produce further arguments that show that WRE and NRE fail to use
nonmoral background theories in a way that is structurally different. WRE and NRE
might still differ in how much weight they place on CMJs, but this difference can be
located within the role moral background theories play in WRE. So, it seems both WRE
and NRE can accommodate the use of nonmoral background theories, and nonmoral
background theories do not enhance the credibility of moral principles by playing a
unique role in WRE. Both methods can accommodate claim (1).
Holmgren also argues against claim (2). Claim (2) asserts that WRE is preferable to
NRE because it minimizes the problem of moral principles being accidental
generalizations of CMJs. The implication is that the CMJs in WRE might be more
credible than the CMJs in NRE. The plausibility of this idea derives from Daniels
introduction of the independence constraint. This constraint requires that the set of CMJs
116
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systematized by background theories is disjoint from the set of CMJs systematized by
moral principles. This makes moral principles secure from being accidental
generalizations from initial CMJs because the moral principles, “have been shown to
have some kind of logical connection (entailment or inference to the best explanation)
with background theories which systematize another set of considered moral
judgments.”118 So, the principles that pass through NRE to WRE are less likely to
represent ad hoc generalizations from one’s CMJs. Against this claim Holmgren argues
it does not establish that WRE is preferable to a sophisticated moral intuitionism.
Because Holmgren has shown that WRE does not differ from NRE in its use of moral
background theories this means the WRE proponent must hold—along with the
intuitionist—that CMJs have prima facie credibility and moral theories gain their
credibility due to the fact that they systematize these CMJs. This makes it possible for
the intuitionist to adopt WRE as a more advanced moral methodology, but it does not
mean that using WRE allows one to avoid moral intuitionism. Thus, Daniels’ WRE is
not an alternative methodology to NRE that avoids the stance an intuitionist takes on the
prima facie credibility of CMJs. Holmgren continues to argue against WRE.
NRE is capable of avoiding accidental generalization because principles are accepted
based on the epistemic desiderata of explanatory power. The more explanatory power a
principle P possesses the less likely it is an accidental generalization of the judgments it
describes. The more CMJs a principle P accounts for the greater the explanatory power
of P. The goal is to formulate and retain principles with the largest degree of explanatory
118
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power. WRE even seems to increase the possibility of accidental generalization. In NRE
the goal is to find a moral principle P that accounts for the widest range of the CMJs that
have not been discarded or revised. The goal in WRE is to account for the widest range
of CMJs and to account for a plurality of principles (e.g., Q, R, S and T). A subset of
these principles (Q, R and S) might be used as background theories to support another
moral principle (T). The independence constraint requires Q, R and S to systematize
CMJs that are disjoint from the CMJs systematized by T. Because of this there is no
single principle within the set that Q, R, S and T can be reduced to. Imagine in NRE a
theory N is created that has a single principle P. Imagine in WRE a theory W is created
and it supports the plurality of principles, Q, R, S and T. If the widest range of CMJs is
captured by both N and W, then N has more explanatory power than W because the
principle in W cannot all be reduced to a single principle in W. The explanatory power in
W is more dispersed because it must rely on two sets of disjoint principles to explain the
same wide range of CMJs as N is capable of doing using a single principle. Because of
this P is less likely to be an accidental generalization of our CMJs than either Q, R, S or
T. The credibility of the principles derives from systematizing the judgments and P is
able to systematize the entire range of the CMJs whereas Q, R, S or T are not able to do
so. Thus, there is reason to prefer N over theory W because P is more likely to be a
correct systematization of the CMJs.119
Holmgren has shown that standard reasoning for preferring WRE to NRE is
unfounded. There are certain cases where WRE is preferable to NRE, but these cases are
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up to the discretion of the inquirer and the work that has been done in the area of moral
theory one is exploring. The sophisticated moral intuitionist can hold that NRE and
WRE are complimentary methods. They are not to be seen as providing better access to
the prima facie credibility of CMJs. Holmgren has shown that WRE affirms the two
basic ideas of a sophisticated moral intuitionism, namely (i) CMJs posses prima facie
credibility and (ii) moral theories gain their credibility from systematizing CMJs.
Whether NRE or WRE should be employed in a given circumstance depends on which
theory is better at avoiding accidental generalization in that context. The methodological
principle that links accidental generalization with explanatory power (EP) is as follows:
(EP)

Search for a principle possessing the greatest possible degree of explanatory
power in order to minimize the risk of accidental generalization.120

Most RE-proponents argue that WRE is preferable to NRE, but Holmgren argues
WRE is not better than moral intuitionism and that NRE is preferable for avoiding
accidental generalization of one’s CMJs. For the foregoing reasons I will focus on NRE
as the primary interpretation of RE. I will also use moral intuitionism as a moral theory
guiding the positive reformulation of my version of NRE. This is not because moral
intuitionism is a priori true as a normative theory with methodological implications;
rather, intuitionism seems best suited to inform RE in a direction capable of rebutting the
input objection. There is another reason to focus on NRE as the primary interpretation of
RE.
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One reason to favor NRE over WRE is because it makes RE a method that is more
than a mere metaphor. Scanlon argues that WRE is open to the charge of emptiness.
Because WRE instructs us to conduct such a broad and sweeping moral inventory it
seems that, “we should decide what views about justice to adopt by considering the
philosophical arguments for all possible views and assessing them on their merits.”121
This seems to broaden RE to the point of emptiness. It demands of the inquirer that he
consider all potential conceptions and all the arguments for those conceptions. What
counts as considering “all possible views” and the pros and cons of each of those views?
Surely this does not mean consider all possible views of justice and consider the pros and
cons of each of those views. Aside from concerns of cognitive and temporal limitations
there is the question of how to limit one’s inquiry to just the relevant views. If one fails
to consider a relevant theory T that could alter one’s final equilibrium point E, has one
truly reached a justified equilibrium point or somehow been deficient in doing one’s due
diligence? What identifies a view as relevant to moral inquiry? By contrast, NRE does
not ask that one brings to bear all possible conceptions and all possible arguments that
could potentially disrupt one’s equilibrium. The relevant considerations are those that
count toward systematizing one’s CMJs with the goal of adopting principles that satisfy
(EP) and other methodological desiderata.
NRE also returns RE to its foundations in Goodman. Goodman articulated
something like NRE when he stated that, “The process of justification is the delicate one
of making mutual adjustments between rules and accepted inferences; and in the
121
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agreement achieved lies the only justification needed for either.”122 Goodman was
talking about induction: inductive inferences are justified based on fit with general rules
and general rules are justified based on fit with accepted inductive inferences.
Substituting “induction” for “moral theory” it is the mutual support of principles and
considered judgments that generates justification, not the system’s fit with something that
gains its support from outside the system. NRE allows for input from outside the system
in the form of experience and new judgments, but it does not require one to go on a
search for all views that might relate to the beliefs within the system, and it does not
require that justification stems from such a search.
4.5 NRE IS COMPATIBLE WITH MODERATE INTUITIONISM
By focusing on NRE it is important to establish that NRE is compatible with
moderate intuitionism. This has been largely assumed in discussion, but it has not been
argued for. Now I turn to that task.
According to Audi, a general form of moderate intuitionism—ethical reflectionism—
is compatible with RE.123 The compatibility of NRE with moderation intuitionism can be
defended using a distinction between justification from above and justification from
below.
In justification from below one derives intuitive moral principles from supporting
grounds. The principles are not presupposed. They are derived from something deeper.
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In justification from above one presupposes the principles and sees what consequences
one can infer from them. This involves, for instance, seeing what kind of lives we would
lead if we were guided by the principles presupposed. From these considerations we
notice our intuitions about the possible lives and the principles that guide those lives. If
our intuitions are satisfactory, then the principles are confirmed. Justification from above
can lead to the revision of principles. As Audi says, “We may find that if, for example,
we restrict the cases in which promising yields a prima facie duty—say, to situations in
which it is fully voluntary—we get a better principle.”124 Using reflection to generate
and test intuitions about cases may result in the revision of one’s view or in greater
justification of principles. This type of reflection is compatible with RE in the following
way:
One can compare one’s intuitions with each other, with those of people one
respects, and with the results of applying plausible generalizations to the
situations that the moral intuitions are about; and one can strive to get all these
items—revising them if necessary—into a stable, coherent whole: this is the
equilibrium resulting from one’s comparative reflections. The intuitionist might,
to be sure, use the procedure more to refine moral principles already accepted
than to discover moral principles; but this is a contingent matter that depends on
what principles are accepted at the start of the process and on how many new
principles or refinements of old ones it produces.125
Audi’s revised ethical reflectionism is clearly in conflict with RE. It applies to the
revision portion of RE, but not to the initial direction RE urges us to pursue. RE asks us
to start with CMJs, filter CMJs and find principles to systematize our CMJs. Audi holds
that one may begin reflection in any fashion. One may start from principles and consider
intuitions about consequences or one may do the reverse. The way ethical reflectionism
124
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mirrors RE is that it requires that everything be made coherent. However, once we have
derived principles from CMJs Audi’s method is compatible with RE. From the outset,
although, RE urges justification from below whereby intuitive moral principles are
derived from their supporting grounds—prima facie justified CMJs. Reflection is used in
RE not just to arrive at intuitions about cases and principles but to arrive at initial moral
convictions that serve as a basis for the justification of principles. Given this correction
to Audi’s compatibility with RE by positing an order of initial reflection (e.g., from CMJ
to principles) there is reason to think Audi favors NRE as opposed to WRE.
One reason Audi’s ethical reflection lends itself to NRE is because when Audi
mentions WRE it is in the context of the method of reflection that proceeds without
directionality (i.e., whatever the circumstances seem to dictate). But we have shown that
there is directionality to RE that proceeds with justification from below initially, though it
may use justification from above once one is trying to achieve mutual support. The goal
in NRE is to generate the strongest principles possible that systematize the CMJs. The
directionality of the procedure is a primary consideration, whereas the mutual fitting
together of judgments and principles is a secondary consideration. The order matters
because CMJs as prima facie credible foundations act to constrain and guide the
formation of principles.
Another reason Audi’s method lends itself to NRE is because Audi holds that it is
possible to increase the justification of a judgment by systematizing it and extending it.
This also might allow a CMJ with some degree of justification to become one that is well
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justified and capable of guiding action or constituting knowledge.126 Audi also holds that
it is possible for the intuitionist to allow RE to systematize principles into something
more general. It might even be desirable because, “that systematization might provide
reasons for the principles and a possible source of correctives for certain intuitions or
apparently intuitive moral judgments.”127 With slight modifications the union of NRE
with ethical reflectionism seems a natural fit. The goal is to use some of the features of
ethical reflectionism (e.g., the notions of understanding and non-inferential intuitions)
within NRE to fill out the details of NRE and systematize and strengthen the CMJs with
which the process begins. Audi nicely summarizes the synergy between NRE and
moderate intuitionism in the following quote:
There is much to commend a fallibilist, intuitionistic moral rationalism that uses
reflection as a justificatory method in the ways described here, encompassing both
intuitions as prima facie justified inputs to ethical theorizing and reflective
equilibrium as a means of extending and systematizing those inputs.128
In summarizing chapter 4, I have argued the best combination of architecture and
truth is realism/foundationalism, RE is compatible with foundationalism, wide ethical
foundationalism is not a viable way to solve the input objection, wide-RE is not superior
to narrow-RE and narrow-RE is compatible with moderate intuitionism. With these
points in mind I turn to providing a positive formulation of a solution to the input
objection.
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5. SOLVING THE INPUT OBJECTION
5.1 KEY OBJECTIVES
Providing a solution to the input objection could quickly become unwieldy if I do not
focus my solution around some core objectives. I will start by clearing away topics that I
will not address but that do need to be addressed at some point to provide a complete
solution. Though I will borrow and adapt ideas from moderate intuitionism I will not
attempt a defense of moral perception, moral knowledge, moral realism and moral
reasons. Though I am adopting moderate foundationalism, I will not defend my solution
against general objections to moderate foundationalism. The focus of this section is on
defending a solution to the input problem. Here are some of the objectives of my
solution:
•
•

•

Define and Explain Key Terms
Realize Methodological Objectives
o Bring back Rawls’ notion of a competent judge to solidify the conditions
of inquiry that make it successful.
o Create an upgraded filter capable of separating good intuitions from
intuitions emanating from tainted sources.
 Use the revised filter to answer Sencerz’ objection that filtering
does not add to the epistemic status of CMJs.
o Clearly define the confidence index and the processing of CMJs from the
stage of initial judgments to considered judgments.
Realize Epistemic Objectives
o Utilize intuitionist criteria that facilitate the identification of genuine
moral intuitions.
o Establish that genuine moral intuitions, as moderate foundations, are truthapt.
o Explain how positive epistemic value is possessed by CMJs.
o Connect positive epistemic status with truth.
o Establish how CMJs with positive epistemic value can be assigned weight
in relation to credences.
o Explain how weight works in the face of expanding experience and
revision pressure.
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•

o Explain how credences correlate to the balance of evidence.
o Show how CMJs are fit to serve as evidence for or against certain
principles.
Yield a Correct Prediction
o Explain how the revised RE procedure yields correct predictions for the
cases in question.

5.2 SLAVERY AS A CASE STUDY
A case that is often upheld as an example of mistaken moral intuitions is slavery.129
Slavery was morally permissible for thousands of years, yet it is a practice that is morally
problematic on many levels. Slavery can be used as a case against the objectivity of
moral facts. If there are objective moral properties, then how come whole people groups
found the practice of slavery morally permissible when it is a practice that violates basic
moral rights? For the sake of argument, a CMJ worth capturing might be, “I judge that
slavery is unjust.” In the United States slavery was practice from about 1654 until 1865.
The majority of slavery was practiced in the southern United States where slaves were
cogs in an agricultural machine. The treatment of slaves was harsh and inhumane. How
could someone living in the Deep South during the time of slavery form the correct moral
judgment that “slavery is unjust” even though slavery is morally permissible according to
upbringing and culture?130 Can my version of RE correctly handle a mistaken moral
judgment, such as, “I judge that slavery is morally permissible,” in light of a person’s
moral principles and morally-relevant background beliefs? Conversely, could my version
of RE properly justify a correct moral judgment, such as “I judge that slavery is unjust,”
129
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in light of a person’s moral principles and background beliefs? Both cases are considered
in relation to explaining how someone in the Deep South during the time of slavery could
use RE, in the face of morally wrong enculturation and personal bias, to justify the moral
truth that slavery is unjust. The upshot of yielding a correct prediction is that engaging in
RE methodology leads to correctly capturing moral truth. Now I will present and explain
the relevance of the two cases.
Case 1 Dr. B is an atheist physician in the South during the time of slavery. After
careful consideration, which includes reflection on the context in which he
was raised and lives, Dr. B forms the following CMJ, “I judge that slavery
is morally unjust.” Dr. B has not deduced this judgment or formed it on the
basis of principle or premise. It just seems correct to him upon due
reflection.
Case 2 Laura Engels is a Christian homemaker in the South during the time of
slavery. After careful consideration, which includes reflection on the
context in which she was raised and lives, Laura forms the following CMJ,
“I judge that slavery is morally permissible.” Laura has not deduced this
judgment or formed it on the basis of principle or premise. It just seems
correct to her upon due reflection.
Both cases highlight the importance of assigning proper evidential weight to CMJs.
In case 1 the CMJ needs to be weighty enough to survive the RE process when brought
in-line with atheist principles.131 In case 2 the CMJ needs to be less weighty so that
through the RE process it is revised to become consistent with basic Christian principles.
For the sake of argument, I will assume atheist principles (e.g., survival of the fittest)
tend to be more accommodating of the idea of slavery, and I will assume Christian
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because of the overall moral good that results.
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principles (e.g., love your neighbor as yourself) tend to be less accommodating of
slavery.132 In case 1 atheist principles put revisionary pressure on the intuition that
slavery is immoral. In case 2 Christian principles put revisionary pressure on the
intuition that slavery is morally permissible.133 A successful RE methodology must
preserve and justify the CMJ in case 1, and it must revise the CMJ in case 2. Both Dr. B
and Laura are considering the context in making their CMJ. For Laura enculturation is
allowing her to have a false intuition. She is attaching too much weight to a false
intuition. If she assigns less weight to her intuition it will be revised when it comes into
conflict with intuitive Christian principles. Dr. B is not swayed by enculturation, but
unless he assigns enough weight to his intuition it will be revised, perhaps reversed, when
brought into equilibrium with intuitive atheist principles. These considerations illuminate
several important factors required for a reasonable inquirer to properly intuit and handle
moral truth.
To establish the evidential weight of CMJs I must clearly explain how weight can be
assigned to CMJs. I must show how it is possible to separate genuine from false
intuitions. The RE filtering mechanism must be strengthened to bolster RE’s ability to

132

These two assumptions are made strictly based on theoretical concerns. Failure of practice to reflect
principles does not bear on these assumptions. Many Christians probably justified harsh treatment of
slaves in the name of God while many atheists probably justified abolition in the name of fairness and
equality. It might even be the case that some Christian principles could be used to justify slavery or that
some evolutionary principles could be used to justify the moral treatment of slaves. I have made these
assumptions out of convention.
133
The Christian principle to “Love your neighbor as yourself” (Mark 12:31) can be formulated as a
golden rule, “Treat others only as you consent to being treated in the same situation” (Gensler 1998: 104).
Considering this principle against her intuition slavery is permissible Laura would have to imagine herself
in the place of a slave as vividly and accurately as she could. She might even have to get to know a slave to
know what they go through. Then, she would have to ask if she was African American would she want to
be treated as a piece of property or a mere animal. If not, the acceptability of her Christian principle would
place pressure on her to revise her CMJ.

81

capture CMJs with probative value and eliminate CMJs that lack probative value. The
notion of a competent judge also needs to be established. Laura might have formed her
moral judgment in ignorance of the specific facts of slavery. Perhaps she views slavery
as good for the Southern economy but is unaware of the historical and present-day
injustices committed in perpetuating the slave industry. Judging the morality of slavery
must be done in light of the specific facts of slavery. It might also be the case that Laura
is less open-minded and aware of how prejudice and bias are influencing her judgment
that slavery is morally permissible.134 In addition, it would be worthwhile for a
competent judge to possess sympathy and imagination to properly assess the moral worth
a particular policy or action has on a person or people group. Before accomplishing these
goals it will be important to get clear on some key terms.
5.3 A TAXONOMY OF KEY TERMS
To keep my analysis on-track I will define some key terms: intuitions, beliefs,
judgments, considered moral judgments, intuitiveness, intuitive judgment, evidence,
credence, balance, weight, specificity, and weight of evidence.
An intuition is a non-inferentially believed proposition that asserts an attraction to
assent.135 The intuition is believed on the basis of an adequate understanding of its
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content.136 It is not held based on any premises nor is it held as a theoretical hypothesis.
Reflecting on the proposition—with adequate understanding—the specific content of the
proposition exerts an attraction to assent to the truth of the proposition. Intuitions are not
necessary or a priori. Intuitions possess epistemic weight but they are fallible, as
reflection can lead them to be corrected, improved or defeated.
A belief is a propositional attitude. It comes in degrees of confidence to affirm the
truth of the proposition. To believe a proposition one must be sufficiently confident in
the proposition. Belief requires a degree of confidence of the truth of the proposition that
is above a certain threshold.137
A judgment is a cognitive act of affirmation. Whether one holds an intuition or a
belief depends on whether one is disposed to affirm the proposition intuited or believed.
A considered moral judgment is an intuition that one affirms under ideal conditions
after having reflected on the proposition with an adequate understanding of the content of
the proposition.
Intuitiveness is a property of a proposition that elicits “the sense of non-inferential
credibility”138 under certain conditions. This term marks an important distinction
between an intuition and something being intuitive. An intuition may non-inferentially
seem true (i.e., seem to have a credibility of its own) and be intuitive, yet one may fail to
believe the intuition is true. It can fail to be believed to be true, yet it can seem to be true.

intuitions. I am most closely aligned with Sosa, though parts of my account of intuitions have an Audiemphasis.
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An intuition may also non-inferentially be believed and assert an attraction to assent, but
it may fail to possess intuitiveness because the intuition is based on a complex
proposition that does not readily elicit a sense of non-inferential credibility. In such a
case, it can be believed to be true, yet it can fail to seem true.
An intuitive judgment is an act of affirmation that is accompanied by a sense of noninferential credibility.139 Throughout the RE procedure intuitive judgments are made in
the process of filtration, revision and seeking harmony between judgments and principles.
Evidence for a belief is that which can increase the likelihood of the truth of the
belief.140 Evidence can also tell against the truth of a belief. Evidence can come in a
range of strengths. Putting together confidence and evidence, it might be rational to
proportion one’s confidence in a proposition to the strength of one’s evidence. An
epistemic goal might be to believe all propositions to a degree of confidence that is
appropriate, which could mean, “believing everything with the exact degree of
confidence that the evidence warrants.”141 Evidence can shape what one is justified in
believing or it is reasonable to believe. It can also confirm or disconfirm a theory or
hypothesis.142
Credence is a subjective estimate of the truth-value of a belief. It is a probabilistic
notion that allows for an expression of the level of confidence a person places in the truth
of a belief. Credence is a term that covers these confidence levels: degrees of belief,
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subjective probabilities, and grades of uncertainty. Specifically, “a person’s credence in
X is a measure of the extent to which she is disposed to presuppose X in her theoretical
and practical reasoning.”143 Beliefs, at a given time, can be represented by a set of credal
functions Ct (i.e., a credal state). To each proposition X and condition Y, for each
element in Ct, there is a credence function that assigns a unique real number 0 ≤ c (X|Y)
≤ 1.144 Credences obey laws of probability. This makes how strongly one believes a

proposition X expressible in real numbers in an interval between 0 and 1. The degree of
truth of a CMJ can vary in concert with its degree of justification. In general, the higher
the credence level, the higher the degree of justification.145
Continuing to explicate these terms along Bayesian lines the next three terms
(balance, weight and specificity) concern how a person’s subjective probabilities
(credences) reflect a person’s total evidence. In a given credal state a person’s
unconditional and conditional probabilities can reflect one’s total evidence or what it is
reasonable to believe given one’s total evidence. Proposition X increases evidence for
another proposition Y as long as the probability of X conditional on Y surpasses the
unconditional probability of X. Balance, weight, and specificity explain how
probabilities can reflect total evidence.146
Balance is connected with individual probability values. The balance of the
evidence determines how firmly the evidence counts for or against a proposition,
143
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hypothesis or theory. Balance is a valance notion that tells in what direction the evidence
points.
Weight indicates how substantial the evidence is. The weight of evidence increases
as one’s evidence increases. Weight can be thought of as a measure of the sum of
evidence on which the probabilities are founded. New evidence increases the weight of
evidence, but it may decrease the probability of the proposition being true—it may
decrease the balance of evidence. So, if the evidence for a proposition, hypothesis or
theory is weighty this does not necessarily mean it is more likely to be true than a
proposition, hypothesis or theory that is less weighty.147
Distinguishing weight from balance can be done using an example.148 The following
example is a case where one acquires more evidence, thus more weight of evidence, but it
does not change the balance of one’s evidence. Imagine one randomly grabs a coin, flips
it once and it lands on tails. One flips it again and it lands on heads on the second flip. If
the coin is flipped two years from now how much credence should one put in the
proposition that the coin will land on tails at that time? Given the current evidence, it is
reasonable to assign a credence of .5 to the proposition. If the coin is flipped a thousand
more times and one keeps careful records about the outcomes and the evidence is in-line
with the coin being fair, then one should still assign .5 to the proposition that the coin will
land tails two years from now. The balance of evidence has not changed, but the weight
of evidence has substantially increased. A few conclusions can be drawn. Balance
147
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concerns how confident it is reasonable to be that a proposition is true given one’s total
evidence. Weight is not reflected in the confidence it is reasonable to have toward a
proposition. Weight is what it is reasonable to believe in light of new evidence. The
weight of evidence shows up in the resilience of credences in light of new evidence.149
As James Joyce says:
Increasing the gross amount of relevant evidence for X tends to cause credences
to concentrate more and more heavily on increasingly smaller subsets of chance
hypotheses, and this concentration tends to become more resilient. As a result,
the excepted chance of X comes to depend more and more heavily on the
distribution of credence over a smaller and smaller set of chance hypothesis.150
Weight of evidence for a hypothesis is reflected in the stability of X’s credences
across a credal state. The specificity of evidence for a hypothesis is reflected in the
spread of credence values across a credal state. Specificity is, “the degree to which the
data discriminated the truth of the proposition from that of alternatives.”151 Ambiguity or
incompleteness in the evidence determines the spread in the credence values. As
evidence accumulates, weight and specificity tend to increase together, but they can come
apart. It is possible to gain in specificity without gaining in weight.152
The weight of evidence for a proposition relative to the evidence can be expressed
formally and metaphorically. The formal Bayesian expression of the weight of evidence
is in terms of stabilizing credences on a small set of chance hypotheses. If there is a high
weight of evidence, adding new evidence E it will not tend change a proposition X’s
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probability conditional on the chance hypotheses. The difference between the credence
for the proposition conditional on the new evidence c(X|E) and the unconditional
probability of the proposition c(X) will be small. What is stabilized is the distance
between X’s credence and X’s chance hypotheses. The weight of evidence for X relative
to E can be can be captured by a formula.153 The formula shows that the overall weight
of the evidence for X relative to E [w(X,E)] will be smaller in relation to how weighty the
evidence for X is. Another important idea the formula captures is that weight has no
evidential valence. This means the weight is the same for X as it is for ~X. Looking
only at the statistical version of weight of evidence would make the title of this thesis
moot. On this account, weight is not a concept for or against a proposition. It is a
measure of the stability of the proposition when introduced to evidence. It is not a
measure of the evidential valence of the proposition, which is often presupposed when
weight is used in other contexts.
There are additional ways weight of evidence is used. The metaphorical use of the
term weight of evidence typically stands for a summary interpretation or synthesis of the
evidence.154 When weight of evidence is used in this sense or when the term weight (or
weighty) is used in this regard there is no accompanying methodology.155 The author
could be using the following phrase, “in my all-things-considered estimation the
153
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proposition X is significant relative to E to a certain degree.” There is not an explicit
weighing of the evidence but more of a gut-reaction to what seems to be the case given
total considerations. Weight of evidence can also be referred to as a methodology. A
contrast can be made between the strength of evidence, which covers statistically positive
and significant results from a subset of the evidence, with the weight of evidence that
looks at all evidence—positive and negative, significant and insignificant.156 Weight of
evidence can also take-on a theoretical meaning. In legal theory weight of evidence can
be given a conceptual framework. Four concepts of this framework include:
1. Relevance: the extent to which any single piece of evidence could have the
tendency to make a fact more or less probable.
2. Reliability: the extent to which the evidence is of a sort reasonably relied
upon to form an opinion or inference.
3. Sufficiency: the threshold “weight” of the totality of the evidence needed to
infer a claim.
4. Standard of Proof: levels of proof needed for the sufficiency of different
types of legal opinions or inferences, e.g., in civil versus criminal cases.157
The four theoretical concepts cover important aspects of weight of evidence. They
are qualitative in nature or left up to the intuitive judgment of a competent judge.
Relevance concerns how a single piece of evidence contributes to the probability of a
fact. Like the Bayesian notion of balance it is a matter of how the evidence is reflected
in the individual credences. If a single piece of data has a relevant weight of evidence, it
will tend to make a fact more or less probable. The distinction between relevance and
balance is that relevance is a notion that is less rigorously statistical and it highlights
whether a bit of data has the ability to support or detract from the probability of a fact.
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Balance, on the other hand, indicates the direction that the bit of data actually points and
the degree to which it points in that direction. Relevance indicates the possibility of
valence, whereas balance is equal to the valence (credence). Reliability is the extent to
which it is rational to form an inference based on the evidence or proposition. CMJs are
often attacked as not being reliable because they are not stable or truth-conducive.
However, if evidence has a dimension of balance then one has a measure of how
confident it is reasonable to be that a proposition is true given one’s total evidence. The
higher the balance of evidence is in favor of a proposition the more reasonable it is to rely
on the proposition in situations of inference. Sufficiency concerns whether the total
evidence passes a threshold whereby the evidence is sufficient for inferring a claim.
Standard of proof recognizes that different moral claims might require different degrees
of sufficiency. The four theoretical concepts just mentioned are more qualitative than
quantitative because there is no precise formula that indicates how to calculate each
dimension. Weight of evidence in this regard informs an inquirer how she should look at
individual and total evidence to estimate the importance of the evidence to the
proposition at hand.
I have covered the Bayesian, metaphorical, methodological and theoretical uses of
the term weight of evidence to arrive at a more precise formulation of the phrase. I will
use the phrase weight of evidence or evidential weight to cover both a qualitative
dimension of intuitive judgment on the importance of the evidence and a quantitative
dimension that estimates the likelihood of the truth of the evidence and how stable the
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evidence is when presented with new information. As a result, the evidential weight of a
body of evidence can be defined as follows:
Evidential Weight: Quantitatively, it is a statistical measure that is reflected in
the concentration of credences around a group of chance hypothesis, and, thus,
stability in light of new evidence (weight), and the balance of evidence in favor of
a proposition as represented by the proposition’s credence values (balance).
Qualitatively, it is a method of intuitively weighing individual or total evidence in
accordance with the degree to which four theoretical concepts are attributable to
the evidence—relevance, reliability, sufficiency, and standard of proof.
The quantitative and qualitative aspects of evidential weight are two modes of
inquiry. One could be rigorous and apply credence values to propositions (CMJs). This
allows for precision when revising beliefs within one’s belief-set. If the balance of total
evidence in one’s belief-set favors proposition X over proposition Y and one is trying to
decide between the two proposition one rationally ought to favor X over Y. In situations
of conflict one ought to be prone to revise Y before X to resolve the conflict. This means
revising the lower credence values as compared to the higher credence values relative to
the total evidence. Using the quantitative measure also helps an inquirer to know when
the credences are stabilizing. As the weight of evidence mounts the credences tend to
settle around a small group of chance hypotheses. As one exposes one’s belief system to
conditions that upset equilibrium one will gain in stability until new evidence no longer
upsets equilibrium because the credences are sufficiently resilient. This helps an inquirer
to know when to stop reflection and when one’s evidence has acquired an acceptable
degree of weight. Evidential weight can also be evaluated intuitively based on how it
seems the evidence tends to make a fact more or less probable, how reasonable it is to use
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the evidence as a premise in inference, the threshold of the weight needed to infer a
claim, and the sufficiency of different types of inferences.
5.4 FRAMING THE INPUT OBJECTION IN KEY TERMS
Using the key terms detailed in the last section it is possible to gain clarity on the
input objection. The objection finds sharp expression in Brant’s A Theory of the Good
and the Right.158 Brandt attacks the legitimacy of appeal to ethical intuitions or
considered moral judgments (CMJs). According to Brandt moral intuitions are firmlyheld moral beliefs. They are indicated by dispositions to affirm specific normative
statements. They are non-inferential because they are not held based on logical relations
to other beliefs (e.g., holding a belief that a mass killing at a school is wrong because it is
an instance of a general principle that one already accepts, such as, murder is wrong).
Brandt mentions the other standard features of a CMJ: made in moments of calm, not
distorted by self-interest, and includes any level of generality (i.e., from a particular
action to a whole class of actions). How committed an inquirer is to a normative
statement can be placed on a scale from 0 (no inclination to belief) to 1 (strongest
possible belief). A degree of belief in a non-inferential intuition determines the person’s
initial credence level. Initial credence levels allow one to choose between normative
beliefs with the purpose of maximizing initial credence levels. This is where the
coherence theory of justification enters Brant’s interpretation of Rawls’ procedure.
Proposed normative principles are tested against intuitions, and specific intuitions are
tested whether they can be included in a system that maximizes initial credence levels.
158
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The problem with this requirement is that requiring consistency does not provide much
guidance for the process of belief revision. It might turn out that beliefs are true or false
and that one could make consistent a set of falsehoods. Revising to preserve initial
credence levels does not assure initial credences correspond to credibilities unless there is
good reason to think that the initial credences are truth apt.
The quickest way to respond to Brandt is by noticing that I have revised RE to be a
foundationalist procedure. The foundations express initial credibility not merely degrees
of commitment. Taking this response a step further in light of the taxonomy of terms one
can see that credence is an estimate of the truth-value of a belief. Credence is a
probabilistic notion that allows for a precise specification of the subjective estimates of
the degrees of belief in a proposition. Though, credence is not a purely subjective
measure because credences are assigned in relation to relevant evidence. Evidence is that
which can increase or decrease the likelihood of the truth of a belief. It is rational to
assign credences to beliefs based on the strength of one’s evidence. Evidence can be
reflected in the credence values along the lines of weight, balance and specificity.
Against this idea, it seems that inference could guide the assignment of credence values,
which undercuts the non-inferential character of CMJs.
Against the objection above it is possible to argue that evidence does not entail
inference. Matthew Bedke argues against the assumption that evidence entails inference
and holds that intuitions can have evidential value without being inferred from
evidence.159 A direct realist like Huemer can hold that awareness of external objects
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provides evidence for propositions about those objects. The belief about the object must
be based on the intuition in order to be justified, but the basing relation does not have to
be inferential. It can be a causal chain of a certain type whereby the direct awareness of
the object causes the intuition. This also allows one to overcome Brandt’s objection that
it is not clear what kind of facts normative claims express. A normative fact is not just a
disposition to affirm a non-inferential intuition; rather, it is a relation a non-inferential
intuition bears to an object of intuition. If Rawls had adopted such a stance on intuitions
and avoided a strict coherentist/holist conception of justification his claim that, “[t]here is
a definite if limited class of facts against which conjectured principles can be checked”160
would have been less confusing, and he would have avoided objections like the input
objection as raised by Brant.
Brant’s objection also includes a concern about cultural indoctrination. Because the
beliefs we happen to have, and tend to affirm upon reflection, might be influenced by the
culture in which we were raised a procedure that systematizes such beliefs may only be
“no more than a reshuffling of moral prejudices.” Across cultures there is great moral
disagreement. Some cultures embrace child infanticide as a form of spiritual sacrifice.
Some cultures embrace the efficient slaughter of cows as a food source. Other cultures
view the cow as sacred and prohibit killing of the cow for mere consumption. When
different equilibria between contemporary and traditional cultures conflict there is no
easy way to choose between the belief systems. The rational or moral action to perform
in a given case might be culturally relative. Antecedent moral commitments do not
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provide a way to resolve moral disagreements unless there is some reason to think that
the subjective probabilities are not biased or that there is a robust way to handle bias
within a system of subjective probability.
On the Bayesian account is it possible to handle bias. Joyce has illustrated this point
as follows:
Bayesians are often portrayed as radical subjectivists who reject any meaningful
epistemic distinction between evidence and biases. On a subjectivist picture, a
person’s biases merely reflect her ‘prior’ judgments of credibility about various
propositions, while her evidence is the ‘posterior’ information she gains from
experience. This suggests a model in which a person starts off with a prior
probability C0 that reflects her initial judgments of credibility (sophisticated
treatments make this a set of priors), and learning proceeds by updating the priors
in light of data.161
This quote makes it seem that there is something right about the input objection. It
seems right to call CMJs biases. Of course, one mitigates bias by forming CMJs under
ideal conditions, but, nevertheless, CMJs are prior credibility judgments that may reflect
certain biases. The problem with the input objection is that it is not the whole story. One
is not simply reshuffling priors to maximize initial degrees of commitment. Priors on the
foundationalist model have a greater degree of contact with reality, especially when
direct realism is assumed, and they are subjected to experience so that the posterior
information which is brought into reflective equilibrium has sufficiently weeded out
propositions that seemed credible initially but which turned out to not be credible upon
further reflection and exposure to experience.162 This is why CMJs possess prima facie
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credibility and are not ultima facie credible or are not taken to be infallible, incorrigible
or indubitable. In this regard, it is reasonable to use CMJs even though it is possible that
some CMJs reflect some degree of cultural and familial indoctrination that is nonveridical.
Now I will solve the input objection by going through each component in the RE
process that enables CMJs to possess positive epistemic status and to be put to good use
in a methodological role of moral justification. These components are as follows:
architecture, general procedure, competent moral judge, intuitions, standard filter criteria,
upgraded filter criteria, credences, principles, and revision procedures. My new
interpretation of RE is called moderate-RE (MRE).
5.5 ARCHITECTURE
MRE possesses an architecture consisting of modest foundationalism and minimal
coherentism. On this perspective one starts with beliefs that are non-inferential or
credible independently from their fit with other beliefs. Bringing these beliefs into
coherence increases the credibility of the beliefs, but coherence is not sufficient for the
justification of the beliefs. Instead, modest foundationalism claims that, “a moral belief
can be justified independently of its inferential relations with other moral beliefs.”163
Despite this, MRE can accommodate the idea that mutual support between beliefs is a
desirable and necessary feature. Mutual support may increase the justification of beliefs,
and be necessary for the ultima facie justification of beliefs, but coherence is not
without critically examining the reasons for accepting the beliefs. This captures Rawls’ intuition that,
“reflective equilibrium...is a notion characteristic of the study of principles which govern actions shaped by
self-examination. Moral philosophy is Socratic” (Rawls 1971: 48-49).
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sufficient for justification because some beliefs can be prima facie credible or justified
independent from coherentist requirements.164 On this account, “a belief is [ultima facie]
justified just when it belongs to that highly coherent belief-system which coheres best, on
the whole, with these modest foundations.”165 MRE is a search for a coherent system that
best accommodates modest foundations. CMJs serve as modest foundations.
There are several motivations behind the modest foundationalist architecture in
MRE. Pure coherentism maintains a counterintuitive proposal on the credibility of
beliefs. It is reasonable for a coherentist to hold that if there are two theories that are
equally good in every regard but one aligns better with independently credible beliefs,
then the one that accords with the independently credible beliefs is a better theory. It is
counterintuitive to hold that fit with independently credible beliefs is a good thing, but
beliefs are only justified in relation to other beliefs. Brad Hooker captures this
awkwardness as follows:
So, for coherentists, an independently attractive moral belief, although itself
unjustified unless or until it is connected to other moral beliefs, can play a
decisive role in an argument for one moral theory against another. This seems to
me an awkward position to maintain. If some well-informed moral belief seems
independently attractive to us, and if a moral theory’s accordance with this belief
counts in favour of the moral theory, why hold back from calling the belief [prima
facie] justified.166
Aside from the awkwardness of the pure coherentist rendering of RE there is another
reason to move away from pure coherentism. Thomas Pogge points out that CMJs (i.e.,
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firmly-held convictions) can increase in credibility when they cohere with other firmlyheld convictions. An analogy to legal theory can be drawn such that, “If two material
witnesses give independent and matching descriptions of events, each of their testimonies
becomes more credible than it would have been on its own.”167 The analogy to legal
reasoning is telling because a similar analogy is used to argue against coherence theory.
As already noted in chapter 4, formal epistemology has produced impossibility results
that indicate pure coherence theory is not truth-conducive. If a pure coherentist approach
to RE is assumed, coherence must be able to create credibility from scratch. That is, a
series of beliefs that are not independently credible when brought into coherence ought to
be capable of creating credibility.168 If one takes the don’t worry strategy there is no
guarantee that beliefs that are not independently credible, and not merely believed, can
lead to a credible system of beliefs in the end. If one assumes that beliefs are
independently credible, one has assumed those beliefs are foundations of some stripe; so,
one has already moved away from pure coherence theory. These technical results
corroborate the idea that firmly-held convictions (or the testimony of credible witnesses)
can only generate credible conclusions or increase credibility because the convictions are
167
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independently credible.169 Credibility has to get into the system somehow and pure
coherence theory is unable to account for this fact. Matching testimonies of unreliable
witnesses will not, necessarily, result in information that is credible. Coherence alone of
different testimonies or beliefs is not a sufficient condition for directing a jury or a moral
inquirer toward truth.170 However, if modest foundations possess independent credibility,
then bringing them together can increase the warrant of the entire system.171
Another motivation for modest foundationalism is that RE assumes a foundationalist
requirement.172 This is the requirement that the judgments that we actually favor play a
justificatory role in reaching equilibrium. In deciding between two equally coherent, yet
mutually incompatible belief systems, imagine I accept the first system as true and, thus,
believe the second is false. The first system is true because I favor my favored beliefs.
This reason plays a self-justifying or foundationalist role and coherentist requirements
cannot explain my choice because the coherentist chains of justification are contained
within the belief systems. If principles and CMJs are coherent, yet they are not actually
held, then they are not pertinent to the reflective procedure for the person who does not
169
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hold those beliefs. The foundationalist architecture is the ground-floor in MRE, but
coherentist considerations are used, as needed, to revise fallible foundations, increase
justification and generate the final state of justification.
The final reason that MRE utilizes modest foundations is that RE is compatible with
such foundations. The later Rawls allowed for a moderate interpretation of RE whereby
rational intuitionism or other foundationalist perspectives were not excluded from the RE
procedure.173 On such an interpretation, “to show that our moral convictions ‘fit together
in reflective equilibrium’ requires that we demonstrate how our most considered
convictions about right and wrong are derivable from a moral conception which itself has
a deductive basis in these abstract rational intuitions.”174 MRE is compatible with
holding that all-things-considered abstract moral principles are self-evident and can
provide a deductive basis for moral convictions.175 This deductive basis may only be
realized after principles are discovered that account for convictions and all elements are
brought into agreement, but such a basis is possible nonetheless. One thing that is
excluded is simply deducing convictions from principles.176 This would make seeking
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RE akin to taking an abstract principle and applying it to specific cases to reach moral
convictions. Instead, MRE holds that fit with considered judgments that are
independently credible is a desirable element of justification, and that a system of beliefs
can have a deductive basis in moral intuitions while, at the same time, serving as a
deductive basis for the intuitions.177 Establishing the credibility of the moral convictions
must not have been done as inferences or deductions from other beliefs. Although, it is
possible once the credibility of these judgments is established that one can see how one
could infer from abstract principles to the moral convictions.
5.6 GENERAL PROCEDURES
This section provides an overview of the MRE methodology. There are two specific
objections raised by Tom Regan that MRE must address: prejudice and conservatism.178
Prejudice implies that intuitions that are not truth-conducive and they may slip into a
procedure that emphasizes intuitions. Conservatism holds that moral convictions reflect
the status quo, as they merely reflect cultural conditioning. Prejudice will be addressed in
the section on moral intuitions and the reliability filters and conservatism will be
addressed in the section on credences. These objections are addressed as manifestations
of the input objection.
The input objection, as formulated by Brandt, distinguishes subjective credence from
objective credibility and argues that moral judgments do not count as evidence for the
epistemology, to justify moral beliefs. A separate, worthwhile endeavor involves using MRE to fend off
the moral skeptic. That is not the primary objective of this thesis.
177
A helpful understanding of RE is that, “we can rely on our capacities for moral reasoning under
appropriate conditions, and that our moral judgments are not always arbitrary but are capable of discerning
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truth of a theory because they might stem from biases, historical accidents and prejudices.
Because of this MRE must make sure it is not merely reshuffling moral prejudices.
Brandt himself rejected the use of intuitions and argued in favor of rational desires that
survive psychological vetting. His idea is that one must get outside one’s system of
beliefs and assess the beliefs in relation to facts of logic and empirical reality. Daniels
argues against Brandt’s method at length.179 But Daniels is unable, as I argued in chapter
3, to address the question of the truth-conduciveness of CMJs. Daniels brought
objectivity into the procedure by subjecting beliefs to the widest possible amount of
critical scrutiny, but he evaded the truth-question by providing a methodological solution
to an epistemic question.180 To answer Brandt’s objection head-on I propose accepting
the charge of intuitionism/foundationalism.181 Let’s briefly consider the intuitionist’s
model.
A contemporary version of moral intuitionism finds expression in the work of Robert
Audi. The key for Audi is the notion of self-evidence. A proposition p is self-evident if,
“an adequate understanding of it is sufficient for being justified in believing it and for
knowing it one believes it on the basis of that understanding.”182 This makes there a
relation between understanding p and believing p, and it posits the adequacy of
179
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understanding as it relates to knowledge. As Audi says about the contrast between selfevidence and truth, “The application of the concept of self-evidence to a proposition
explains both how it can be known (roughly, through understanding it) and why its
justification requires no premises.”183 One might intuitively know that a proposition is
true without knowing why it is true because one lacks an adequate understanding of the
proposition. The truth of a proposition is apprehended through intuition. As Audi says,
“the primary role of intuition is to give us direct, i.e., non-inferential, knowledge or
justified belief of the truth of certain moral propositions.”184 So, for ethical intuitionism,
intuition provides justified belief of the truth, not the self-evidence, of moral
propositions. This distinction is important because the plurality of basic moral principles
(i.e. prima facie duties) that intuitionists tend to embrace need not be defended as noninferentially self-evident. Because the truth of intuitions is known based on complex
relations between concepts, yet self-evidence is known through knowledge about these
grounds, such knowledge might not be available. One might recognize the truth of a
proposition but not recognize the self-evidence of that proposition.185 Intuitions may or
may not have self-evident propositions as their objects. I mention these distinctions
because it allows me to borrow the notion of intuition from the ethical intuitionist without
thereby being committed to the self-evidence of the propositions intuited. An intuitionist
183
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notion of intuition will be used to get at the truth of CMJs—to show how CMJs are
genuine or objectively valid despite being fallible. This will provide a direct response to
Brant’s objection. Why defend CMJs or moral intuitions as truth-conducive?
I must explain how CMJs are truth-conducive because CMJs are the data, the
evidence, against which principles are evaluated. Though I provided a specific definition
of CMJs, the purpose of CMJs could be understood as, “judgments about what actions are
required, permissible, and/or forbidden in a particular set of circumstances, or about the
acceptability of a more general moral rule (either absolute or pro tanto) that specifies
what is required, permissible, and/or forbidden in a range of similar cases.”186 CMJs are
intuitions about the rightness or wrongness of actions. In MRE the accent of justification
is on CMJs. We ought to select a moral theory based on the considerations that we place
greatest credence in and these are our CMJs.187 When a group of principles (a theory)
best accounts for CMJs, then this match counts as evidence for the principles.
Alternative moral principles (or sets of moral principles) are tested by how well they fit
with one’s reflective intuitions. As Michael Huemer, a contemporary intuitionist, has
stated, “ethical intuitions provide prima facie justification for ethical beliefs.”188 Because
of the important role CMJs play in justification one must defend their status as truthconducive otherwise one is open to the objection that intuitions should not play such an
important role in the justification of ethical beliefs.
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Though the accent of justification is on CMJs this account is not committed to the
factivity of CMJs. There can be false intuitions. Even in ideal inquiry conditions it is
possible to have a false intuition because one’s intuition is biased or distorted by factors
of enculturation. Ideal inquiry conditions make it more likely that intuitions are correct,
but they do not absolutely block against the fact that, “a mere prejudice can masquerade
as an intuition.”189 MRE is only committed to the idea that our moral intuitions are not,
en masse, unreliable. MRE holds that, “our considered moral convictions are sufficiently
reliable to proceed with a moral theory of justice that at least approximates the correct or
most reasonable view.”190 This makes CMJs reliable, though not infallible, evidence of
moral truth. CMJs posses what Hooker calls independent credibility.191 CMJs are
attractive without reference to something beyond themselves, but CMJs might turn out to
be wrong. In addition, CMJs can accept support from other beliefs, even as they carry
their own justification or are attractive in their own right. Through systematization of
CMJs, and potential revision, there exist resources to correct false or merely apparent
intuitions. Over time beliefs should come to track the truth to a greater degree as biases
and inconsistencies are uncovered and eliminated. This is part of the process of
achieving greater moral maturity. One comes to see with greater clarity what is true
regarding moral and immoral actions.
This is also how MRE solves the weak version of the input objection. The weak
version of the input objection holds that there is no reason to think CMJs are true. MRE
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shows how CMJs possess evidential weight and this explains why it is reasonable to think
that CMJs are true.192 Though it is possible that some CMJs are false, as MRE proceeds
the probability of there being false CMJs in one’s belief-set continues to diminish.
MRE is a process of deliberately inducing conditions for the moral development of
an individual. Often, one’s moral beliefs settle into an unhealthy homeostasis. This
occurs when one’s belief-set contains biases, inconsistencies or explanatory inadequacies
that go unchecked. Uncertainty, instability or new experience can upset a homeostasis
and lead to a new equilibrium point. The general flow of MRE is to establish
equilibrium, upset equilibrium, allow beliefs to settle, then self-induce uncertainty
through self-examination or increased experience.193 This captures the intuition that
people only typically re-examine their moral beliefs when their world is shaken by
personal or social tragedy and suffering. In this regard, MRE aims to be proactive beliefformation and moral maturity methodology. Now I will review the standard RE
procedure and indicate how MRE differs from this procedure.
In typical RE methodology one begins with a set of moral intuitions. These
intuitions are examined and only intuitions that one can confidently affirm are retained.
Grounds for dismissal include suspicious formative factors or occasional epistemic
distorting factors that generate instability and vagueness in a moral judgment. The
retained intuitions become CMJs because they are judgments one is inclined to adopt
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under conditions conducive to good decision making. From the CMJs, principles are
inferred or conjectured that might account for the CMJs. Working from both ends one
revises principles and CMJs until they are mutually supportive. From narrow-RE one
proceeds to wide-RE whereby different background theories are introduced to test the set
of CMJs and principles under different conceptions. These conceptions are arguments
for and against the current set of beliefs and act as further evidence against which beliefs
are revised. When CMJs, principles and background theories are harmonized one has
achieved wide-RE.194 As already argued, wide-RE does not constitute a theoretical
advantage or an increase in justificatory force over and above narrow-RE. For this
reason I will continue to focus on narrow-RE and defend it against the charge that it is
fundamentally conservative (i.e., matches principles with relatively fixed CMJs). By
contrast, the MRE method might be outlined in the following steps, which will be
elaborated in forthcoming sections in this chapter:195
1. Ensure that one is a competent moral judge.
2. Collect all moral intuitions.
3. Validate the genuineness of each intuition by verifying four requirements are met:
non-inferentiality (or directness), firmness, comprehension, and pretheoreticality.
4. Discard intuitions that are not genuine.
a. This includes propositions that are not beliefs but are mere inclinations to
believe (i.e., held with less than .5 degrees of confidence).196
5. Validate that genuine intuitions are genuine CMJs by putting the intuitions
through three filters: occasional epistemic distorting factors (OEDF), suspicious
formative factors (SFF), and the mixed error menagerie (MEM).
a. This is where the data is validated as veridical.
194
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386).
196
This distinction expresses the idea that confidence is related to degrees of belief, whereas credence is
related to the truth value of the beliefs. Evidential weight covers both of these dimensions.
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b. MEM is a mixed filter that includes some elements in previous filters, but
it also includes other elements not found in previous filters. Such
redundancy generates greater purity of filtration.
6. Disregard CMJs that fail any of the three filter tests.197
7. Apply credences to the remaining intuitions (the CMJs) according to the strength
with which one is attracted to assent to the truth of the intuitions.198
a. These assertions might have the following form: Moral judge X judges
that p is the case to degree of strength c.
b. This is assigning evidential weight to the CMJs.
8. Rank the CMJs according to their credence values.
9. Infer or conjecture from the CMJs to principles that account for the CMJs.
10. Revise the principles in an effort to discover the set of principle that best cohere
with the modest foundations (the CMJs).199
a. This is how the accent is placed on CMJs.200
b. To decrease the risk of accidental generalization, favor principles that
have the greatest degree of explanatory power.
11. In situations of conflict where principles are recalcitrant to revision (i.e., they
resist revision or keep reappearing while seeking inference from CMJs and
coherence with them) revise some CMJs so that they are in-line with the resistive
principles.
12. When revising CMJs be more willing to revise CMJs with lesser evidential weight
and be less willing to revise CMJs with greater evidential weight.201
a. In a case where one holds CMJ1 with .5 credence and CMJ2 with equal
credence, and there are no CMJs held with lesser credence, then one may
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This step overcomes a doxastic conservative stance whereby anything a subject believes has some merit
counting in its favor, which might include products of superstition or wishful thinking. For an example of
such a position see Elgin 1996: Ch. 4. The inquirer must not only have a genuine belief or intuition but the
belief must also seem to be the case. The filters eliminate things that seem to be the case but really are not
the case. Products of superstition and wishful thinking are filtered out. This step aligns MRE with
phenomenal conservatism whereby things that seem to be veridical have a presumption in their favor,
which includes but is not limited to things that are believed. This is not, however, pure phenomenal
conservatism because things seem true in relation to certain filter criteria, not simply by seeming to be the
case to the person.
198
This use of credence, which covers ‘degree of belief’, is echoed in DePaul 2006: 620 n.13. It
corresponds to how likely is seems to the agent that the proposition intuited (believed) is true.
199
This can be instantiated in terms of explanatory power.
200
It is interesting to note that the accent on CMJs reverses the consequentialist impulse to put more
weight on abstract principles and less weight on intuitions about specific cases. Intuitions can be at any
level of generality, but they tend to be about specific cases. The bumper sticker for MRE reads: trust your
intuition.
201
Notice that all judgments with credence values are allowed into consideration. This avoids the problem
of the confidence constraint whereby one eliminates CMJs that possess lesser evidential weight. Even
judgments that one is not fully confident in are considered, but they are considered in accordance with the
confidence it is reasonable to put in them in relation to the evidence in their favor. This captures Scanlon’s
suggestion to consider all judgments with credence values (Scanlon 2003: 144).
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resolve the conflict using the criterion of intuitiveness for which the CMJ
that elicits a greater sense of non-inferential credibility is revised last.
b. Repeat steps 10-12 until CMJs and principles are brought into a state of
mutual support or maximal coherence.
13. Consider other hidden assumptions or background principles that one finds
intuitive in relation to the set of CMJs.
14. Apply these background principles to the belief set and revise the CMJs, the
principles, or the background principles as needed.202
15. When CMJs and principles are maximally coherent one has achieved moderate
reflective equilibrium (MRE).
16. As new experience (empirical or informational) is encountered revise current
commitments in light of new experience to achieve a belief set that is more
comprehensive and fully justified. Also, revise beliefs as one intuits new moral
convictions and infers or conjectures principles from these convictions.203
There are several points worth mentioning about the MRE procedure. The MRE
procedure invites an inquirer to establish and defend why credences are equal to
credibilities. It allows an inquirer to explain and rank what seems true according to
degrees of commitment. It then asks the inquirer to apply external filter criteria to
credence values that are subjectively weighted. This challenges the inquirer to make the
subjective more objective. The external filter criteria are independently credible because
they are standards that address typical ways in which intuitions can be mistaken.204
Credences are validated and one is warranted in putting the credence one does in one’s
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These background principles are not the same as the background theories of wide-RE. They are not
required to be a systematic conception that is applied to the current set of beliefs. It is assumed that a
reasonable conception has already been generated. The background principles may produce slight
alteration in one’s current moral conception, but these are likely to be refinements instead of radical
departures from current commitments.
203
There is not a mandate that people seek formative experiences, as is mandated by DePaul 1993. It is
assumed that one must remain open to experience and seek to revise beliefs in light of experience, which
means that the person is a competent judge. Unless one is completely isolated from society one will have
ample feedback for the revision of beliefs. If one is in isolation, then imagination can proxy for the role of
experience.
204
The filter criteria come from ethical intuitionism’s attempt to explain moral disagreement. If moral
beliefs are facts, then how come there is so much disagreement? Intuitionists, like Huemer, explain
disagreement by showing how people go wrong in reasoning, how distortions stem from errors common to
reasoning in general and morality in particular.
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CMJs because the CMJs have survived filtration. In addition, the CMJs themselves are
genuine intuitions. They meet four requirements for being properly formed and held by
an inquirer. As such, CMJs are likely to be truth-conducive because the conditions and
constitution of genuine intuitions has been satisfied. This makes it rational for one to put
the evidential weight one does in the CMJs. A competent judge who follows MRE will
tend to reach justified moral beliefs. Akin to observation reports, the competent judge
will tend to veridically apprehend moral matters. For example, one might be able to see
that under certain factual circumstances it is very likely one should keep one’s promise.
This is similar to claiming that a competent perceiver, under conditions favorable to good
perception, will see an orange on the kitchen counter when there is in fact an orange on
the kitchen counter.205 This is why the first step in the procedure is important. If one is
not a competent moral judge, then one might not be able to apprehend moral truth. A
color-blind perceiver may be unable to apprehend the truth of certain color perceptions.
Similarly, if one is highly self-interested, closed-minded and unwilling to use the
intuition requirements and filter criteria that lead to good moral judgments, then one may
not see the true moral propositions. If the agent is defective in terms of moral
competence, then moral truth is not likely to be apprehended and false judgments are
likely to result. For this reason I will re-introduce the notion of a competent judge back
into the RE procedure.
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Relating this example to intuitions, the constitution conditions on the intuitions make sure that what one
is receiving through one’s epistemic channel is in fact a genuine intuition. It separates, for example,
emotional reactions from reflective seemings. The favorable conditions (e.g., good lighting) are akin to the
filter criteria that ensure the conditions under which genuine intuitions are formed are conducive to forming
veridical judgments.
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5.7 COMPETENT MORAL JUDGE
From Rawls’ first articulation of a “decision procedure” in ethics (1951) to his
embedding of a similar procedure in his theory of justice (1971) the notion of a
competent moral judge was dropped. It is possible to speculate why this occurred. One
possibility is that Rawls dropped the notion of a competent judge under the sway of
Quinean epistemology. Instead of focusing on the agent making the judgments, the focus
changed to the beliefs themselves. In A Theory of Justice the make-up of the agent
bringing the judgments into reflective equilibrium is not central as long as the beliefs
themselves are mutually supportive. The shift to focus on beliefs accords with the shift to
a holistic, coherentist reading of the procedure. Another possibility is that Rawls’
original position is thought to embody many of the characteristics of a competent judge.
It is possible to assume that behind the veil of perception one would be a competent
judge. Regardless of the possible reasons for dropping the competent judge I will reinsert the competent judge into the procedure to guard against person-centered mistakes
in making moral judgments.
Whether or not RE contains a provision on the inquirer being a competent moral
judge impacts the justificatory force of a CMJ within RE. When Rawls dropped the
competent judge it had the effect of weakening the notion of a CMJ. This exposed RE, as
found in A Theory of Justice, to the objection that the data of RE lack credibility. Thus,
the credibility of CMJs is going to be restored, in part, by reintroducing the competent
judge and the more stringent notion of a CMJ.
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The notion of a competent judge has two categories of characteristics—general
knowledge capacities and moral knowledge capacities. The first category includes the
following features: average intelligence, general knowledge of the world and the
consequences of actions, knowledge of the facts of specific cases where one is called to
judge, a willingness to use logical reasoning to determine what one should believe, and
an open-minded when it comes to re-examining options in light of further evidence. In
the second category are characteristics attuned to capturing moral knowledge. For
example, a competent judge, “knows, or tries to know, his own emotional, intellectual,
and moral predilections and makes a conscientious effort to take them into account in
weighing the merits of any question.”206 This self-knowledge is important because it
results in the ability to account for one’s prejudices and biases. Though biases may
influence one’s judgments, such biases do not determine the outcome of one’s judgments
because one is insufficiently aware of their influence. A competent judge must also have
a sympathetic knowledge of human interests that tend to conflict and create moral
dilemmas.207 Experience is important in gaining knowledge of human interests. Where
experience is incomplete Rawls’ admits the importance of imagination. Through
“imaginative appreciation” the competent judge can imagine how interests can
conflict.208 The judge can then lay before himself, “all the interests in conflict, together
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Rawls 1951: 179.
This is called perceptive equilibrium by Martha Nussbaum 1990: 25-26. As Charles Harris summarizes
this notion, “We must place ourselves in the position of another as fully as we can in order to determine
what moral judgment is proper” (Harris 2005: 73).
208
A contemporary take on this idea is the notion of hypothetical retrospection (Hansson 2007). This is
where one imagines a future possibility has materialized. One does this to minimize risks and
uncertainties. The correct course of action is the alternative that is morally permissible according to all
207
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with the relevant facts of the case, and to bestow upon the appraisal of each the same care
which he would give to it if that interest were his own.”209 Imaginatively taking-on the
interests of others as if they are one’s own serves the end of impartial judgment. A
competent judge is impartial and reasonable in the appraisal of moral matters.
MRE’s adoption of the notion of a competent judge has the effect of sharpening the
notion of a CMJ. DePaul summarizes the notion of a CMJ in relation to Rawls’ notion of
a competent judge as follows:
(1) the judge does not stand to be punished for making the judgment, (2) the judge
does not stand to gain by making the judgment, (3) the judgment concerns a real
case where real interests are in conflict, not a merely hypothetical case, (4) the
judgment was preceded by careful inquiry into facts and fair opportunity for all
concerned to state their side, (5) the judge feels sure of the judgment, (6) the
judgment is stable for the judge across time and shared by other competent
judges, and (7) the judgment is intuitive, in the sense that it was not formed as a
result of the conscious application of moral principles.210
This more restrictive notion of a CMJ details the type of judgment a competent judge
is likely, willing and required to make. Competent judges possess characteristics
conducive to the generation of CMJs as outlined in the preceding quote. On this account,
CMJs are impartial, grounded in facts and fair inquiry, firmly-held by the judge, stable
and intuitive, and reflect real human interests—either present day or historical. Once
these characteristics are brought to light it becomes evident why CMJs are initially
credible, not merely initially believed. Though CMJs have subjective qualities, they are
far from purely subjective judgments that lack precedence, reflect instinct or

hypothetical retrospections. This is a way of sharpening intuitions and considering moral alternatives and
human interests. It can aid in developing sympathetic knowledge.
209
Rawls 1951: 179.
210
DePaul 2006: 620 n.15.
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enculturation or are biased by ulterior motives at the hands of self-interest. These
qualities find parallels in the intuitionist’s notion of an intuition. The next section will
explore in what sense a CMJ is an intuition that one affirms under ideal conditions.
5.8 MORAL INTUITIONS
MRE adopts four requirements outlined by Robert Audi as requirements an intuition
must embody to be counted as a genuine intuition.211 While describing the four
requirements I will show how the notion of a CMJ, which is grounded in the notion of a
competent judge, meets these criteria.
The first requirement for an intuition to count as a genuine intuition is the
requirement of non-inferentiality (or directness).212 This is the requirement that intuitions
are foundational beliefs because what is intuitively known is not evidenced by inference
from premises.213 This means that a genuine intuition must not be arrived at as a
conclusion of inference. It can, however, be arrived at as a conclusion of reflection
whereby one reflects on the content of a proposition from a global perspective in relation
to its context. That a genuine intuition cannot be inferred from premises coincides with
the requirement that a CMJ is intuitive with regard to ethical principles. A CMJ cannot
be arrived at by a conscious application of principles. If CMJs are to be something
against which principles can be tested, they cannot be inferred from the principles they
211

I am using the term ‘genuine intuition’ as an intuition that meets Audi’s four requirements.
Audi 2004: 33-34.
213
This does not mean that what is not evidenced by other beliefs cannot itself serve as evidence. It simply
means that the ground of what can serve as evidence is not further beliefs or premises. Instead, the ground
is the capacity for a competent judge to form CMJs under ideal conditions. It involves the rational capacity
of the judge to form judgments that emanate from and reflect the character of the judge. Placing the focus
on what can evidence what is intuitively known also avoids implying that a proposition intuitively known is
a priori.
212
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are supposed to validate. This would threaten the method with justificatory circularity.
This is also consistent with CMJs being conclusions of reflection because, as Rawls
states, “An intuitive judgment may be consequent to a thorough inquiry into the facts of
the case, and it may follow a series of reflections on the possible effects of different
decisions....What is required is that the judgment not be determined by a systematic and
conscious use of ethical principles.”214 The goal is to reach principles that can justify
moral beliefs and can be shown to be justified. CMJs are the anchor against which this
process is elaborated. This requires CMJs to be arrived at with sufficient distance from
the principles that might later elaborate or intuitively express the CMJs.
The second requirement for a genuine intuition is the firmness requirement. An
intuition is not merely an inclination to believe because it is typically a case of belief.
Something can be intuitive without being an intuition.215 An intuition must be a
proposition that is thought to hold, and it “tends to be relinquished only through such
weighty considerations as a felt conflict with a firmly held theory or with another
intuition.”216 This account aligns with Rawls’ requirement that a CMJ be firmly-held.
The third requirement for a genuine intuition is that an adequate understanding of the
propositional content must be part of the formation of the intuition. This is the
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Rawls 1951: 183.
Audi makes this distinction with reference to perception. Regarding that which is merely intuitive, “the
data would be less clear, just as a view of an unexpected island in the fog is less clear than it would be in
sunlight and provides less reason to alter one’s map” (Audi 2004: 34). I part ways, however, with Audi by
reserving the term evidential weight for degrees of confidence (belief) along with credence (likelihood of
truth); whereas, Audi mentions that evidential weight need not be denied to intuitive propositions, but that
intuitions proper have much more evidential weight. I hold that genuine intuitions have degrees of
confidence, but they only possess evidential weight once their tendency toward truth has been assessed. It
is possible that being held firmly or confidently can increase the evidential value of the intuition, but both
confidence and truth must be present for the intuition to have evidential weight.
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comprehension requirement. When considering a proposition an intuition may quickly
arise in response, but when there are many conflicting human interests reflection may
take awhile to properly understand the proposition. Adequate understanding is a gradable
notion and a minimal amount of adequate understanding is required for a proposition to
be genuine. The upshot of this is that, “this kind of basis of a belief tends both to produce
cognitive firmness and to enhance evidential value.”217 Understanding can add to the
evidential value of an intuition, and it can produce a firmness with which an intuition is
held. This connects to the notion of a CMJ because one is required to feel sure of the
CMJ. Feeling sure results from cognitive firmness—the fact that one has a firm grasp of
the content of the proposition.
The fourth requirement of a genuine intuition is the pretheoreticality requirement.
This means that intuitions are not, of necessity, ground on theories for their support, and
intuitions are also not held as theoretical hypotheses. To avoid confusion it is important
to recognize that it is possible for the content of intuitions to be inferentially justified or
held on the basis of a theory. Non-inferential justification is not the only type of
justification that can justify an intuition. However, for the intuition to be genuine the
intuition must not be held as a theoretical hypothesis or based on a premise. The crucial
question is, “How is the intuition in fact held?”218 This links-up with the notion of a CMJ
in that a group of principles can constitute a theory and a CMJ cannot be evidentially
ground in a principle to receive its prima facie justification, its initial credibility.
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These four requirements act as a baseline for testing the genuineness of intuitions.
Intuitions that meet all four criteria continue on to the next round in the MRE process.
The baseline for being an intuition does not exhaust the requirements for being a CMJ.
This is why genuine intuitions must continue to the next stage where they are validated as
being veridical. The four requirements of a genuine intuition ensure that the belief is held
in the right way to count as an intuition. Aspects of a CMJ that the four requirements fail
to capture are: that the outcome of the judgment is not tied to merit and demerit incurred
by the judge, the judgment concerns an actual case (either current or historical) with real
human interests in conflict, the judgment was made with a reflection on all the facts of
the case, and the judgment has precedence and is shared by other judges. This is why the
four requirements for being a genuine intuition is a test appropriate to the confidence it is
reasonable to have in a belief, but it is not appropriate to the truth of the belief because
the belief has not survived a vetting process aimed to identify purely subjective
judgments that are likely to reflect suspicious formative factors and distorting epistemic
factors. As Audi mentions, “absence of all bias is apparently not part of the concept of
an intuition.”219 The same holds for the concept of a CMJ. Though all bias is not
eliminated during the filtration process there is a progression toward less bias and the
elimination of purely subjective judgments. Bias can also be identified and corrected as
CMJs are extended in the form of principles. It is reasonable to view MRE as a process
of the successive elimination of biases as CMJs are systematized and brought into a state
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of ultima facie justification. With this thought in mind I proceed to the next section
where the three filters are explained.
5.9 THE THREE FILTERS
Once a proposition is firmly held, adequately comprehended, and pre-theoretically
and non-inferentially formed it is ready to pass through a series of filters on its way to
becoming a full-fledged CMJ. Now I will motivate the move from the traditional RE
filters to the robust three-fold filters.
As traditionally understood, there are two general conditions RE filters are thought to
capture. The first condition can be formulated as the principle of general reliability
(PGR). The principle can be stated as follows:
(PGR) Moral beliefs formed under conditions generally conducive to the formation
of true beliefs will be more reliable than moral beliefs not formed under these
conditions.220
PGR assumes that a belief, when formed under the right conditions, will be reliable.
To be reliable is to be truth-conducive. So, a belief formed under conditions of general
reliability is more likely to be true. These conditions capture a great deal of what it
means for an intuition to be a CMJ. Generally reliable cognitive conditions have the
following traits: good inference patterns, based on nonmoral evidence (i.e., wellinformed), not distorted by prejudice or self-interest, held with confidence, made in a
moment of emotional equanimity and stable over time.221 When a further condition is
added to the principle of general reliability all of the outstanding elements, which were
220
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not captured by the notion of a genuine intuition, are captured to make an intuition a
CMJ. This is the requirement for impartial and imaginative consideration of the interests
of the relevant parties in a given case. Greater reliability is generated when a competent
judge uses her capacities for imaginative consideration of the interests of others and from
that impartial perspective formulates a judgment about the case.
The two general conditions of reliability alone do not produce an intuition with
probative force. To cite one example, intuitions formed in an emotionally calm moment
are not always evidential.222 Calmness cannot always ascribe credibility to CMJs
because there are cases where arousal of moral emotions can lead to the correct
judgment. If one discards an intuition formed when one has an overwhelming sense of
moral indignation and disgust this can lead one away from the correct moral assessment
of the situation. Indignation may have non-inferential evidential value. As Audi
indicates, “This is certainly possible where the emotion is produced as an appropriate
response to the relevant base properties, such as flogging or lying, properties that would
directly support the corresponding moral judgment.”223 Adding an intuitionist
perspective to the filter conditions allows for a more accurate assessment. Instead of
requiring emotional equanimity as a condition of reliability what is required is a
fittingness relation between the emotions and the base properties, which may be
perceptually ground or ground in certain cognitions (i.e., memorial impressions). With
this revision to the emotional component the first filter is established. It is called the
222

See Sencerz 1986 for a sustained argument against the principle of general reliability, and for a specific
argument against the evidential value of emotional calmness see pp. 80-82 of the paper.
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Audi 2004: 56. This sentiment is corroborated by DePaul when he states, “feelings of moral outrage
reliably indicate egregious wrongdoings” (DePaul 1993: 17).
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occasional epistemic distorting factors filter.224 It recognizes that certain factors can
interfere with one’s ability to correctly form epistemic judgments. If an intuition is made
under conditions of insufficient information, intoxication, inattention, bias, haste or lack
of fittingness between emotions and base properties, then it is likely to be false or
misguided. Despite the first layer of protection against misguided intuitions becoming
CMJs there is another filter that is needed. This filter specializes in uncovering bias and
prejudice that emanates from enculturation or a tainted source.
A common element in the input objection is insistence that CMJs may merely reflect
familial and cultural indoctrination that could have been different if one had been raised
in a different family or lived in a different culture. Our moral intuitions may be
subjective in that they simply reflect views that have been, “inculcated into us by parents,
teachers and society from childhood.”225 Brandt agrees with Singer and Hare’s
assessment and argues that our goal should be to step outside our own tradition and
objectively access the facts of the case. Against this idea Scanlon argues, “The aim of
Moral Enquiry is not to justify our ‘considered judgments’ with reference to some new
and independent standard, but to clarify the reasons that we already had for believing
them to be correct and to determine whether, in the light of reflection, we still find them
persuasive.”226 The ultimate credibility of our CMJs is not going to be found in an everelusive culturally-neutral vantage point. The goal is not to seek a culturally-neutral
standard, but to use a standard that is capable of sorting good from bad enculturation.
224

I borrow this term from Copp 1984.
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prejudice, and no amount of reflection can make that a solid basis for morality” (Hare 1981: 12).
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The goal is to minimize the influence of pernicious prejudice and bias by using a standard
that stands outside, yet is implied within, the system of beliefs being evaluated. To
address this concern I turn to the next filter.
The next filter is the suspicious formative factors filter. This filter seeks to further
mitigate the influence of inadequate familial and cultural training. It is important to
realize that not all formative factors are negative. Some familial, cultural and religious
training is consistent with forming CMJs that are truth-conducive. Moral disagreement is
a related topic, but it can be addressed apart from factors that tend to degrade the quality
of moral judgments one tends to make. To mitigate the influence of negative formative
factors on one’s judgments it is important to generate sensitivity to the factors that
negatively influence one’s cognitive attitudes. These factors decrease the flexibility of a
judge’s cognition in a given situation, making it rigid to the point of missing the truth of
the situation. These factors cloud one’s apprehension of objective moral truth.227 A
judge’s cognitive flexibility is influenced by the degree to which:
•
•
•
•
•

One’s early moral training and environment were authoritarian.
One is stubborn.
One is intellectually self-confident, or has intellectual courage.
One is able to admit error to others and to oneself.
One is influenced by authority.
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My theory could be understood along the lines of virtue epistemology. Such a reading would focus on
the development of the moral agent in an effort to increase the efficacy of making moral judgments.
However, the filters train inquirers to spot factors that distort judgment making. The filters are not overtly
designed to cultivate epistemic virtues. It is possible that possessing epistemic virtues would bolster one’s
ability to filter intuitions, but such a positive program of character development is not central to running
judgments through the filters. The filters institute a negative program of eliminating bad judgments. Yet,
there might be a pragmatic argument in this area such that possessing epistemic virtues would enable one to
make better judgments and, as a result, require less filtering of judgments made under the influence of
distorting factors.
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•

One’s interests and the interests of one’s fellows depend on the general
acceptance of one’s views.228

Copp posits these factors and claims that conservative foundationalism cannot deal
with these factors because, “there is no fact of the matter as to what our considered
judgments would be like were our early moral training not to have been at all
authoritarian, and were our moral views not to have been at all influenced by anyone’s
self-interest, by our class background, or by the culture of our society.”229 Copp is right
that there is no absolute fact-of-the-matter as to what our judgments would be if they
were free from the influence of any distorting factors. CMJs still operate within the
realm of fallibility and what appears to be the fact-of-the-matter at one time may appear
to not be the fact-of-the-matter at another time. However, if one is sensitive to the
influence of one’s early moral training and how an authoritarian upbringing makes one
more prone to blind submission to authority, then one is able to recognize the influence of
this attraction to assent to propositions that favor one’s upbringing in this regard. This
may produce a heightened need for reflection on intuitions that take authority at face
value or true in virtue of emanating from an authoritative source. This covers two of the
formative factors mentioned by Copp. The other factors one must screen for in one’s
intuitions are low intellectual self-confidence, stubbornness, pride and the desire for
acceptance. These factors can cloud one’s ability to see moral situations for what they
are and form correct judgments. For example, if a judge was raised by parents who
struggled with obvious pride issues, then one may be more inclined to lie in situations
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where one has the opportunity to admit one has made a mistake. The judgment that one
must lie to protect one’s sense of self and reputation is emanating from a place
conditioned by negative formative factors. The true moral judgment is that one ought to
tell the truth and take responsibility for one’s actions and the harm one’s mistakes may
have caused. This is because lying to protect one’s pride only tends to perpetuate more
problems and not allow for an accurate assessment of what happened and why it
happened. The desire for acceptance, the trait of stubbornness and low intellectual selfconfidence can produce similar false judgments of situations where one is confronted
with moral issues or human interests that conflict. Though there may be a fact-of-thematter with regard to what is morally true one cannot reasonably expect that by making
judgments under ideal conditions one will reach CMJs that are all free from distorting
factors.230 One would need something like perfect cognition, if not omniscience, to be
able to apprehend all facts-of-the-matter under idealized conditions. One’s cognitive
capacities are limited and the complexities of actual human interests far outstrip one’s
ability to perfectly apprehend and judge the moral truth in a given situation. Despite this,
the cognitive filters mitigate against gross errors of judgment. They also progressively
allow one to triangulate on the moral truth as one discards judgments that are distorted.
CMJs may not ever totally capture the moral fact-of-the-matter, but they can serve as
evidence of objective moral truth and in that regard credibly serve as foundations for
one’s normative theorizing and normative conclusions.
230

This brings to mind a some/all distinction. Ideal conditions do not require all CMJs to be free from
distorting factors. The conditions only increase the probability that some CMJs are free from distorting
factors. The CMJs that are distorted but still make it through initial filtration are likely to be exposed or
revised as CMJs are systematized.
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The final filter is the mixed error menagerie.231 This last filter aims at addressing
wide-spread sources of error that lead to disagreement. If beliefs and intuitions aim at
truth, then people will tend to agree with each other when they see the truth; yet, in the
moral realm great disagreement persists. Disagreement persists because error exists and
people are fallible human agents. Michael Huemer summarizes this point as follows:
People seldom satisfy ideal conditions for reasoning, and even the best of
cognitive conditions do not render humans infallible. The causes of our beliefs
can be highly complex and largely hidden from us. We often cannot articulate
some of the reasons for our beliefs. The intuitionist can no more produce an
algorithm for computing the correct moral theory than we can produce a general
algorithm for computing correct empirical theories.232
MRE is not a decision procedure or an algorithm for computing moral truth.233 It is a
procedure that when followed tends to produce beliefs more likely to be true and
justified. A competent moral judge is competent in virtue of possessing capacities for
reasonableness. A competent judge, however, is not immune from errors that can occur
during the procedure. A competent judge is, however, disposed toward looking out for
such errors and correcting such errors when they are discovered. Now I will discuss the
details of the mixed error menagerie.
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This entire thesis opened by discussing an objection by Daniel Bonevac. Bonevac’s assumption is that
RE is a decision procedure that must attain the criteria of logical consistency and theoretical completeness.
The problem with this assumption is it reduces the human to an inference machine, and it reduces the
complexity of moral decision making down to generating a well-formed formula. The problem with this
assumption is articulated by Huemer when he says, “While beliefs in some sense aim at the truth, people’s
beliefs may gratify many other passions besides the rational hankering after the truth. Nor do the canons of
logic and critical thinking algorithmically determine what is and what isn’t a bad argument” (Ibid: 137).
Thus, in some sense, Bonevac generated a straw man argument that was easily knocked down. MRE is a
messy procedure to a certain degree and cannot be reduced to a logical decision procedure that is
guaranteed to reach a point of final equilibrium. Assessing whether RE is a non-terminating procedure
assumes it is a decision procedure. Under such a rubric it is doomed to failure as such.
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The mixed error menagerie affords the competent judge a last opportunity to screen
the set of CMJs for mistaken CMJs. The competent judge is to screen the CMJs with an
eye for eliminating CMJs that may reflect the following errors: bias, miscalculation,
confusion, misunderstanding and lack of understanding, oversight, hasty judgments, false
or incomplete information, unarticulated assumptions, stubbornness, fallacies,
forgetfulness, intrinsic difficulty of issues, inarticulate evidence, and mental defects. The
mixed error menagerie contains some elements in the previous two filters, and it also
contains greater specificity of some previous filter criteria. There are also new criteria in
the filter and some criteria that touch on the four requirements that make an intuition
genuine. This filter acts as a final validation before the set of moral intuitions that
survive the filtering process are coined prima facie credible and ready to be used to
justify moral principles. I will paraphrase each criterion in the filter as articulated by
Huemer and connect the criterion with previous steps in MRE.234
Bias toward self-interest often results in error in apprehending moral truth. This can
occur when one wants to believe what it is in one’s interest to believe. It can also occur
when one does not want to believe something that is true. Bias can be shaped by pride, a
yearning for acceptance by a community, or wishful thinking concerning what one wants
to be true. This filter criterion connects with being a competent judge because being a
competent judge requires considering the interests of others, not just what it is in one’s
interest to believe. Bias also connects with the occasional epistemic distorting factors
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and the suspicious formative factors filters. Notice the strength with which MRE
combats bias and prejudice.
Miscalculation occurs when a judge makes a mistake. Despite being a competent
judge this can occur when one makes a mistake in reflecting on the dynamics of a moral
case. Confusion occurs when one fails to distinguish two things that seem similar. An
example of this error is someone who thinks that talking requires using language so one
cannot talk about the language-independent realm. Misunderstanding, or lack of
understanding, occurs when concepts and theories are misunderstood. A moral judge has
a genuine intuition when there is proper understanding. It is possible, though, that an
intuition masquerading as a genuine intuition has survived to this point in the process.
This is why it is important for the moral judge to screen for this type of error before the
intuitions become CMJs. Oversight occurs when a judge fails to notice important
considerations. This can occur when judgments are made but an important element is
overlooked or it can occur from selective attention. Hasty judgments occur when a judge
makes a judgment based on an initial impression or gut-reaction. This punctuates the
importance of using non-inferential reflection to attain adequate understanding. Errors
from false or incomplete information occur when not all facts relevant to making a
judgment are known. An example of this is two judges discussing abortion. One judge
has consulted pro-life literature and one has consulted pro-choice literature. Some of the
information might be false, and both judges do not possess complete information about
abortion. Unarticulated assumptions occur when an assumption is operating in the
background and controlling the judgment. If, for example, a judge is arguing for pro-life
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when it comes to abortion and the other is arguing against pro-life, they may be arguing
past each other because the pro-life judge is operating under the assumption abortion is
murder while the other judge is operating under the assumption it is terminating a cluster
of cells. Stubbornness can impact willingness to examine old beliefs in light of new
evidence. Perhaps an intuition stems from a refusal to reflect on the evidence at hand.
This criterion is also covered by the notion of a competent judge and the suspicious
formative factors filter. Fallacies occur when poor forms of reasoning guide judgment
making. Examples include, denying the antecedent, equivocation, begging the question
and non sequitur arguments. This criterion is not as relevant to intuitions because they
are largely based on reflection and not explicit inference, but is it possible that, say, the
naturalistic fallacy has been committed when one has the intuition that because
something is natural it is good. Forgetfulness can occur when one fails to remember
important factors in the process of reflection. Leaving such factors out can lead to
incorrect judgments. Errors can also result from the intrinsic difficulty of issues. Some
propositions with complex content require a great deal of reflection before they can be
properly understood and intuited. If one stops the process of reflection prior to grasping
an intrinsically difficult issue or fails to reflect on the interests of all relevant parties, then
one’s resulting intuition about the case may be in error. Inarticulate evidence occurs
when there are grounds for a belief that one is unable to articulate. This kind of evidence
often occurs when one is forming an intuition and one is unable to articulate the basis for
the intuition. The point is not to eliminate intuitions that one cannot recognize the
evidence for; rather, the point is to recognize those intuitions that one cannot articulate
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the evidence for and ensure that one still has confidence in those intuitions. Mental
defects are hedged against by the first step in the MRE process. Part of being a
competent moral judge involves having average intelligence and good cognitive
functioning. If, for example, one is a paranoid schizophrenic it will be difficult for that
person to distinguish delusions from veridical judgments.
Huemer detailed the menageries of error to show how disagreement is possible
within an intuitionist framework. I packaged the criteria into the mixed error menagerie
and deployed it in the service of vetting intuitions prior to them becoming CMJs. This
move is strategic because it puts MRE well on the way to addressing the problem of
disagreement. It embeds criteria for identifying common sources of error that lead to
disagreement in the criteria for what it takes to become a CMJ. This means CMJs are
less likely to be the kinds of things people disagree over. If disagreement persists then it
is possible to look at the filters and identify how one of the judges made a mistake. This
facilitates a convergence toward truth, and it solves the problem of explaining the
credibility of CMJs prior to the end-point of RE. The story that can be told is that people,
even competent moral judges, are prone to error, and CMJs are credible to the degree that
the judge mitigates these errors from creeping into the set of CMJs.
In closing this section, given the four requirements for constituting an intuition and
the three filters an intuition must get through to become a CMJ, a CMJ cannot be readily
equated with a prejudice or a mere subjective reflection of cultural and familial
indoctrination. The reason this objection is commonly leveled against RE is because the
method only uses the first filter (i.e., occasional epistemic distorting factors) in its
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unrevised form and a confidence index as the sole factors bestowing credibility on CMJs.
By contrast, on many different levels, a CMJ is evaluated and benchmarked against
general and moral standards that vindicate placing confidence in the CMJ and vindicate
believing that the CMJ is likely to be true. Judgments are not certified as credible simply
by the confidence we place in them. Given these considerations, MRE has undermined
the claim that CMJs represent prejudices or mere subjective judgments that may have a
status no better than fictions.235
5.10 ASSIGNING EVIDENTIAL WEIGHT
Now that CMJs are established as credible they are ready to be assigned credence
values according to how likely they are to be true. CMJs arrive at this stage in the
process with a certain degree of belief or confidence attached to them. The credibility of
the CMJs stems from having subjective degrees of confidence validated in a searching
and objective way. Filters act to instill a measure of objectivity into the process. In this
stage the competent judge takes another look at the CMJs and prepares them for the
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As brought to my attention by Richard Tieszen, I recognize the potential for conflicts between the three
filters. The biggest source of conflict may be between the suspicious formative factors filter and the mixed
error menagerie. The formative factors filter screens for bias as a result of cognitive inflexibility (i.e.,
missing the moral truth because of patterns of thinking that prevent accurate belief updating in light of new
evidence). If, for example, one is raised in an authoritarian home, then certain beliefs about liberty
connected with the values of democracy or beliefs about women’s role in society may impact the ability to
correctly judge the moral truth in issues of free speech or women’s rights. There may be cases, however,
where such an upbringing is conducive to perceiving the moral truth. That is, one may refuse to bend in the
face of pressure (e.g., from society or a peer group) that what is morally wrong is actually morally right.
As an example of conflict between the filters one might not have formed a belief as a result of acceptance
of one’s views (e.g., from a peer group), yet when the belief passes to the next round it is discovered that
the lack of acceptance also reflects a lack of input from one’s peers, which may have resulted in
miscalculation of the dynamics of the moral case. The second filter says the belief is not problematic, but,
because of the same criteria that allowed the belief to pass through the second filter, the belief is identified
as problematic in the third filter. I take such a case and other potential scenarios to reinforce the
importance of having all three filters in place. Despite the potential for conflict, what one filter may miss
the other filter may catch.
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revision process by assigning to them credence values in relation to the estimated truthvalue of the beliefs. This involves putting a number or a relative ranking on a person’s
degrees of belief. The higher the credence level a CMJ enjoys the higher the degree of
justification it possesses. CMJs with higher credence values will impact principles
differently than CMJs with lower credence values.
An inquirer assigns a probability value to each CMJ according to the level of
confidence the inquirer has in the truth of the judgment. These assertions might have the
following form: moral judge X judges that p is the case to degree of strength c. This is
assigning evidential weight to the CMJs. Such a procedure is warranted because of the
capacities of the moral judge and the constitution of the CMJs being assessed (i.e.,
genuine intuitions made under ideal conditions that have survived filtering). This is why
credences correspond to credibilities. After assigning credence values to the CMJs the
CMJs are ranked relative to each other according to their credence values.236 Now that
these values are assigned it is important to consider a common objection to RE and to the
idea of assigning subjective probability values to beliefs.
The charge of conservatism against RE takes many forms. The most general
objection of conservatism is the idea that moral convictions simply reflect the status
quo.237 It is clear that this version of conservatism is not problematic for MRE. Most
CMJs are not formed on the basis of cultural and familial indoctrination. They are not
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a measure of accuracy to the procedure. The upshot of using credences is it allows for a measure of how
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does not like assigning numbers to beliefs one can use a relative ranking and say: I hold CMJ1 to be truer
than CMJ2 and but not truer than CMJ3.
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held because they are what one was taught to believe or what one was modeled while
growing up. They are held because they pass extensive filter tests that separate prereflective from reflective intuitions, biased intuitions from unbiased intuitions, and false
intuitions from true intuitions. It is highly likely that beliefs in the set of initial CMJs are
not made on the basis of reflecting the status quo or cultural conditioning.
Another variety of the conservatism charge is made against conservative
foundationalism, which MRE seems to be a version of at first glance. Conservative
foundationalism would, “portray our idealized considered moral judgments as
epistemically basic beliefs that, together with other basic beliefs, provide the basis for
any other justified beliefs but are justified themselves without need of grounding.”238
The modest intuitionism adopted by MRE guards against this claim because basic beliefs
(CMJs) are not “without need of grounding” they are simply without need of grounding
in other beliefs. Instead, they are ground in one’s ability to intuit non-inferential beliefs.
Further, the charge of conservatism has its greatest force in relation to coherence theory.
As Copp states:
Conservative coherence theories of moral justification face a dilemma. On the
one hand, unless there is a prior reason to think that considered moral judgments
in ideal circumstances would be credible, there is not reason to treat them as a
standard of justification....On the other hand, if there is a justification of them that
is prior to the account provided in the conservative theory, then the theory is not a
fully general account of the justification of moral judgments. Hence, even if such
a prior justification is avoidable, it would be an error to build a conservative
constraint into a theory that is intended as a general theory of moral
justification.239
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The dilemma Copp poses is not as pressing for conservative foundationalism as
embraced by MRE. This is another benefit of going the foundationalist/intuitionist route:
it is quickly able to discharge the objection of conservatism. This has the added benefit
of being able to nullify DePaul’s move towards a radical, as opposed to a conservative,
interpretation of RE.
DePaul held that the input objection shows that the conservative version of RE is
untenable. This is because moral beliefs have truth-values and persistent moral
disagreement shows that many moral beliefs are false and not credible. This means
initial credence levels are not credible. As discussed in the previous section, moral
disagreement is the result of errors and the mere fact of moral disagreement does not
impugn holding that moral beliefs are truth-conducive and credence values, expressing
evidential weight, correspond to credibilities. DePaul thought that a method that used
credence values cannot reliability generate credible beliefs, so a radical interpretation of
RE was called for so that prior degrees of commitment to beliefs do not hold sway in the
revision process. One could have a conversion experience and disregard credence values
all together. One could radically alter one’s belief-set without paying homage to prior
commitments.240 The move to radical-RE is founded on a lack of explanation of the
variety of ways moral disagreement can occur and embedding those ways into a
heightened sensitivity to those factors prior to one assigning credence values. DePaul’s
240

While DePaul’s method sounds plausible it leads to a Wild West of moral belief formation and
justification. Without clear steps or guidelines and simply leaving it up to the inquirer to determine what
standards to apply and licensing the undermining of all prior commitments in an instant leads to a theory of
moral justification that is highly random and subjective. DePaul tries to provide some levity to the
procedure by urging people to seek out formative experiences like reading a good book or poetry, but this is
DePaul imposing a constraint of what constitutes a good experience and what constitutes a bad formative
experience. Again, this is an external standard that, from within his version of RE, should be ignored.
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book length treatment of RE and his adoption of the radical version of RE is founded on
this mistake. MRE, however, has corrected this mistake and held it is reasonable to use
credence values in RE and that credence values correspond to credibilities.
MRE embraces conservatism or degrees of commitment as an operating cost of
proposing a method of reflection in the mold of RE. It uses this factor in a productive
way and avoids the objection that using a mere confidence index does not produce
credibility.241
5.11 PRINCIPLES
Now that the set of CMJs is established the next stage involves formulating
principles that match the CMJs. These principles can be inferred as premises from the
CMJs. By applying these premises one can see if one is led to the CMJs they seek to
account for. Another way to formulate principles is to conjecture principles that one
thinks may account for the CMJs. Inference may work in cases where the set of CMJs
lend themselves to an obvious set of principles whereas conjecture may work in cases
where one is unsure how a general principle can be inferred from a specific CMJ or a set
of CMJs. This use of principles matches the intuitionist model of justification and raises
an objection.
An objection to the incorporation of intuitionist elements in MRE hinges on the
directionality of justification. For many intuitionists, “knowledge of singular moral
241

This also avoids dropping the confidence constraint all together because it is not a reliable guide to
revision. Knight 2006 drops confidence and allows in all judgments that meet general conditions of
reliability. MRE generates greater precision of judgments. This acts as a guide to revision when
comparing a bunch of judgments one has little confidence in with a single judgment one has great
confidence in. The individual has actual numbers or comparative rankings to determine whether the group
of judgments possesses greater evidential weight than the single weighty judgment.
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judgments is epistemically prior to knowledge of moral principles.”242 This reflects a
particularist orientation to the discovery of moral truths. According to the objection, if
principles are ground in the capacity to form singular judgments, then it is possible that
principles will only reflect the CMJs of the judge going through the process. In such a
case, there would be as many valid moral principles as there are different judges with
different CMJs. This represents another variety of a subjectivist objection to RE because
there is no guarantee that generally held principles will ever be reached. The first
response to this claim comes from within MRE. One of the requirements of the
occasional epistemic distorting factors filter is the requirement for impartial and
imaginative consideration of the interests of the relevant parties in a given case. Though
CMJs are particular judgments, which are made at all levels of generality, they are not
exhausted by the interests of the judge making the judgment. Part of the definition of a
CMJ is that the judgment is stable for the judge across time and shared by other
competent judges. Thus, MRE is capable of handling the objection that there would as
many valid principles as there are moral judges.
Another way of responding to the subjectivist charge against MRE’s moral principles
is by drawing a distinction between establishing ethical principles as valid and knowing
ethical principles are valid.243 A moral judge can claim that principles are valid for all
people, but not know that the principles are in fact valid for all people. It could turn out
that the moral judge is mistaken. However, as Regan clarifies, “Having admitted my
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fallibility, it does not follow that I am advocating principles valid for me alone.”244
Fallibility need not lead to subjectivism. If a competent moral judge correctly follows the
MRE procedure that judge can reasonably claim those principles are binding on all
because the principles account for generally shared intuitions and the interests of the
relevant parties to the moral dilemma. It is reasonable for one to claim that competent
judges who make ideal moral judgments about which principles to accept would reach a
consensus about which principles are binding on all people. What the competent judge
cannot claim is that she would know what principles any or all competent judges would
choose. Despite not knowing that the universal application of the principles is validated,
due to fallibility, competent judges still can claim the principles arrived at are binding. In
closing this section it is important to consider another way MRE is similar to yet different
from intuitionism.
In relation to moderate intuitionism MRE allows that moral principles can become
intuitions, but it does not endorse the self-evidence of moral principles. If MRE endorsed
self-evidence it would be possible to simply apprehend the truth of moral principles
without going through CMJs. This would defeat the purpose of principles being ground
in CMJs. The way RE is typically mentioned as being compatible with a moderate
intuitionist schema is as an additional (optional) method that can be used to increase the
justification of moral principles, but RE itself is not necessary for the justification of
moral principles. MRE, by contrast, requires moral principles to be validated as ultima
facie justified in reference to moral intuitions. Locating the set of principles that best
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cohere with the modest foundations produces ultimate justification, not simply
apprehending prima facie duties (principles) and applying the principles to a given case
to discover the resultant duty that justifies the correct action in a given case. For the
intuitionist, RE is an additional procedure that can add to the justification of the beliefset, but it is not, of necessity, integral to generating justification. Despite this difference
between a strict moderate foundationalist model and the model of MRE that incorporates
some intuitionist elements there is a similarity between what the models allow for in
terms of principles.
A principle can become an intuition at a later point in time. This idea is captured by
DePaul’s admission that:
[A] principle originally formulated via inference from a number of intuitive
judgments about particular cases can come to be an intuition itself. In such a
case, the principle would at first, and perhaps for some time, have been believed
on the basis of its best explaining a range of intuitive judgments. But at some
point the principle would come to seem true in its own right, and would be
believed on the basis of seeming true rather than on the basis of inference.245
Under the MRE model a principle can become self-evident, but its self-evidence
comes via the ground of being properly situated with CMJs. After a period of being
situated with CMJs the principle can become self-evident or seem true in its own right.
However, its self-evidence was precipitated by and dependent upon its role in explaining
CMJs. Self-evidence cannot bypass this necessary step on the way to a principle
appearing true in its own right. On the contrary, for Audi, the ground of self-evidence is
first and foremost adequate understanding—looking at the proposition the right way can
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reveal its truth.246 If this were the case one would not need to go through the process of
forming principles out of intuitions. Principles could be justified from the start simply by
attaining a proper understanding of the content of the proposition. In such a model,
understanding is both necessary and sufficient for justification. On the MRE model,
adequate understanding is necessary but not sufficient for forming justified beliefs. The
intuition here is that one does not adequately grasp a principle until one is able to apply
the principle or see its consequences in particular judgments in specific cases. Out of
apprehending what principles entail, self-evidence emerges; self-evidence emerges out of
the systematization of CMJs. There is no shortcut to this process by simply reflecting on
a principle in the right way. Principles are conclusions of inference that can become
intuitive at a later point in time.247
5.12 REVISION
At this point in the MRE process CMJs have been formulated and principles that
match the CMJs have been inferred or conjectured. The next stage in the process
involves revising the principles in an effort to discover the set of principles that best
cohere with the modest foundations (the CMJs). This is how emphasis is placed on the
CMJs. However, some principles may resist revision or continue to re-appear in the set
of principles even as one revises or discards the principles to bring the total set of
principles more in-line with the CMJs. This is an indication that some CMJs need to be
246
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revised. In this case, one retains the resistive principles and revises the CMJs so that they
are better in-line with the principles. As one revises the CMJs one should work from the
CMJs with less evidential weight toward the CMJs with more evidential weight. Because
the CMJs have been ranked according to numerical or lexical standards there is less
guesswork when it comes to knowing the next proposition to revise.248 Hooker
illuminates the need for this methodological principle while discussing a competent
judge’s belief that the principles arrived at in RE should be obeyed, “If the modest
foundationalist theory of justification is correct then she will still be justified in this
belief, so long as, in the course of attaining equilibrium between her beliefs, she was most
willing to revise those beliefs with the least prima facie credibility.”249 What about a case
where there are two equally credible beliefs in need of revision? In a case where one
holds CMJ1 with .5 credence and CMJ2 with equal credence, and there are no CMJs held
with lesser credence, then one may resolve the conflict using the criterion of intuitiveness
for which the CMJ that elicits a greater sense of non-inferential credibility is revised last.
The next step involves continuing to work from both ends, revising principles and CMJs
as needed, until one converges on a state of maximal coherence or mutual support.
At this point it is important to consider other hidden assumptions or background
principles that one finds intuitive in relation to the set of CMJs. Apply these principles to
the belief set and revise the CMJs, the principles, or the background principles as needed.
When CMJs and principles are maximally coherent one has achieved moderate reflective
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equilibrium (MRE). As new experience, either empirical or informational, is encountered
revise current commitments in light of new experience to achieve a belief-set that is more
comprehensive and fully justified. Also, revise beliefs as one intuits new moral
convictions and infers or conjectures principles from those convictions. Now I will
mention another consideration—simplicity.
The consideration of simplicity comes out of a question Brandt mentions: “one might
say that a ‘coherent’ system is one that maximizes the ‘initial credibility’ (but is this the
same as degree of firmness?) of the relevant beliefs. Is there a significant place for
considerations of simplicity in the choice of what is to be accepted?”250 To answer
Brant’s question embed in parentheses “initial credibility” or evidential weight cannot be
equated to firmness, although firmness is one component of a CMJs evidential weight.
Regarding Brandt’s main question, MRE does allow for considerations of simplicity in
the choice of what is accepted and revised. The primary concern is the maximization of
evidential weight, but a secondary concern might be simplicity.251 The objection raised
by Brant is that RE’s preoccupation with maximizing initial credibility neglects other
important epistemic desiderata. MRE allows for simplicity, for example, to guide
reflection in cases of conflict where beliefs are equally credible or once initial credibility
has been maximized to shift to considering the simplicity or elegance of the belief
system.
Another consideration worth exploring is that without the method being a decision
procedure guaranteed to reach an end-point in a finite amount of time it is not clear that
250
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one will ever reach MRE or know when to stop revising. This objection stems from
Bonevac taking RE to be a decision procedure and then concluding that, based on logical
considerations, RE possesses its own halting problem. This motivated Bonevac in the
direction of pragmatic intuitionism. Despite not being able to reach equilibrium it is
possible on Bonevac’s model to hold that judgments and principles that are stable under
reflection are true. These judgments are not stouthearted principles like the ones Rawls
proposed (i.e., his two principles of justice); instead, they are unruly principles that
always admit of exceptions and fallibility. One always seeks normative justification in
the face of a plurality of competing principles.252 I escape Bonevac’s objection because I
have shifted in a moderate intuitionist direction and not tried to articulate the process as a
decision procedure. The modest foundations are not stouthearted, and the halting
problem does not apply to a process that is not interpreting sets of beliefs along the lines
of completeness and decidability. The competent moral judge determines when the sets
are decidable and when the process can come to an end.
MRE’s adoption of an intuitionist criterion of reflection provides an answer to the
objection that MRE might be a process that never reaches a state of equilibrium. Walter
Sinnott-Armstrong raises a similar objection against Audi’s view on reflection when he
says that knowing when to stop reflecting requires forming a second-order belief that
reflection is complete. This would work against Audi’s claim that reflection can noninferentially justify beliefs because one would need to infer from a second-order belief
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that one’s reflection is adequate and one may stop reflecting. Audi responds to this
objection in the following way:
Much as, when we look into a room to see if the table is set, we stop when we see
enough, we can stop reflecting on whether a poem’s language is artificial when
we read enough. This is usually when we reach the judgment we sought to make
(or some judgment that brings a sense of closure). Again, we may believe we
have reflected long enough; but we need neither believe this nor have a criterion
for its truth in order to reflect enough to make a judgment. Compare, too,
recognizing a painting, which may require simply looking at it until its identity
‘hits us.’253
Audi is responding to Sinnott-Armstrong within the context of non-inferential
reflection that generates prima facie justified intuition. The same concept applies to the
MRE process as a whole. Because MRE involves intuitive judgment throughout the
entire process, and intuitive judgment involves affirming something when it is
accompanied by a sense of non-inferential credibility, it is plausible that one could form a
global intuitive judgment about the non-inferential credibility of the entire belief-set.254
Similar remarks can be made about knowing when to start reflecting again and when new
experience should prompt one to revise current commitments.255
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6. CONCLUSION
6.1

UPSHOTS
In concluding it will be beneficial to cover some of the upshots of the method.

Recalling DePaul’s distinction between the epistemic status and the epistemic role of a
moral intuition, it is now possible to see that MRE is a best case scenario. It uses moral
intuitions with a positive epistemic status (i.e., credibility) in an evidentiary role.
Though, in theory, moral intuitions with a negative epistemic status could be used in an
evidentiary role those intuitions are epistemically inferior to intuitions with a positive
epistemic status because negative status intuitions are less likely to point toward moral
truths or facts (i.e., they are more likely to reflect personal, familial and cultural bias).
The next thing to notice is that RE is no longer a mere metaphor. MRE avoids the
extremes of making moral justification either an algorithm or a metaphor. RE is no
longer an unattainable ideal that is ill-defined and hopelessly imprecise. Because wideRE and radical-RE made the method stretch to the point of being vacuous Daniels, Rawls
and DePaul were forced to acknowledge that RE is an unattainable ideal, a mere
metaphor.256 MRE acknowledges that not every agent will have the mental or moral

when to stop and start reflecting, which blocks objections of a non-terminating procedure or an endless
cycle of evidence gathering.
256
This avoids having to makes comments like this, “With respect to the consideration of all alternatives, it
is important to recognize that this is an ideal. In real life, were we have limited resources, there can be all
sorts of good reasons for considering certain alternatives, starting with the simple fact that we may not have
the time to do so. But it is hard to see what reason could be given for denying that the ideal should be
openness to the consideration of any alternative” (DePaul 2006: 617). Openness to any alternative is not a
virtue of a theory if it makes the theory hopelessly demanding and practically impossible to apply in real
life. Whatever gain in theoretical defeasibility is gained through the wide and radical interpretation of RE,
which I have argued is none to negligible, it is purchased at the cost of precision, non-vacuous constraints
and pragmatic applicability to actual cases.
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capacities demanded in order to realize a full justification of one’s moral beliefs. It also
restricts the scope of considerations down to a manageable breadth and provides steps for
a competent judge to follow in going through the process.
MRE adopts a moderate intuitionist perspective on intuition. This allows intuition
with certain characteristics to be suited for the task of justifying moral principles. These
intuitions are pretheoretical, non-inferential, well-comprehended and firmly grasped.
These intuitions are not inferential judgments, and, as such, they are capable of serving as
premises for inference.257 The move toward moderate intuitionism makes the intuitions
suited to serve as moderate foundations. It does not posit special faculties and
unrevisable foundations.258 A proponent of MRE can reject special faculties because
moral intuitions stem from rational capacities, yet a proponent of MRE can embrace
CMJs as revisable foundations. But MRE does not stop validating the authenticity of the
intuitions at this point. It continues to run the intuitions through three filters that sift out
intuitions that reflect cultural indoctrination— superstition, bias and mere historical
accident. Moral intuitions that survive the filtration process are deemed considered moral
judgments (CMJs), assigned evidential weight and deployed in the service of discovering
principles that match these moderate foundations and systematize them in important
ways.
MRE overcomes the input objection because there are reasons at the meta-ethical
level to consider CMJs as truth-conducive. Because some, if not most, moral intuitions
257

Audi 1997: 50-51.
This comment is made by Daniels in his Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on reflective
equilibrium, as he says concerning classical intuitionism, “Modern proponents of reflective equilibrium
reject such mysterious faculties. Indeed, they claim moral judgments are revisable, not foundational.”
258

143

that become CMJs do not embody distorting factors MRE is moving the competent judge
toward truth. As Carl Knight emphasizes, “This may be the case if some kind of realism
whose truths we are only able to comprehend by means of philosophical reflection is true.
There are, then, good metaethical reasons for believing that someone’s full reflective
belief in a moral proposition gives that proposition some credibility.”259 Moderate
intuitionism is inclined toward moral realism, so beliefs formed through intuitionist
rational capacities reasonably generate credible beliefs or beliefs that evidence truth.
Even when trying to create a meta-justification of MRE it, “seems to require MRE must
be (conditionally) truth-conducive in a way that cannot somehow be reduced to or depend
upon MRE producing convergence in opinion.”260 Thus, MRE lends itself to realism at
the meta-level, and, if realism is correct, filtering out distorted CMJs may take a
competent judge towards moral truth.
6.2 CORRECT CONCLUSIONS IN THE SLAVERY CASES
The final upshot of MRE that I will mention is that it can correctly derive
conclusions for the two historical cases presented earlier.
Case 1 involves an atheist doctor named Dr. B who lives in the South during the time
of slavery. He judges or intuits that slavery is morally unjust. As Dr. B runs this
intuition through the four requirements it is the case that the intuition is genuine. As Dr.
B runs his intuition through the three filters it makes it through the filters because: the
intuition does not reflect epistemic distorting factors, imaginative consideration of the

259
260

Knight 2006: 222.
Kappel 2006: 144.
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interests of slaves vindicates that if he were a slave he would deem slavery as unjust, the
intuition is not distorted by suspicious formative factors and it was not made under
situations that reflect a menagerie of error. The only problem with the intuition is that it
is not widely shared by the immediate community Dr. B lives in. But, because Dr. B is
well-read, he knows that his neighbors to the North widely accept his moral intuition as
credible. Dr. B infers from his intuition the principle that all people are born free and
equal regardless of their race. Slavery reflects forced labor bondage and unequal
treatment of people due to their place of origin and skin color. So, that slavery is unjust
is a CMJ that Dr. B arrives at again through application of the principle that all people are
born free and equal regardless of their race. The high credence Dr. B places in this CMJ
makes it likely that it will survive the revision process and achieve a status of ultima facie
justified.
Case 2 involves a Christian homemaker named Laura living in the South during the
time of slavery. Laura has the intuition that slavery is morally permissible. Laura runs
this intuition through the four requirements and it is indeed a genuine intuition. As Laura
runs the intuition through the three filters there are problems with the first filter. As
Laura gives imaginative consideration to the interests of slaves she realizes that if she
were a slave it would seem that slavery is unjust. The intuition fails the first filter test,
and it is discarded. Even if the first filter did not catch the falsity of the intuition and
Laura continued running the intuition through the second filter it would still fail. In the
suspicious formative factors filter Laura might realize that her early moral training was
authoritarian. Her father was a slave owner and ran his household like he did his
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slaves—with an iron fist that encouraged conformity to authority. This led Laura to takeon the moral beliefs of her father who rationalized the immoral treatment of slaves and
somehow made slavery seem morally permissible. At this point, Laura would realize her
moral intuition was not correct and discarded it before it made it to the final stage of
filtration. Even if the intuition somehow went undetected as false and made it through
the mixed error menagerie it would be in conflict with one of Laura’s Christian
principles, namely, to love your neighbor as yourself. Because of the weight Laura
places on her Christian values this principle is likely to be recalcitrant to revision and
prompt Laura to look into her set of CMJs for CMJs in conflict with this principle. She
would discover the morality of slave practices is in conflict with treating another person
as one would assent to being treated. So, she would revise the CMJ.
These examples show the power with which MRE is able to authenticate the
credibility of moral intuitions and prompt theory change.261 As intuitions become CMJs
and CMJs are systematized the ability for the procedure to uncover prejudices and biases
continues to increase. MRE’s progression of justification is an upshot of the method that
counts in favor of the method being capable of justifying moral beliefs and those beliefs
being truth-conducive.
6.3 A BRIEF RECAP
In this thesis I provided a sensible solution to the input objection to RE. This
solution reinterpreted RE along the lines of moral realism, ethical intuitionism and
261

For an articulation of how RE is a method of theory change see Harris 2005. Harris even notes a
related example of theological beliefs about sin and CMJs regarding slavery (p. 71). This example
explicitly applies to wide-RE, but background principle and beliefs can prompt new intuitions and, in that
way, be fed into the narrow-RE procedure.
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epistemic foundationalism. My solution to the input objection (i.e., moderate-RE) was
detailed in the last half of the thesis. In the first half of the thesis I set up the objection,
explored potential ways of solving the objection and motivated my specific solution by
exploring various combinations of architecture and truth. Moderate-RE was able to
correctly able to handle CMJs around the historical practice of slavery in the southern
United States. Additional upshots of moderate-RE were identified: it uses CMJs which
possess positive epistemic status in an evidentiary role, it provides steps for a competent
judge to follow in going through the process, and it takes a competent judge towards
objective moral truth while avoiding the extremes of making moral justification either an
algorithm or a mere metaphor.
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